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ABSTRACT
Postal Service and the Public: A Case Study in Public Policy
(September, 1983)
M. Elliot Vittes, B.A., William Paterson College
M.A., Cornell University, Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Jeffrey L. Sedgwick
This is a study of postal service development in the United States
from the 1770s to the present. It presents a comparative perspective on
the change of the Post Office from a government department to a public
corporation and what this transformation tells us about the American
political system's approach to public service provision.
The history of the Post Office indicates three major tensions in
the approach to postal service. There have been shifts of emphasis
within these areas, so that new accommodations in the tensions have re-
placed older ones.
The first tension is between a national Post Office Department which
was closely tied to local communities through Congress and the nature of
administration and an increasingly nationally-oriented postal corpora-
tion. The public corporate form frees the Post Office from many of the
constraints of and inputs from local conditions.
The second tension is between a politically responsive part of
government with oversight and direct involvement by the Executive and
Congress as opposed to an autonomous corporate form of organization
V
which is purposefully insulated from the operations of those two
branches of government. The change to a Post Office which is indepen-
dent from Congressional and Executive politics is intended to allow for
concentration on a businesslike approach to postal service rather than
a more political approach.
The third tension is between service demands on the Post Office
from interest groups and individuals and the goal of economic efficiency
Intended to reduce or ameliorate deficits. Service demands tended to
shape financial conditions for much of Post Office history, while re-
cently the economic stance has become a more decisive factor in service
strategies chosen by the United States Postal Service.
All three represent continuing accommodations within the American
political culture. The Post Office has always been a national institu-
tion, but the types of ties to localities have changed so that it is
presently removed from significant input from communities. Its role in
helping to promote commerce has always been important, but recent re-
forms have moved the Post Office closer to a business form, which change
its abilities or stance as a public service. Finally, there have always
been financial constraints on the Post Office, but whereas earlier the
extension of service was politically attractive and economically feasi-
ble, the economics of postal service and Post Office deficits have made
finances a significant focus of postal decisionmaking.
The development of postal service in the United States reflects
changes in the political system and the way in which it deals with pub-
vi
lie service demands. The use of the government corporation form sub-
jects the Post Office to different pressures and influences than use of
the government department form, and so defines public service in a
changed manner. The Postal Service has become more attentive to demands
consistent with a corporate form, while it has become less responsive to
more traditional types of political pressure placed on government de-
partments. This has altered the orientation and nature of service, and
the place of the Post Office within the context of a governmental
agency.
vii
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the topic of postal service and its changed
character in the context of American politics. The Post Office began as
an integral operating part of the national government but has been trans-
formed into a public corporation which is tied to the national government
but removed from direct and ongoing Congressional or Executive control.
This change to a public corporation occurred in 1971.
The discussion of the Post Office sets out the differences between
a postal service operated as a government department or agency and one
run as a public corporation. The new form taken is the result of al-
tered conditions in the society and political process and reflects one
contemporary approach to the provision of public services. Therefore,
the recent growth in the use of public corporations makes the topic one
of interest and importance in contemporary affairs, for it is indicative
of how the political system is attempting to cope with the demands of
modern American life. The reasons for the use of the corporate form in
the provision of postal service can be better understood through defin-
ing the term "public corporations," positing the importance of the in-
quiry, and explaining the approach taken in discussing the subject, both
traditionally and in this study.
1
2The Place of Public Corporations in the Modern State
Public corporations are extra-governmental entities, tied to the
state by authorizing legislation, legitimacy, implicit and/or explicit
financial guarantees, and "ownership." They are part of the government
in the sense of having been created by government and retaining certain
ties to government, but they operate autonomously from the regular de-
partments (and constraints) of government. They are free from regular
budgetary processes, public administrative techniques, political battles
involving the executive departments, political patronage, and some or
all civil service requirements. Instead, they are established to oper-
ate on the managerial model of private business in order to take advan-
tage of the flexibility, aggressiveness, and efficiency"^ which the ab-
sence of government constraints is said to allow. They are intended to
be financially self-sufficient, or at least economically efficient given
their mandate, and able to pursue their goals in a "businesslike" way.
2
The growth in the use of the public corporate form has been tied to
reactions to emergencies which occurred because of foreign policy con-
siderations (World Wars and the Cold War), economic distress (the Great
Depression), and the social welfare programs meant to meet these crises
(the New Deal, the Great Society). The case of the Post Office, how-
ever, does not fit into this pattern for there was no widespread emer-
gency at hand. There was alarm concerning the financial condition and
service delivery performance of the Post Office (see Chapter V) but
these were not the result of a greater societal crisis.
Earlier, the national government had acquired ownership of
the
3Panama Railroad Company in 1904 (by gaining French interests in it) and
the Alaska Northern Railroad Company in 1915, and founded the Federal
Land Banks in 1916, but these first isolated instances simply.
eroded the basis for opposition in principle to federal public
corporations and by the time of World War I the United States
was prepared to and did employ the public corporation as a
normally available alternative for the carrying out of federal
functions .
^
The first spurt of public corporate formations was the result of speci-
fic emergencies, however, and was intended to be temporary.^
But emergencies continued to arise, and public corporations were
formed as a consequence. The Great Depression brought the New Deal
programs, and World War II generated a host of new needs, and public
programs and institutions. Efforts at administrative reorganization
slowed the growth of public corporations, since the Brownlow report and
the first Hoover Commission "were antagonistic to the existence of auto-
nomous administrative units and markedly biased in favor of a closely
co-ordinated executive branch."^
The post-World War II period, with the growth of the permanent na-
tional security and welfare state, brought about renewed interest in
autonomous public corporations. The willingness and impetus to use pub-
lic corporations has been indicative of the difficulties and obstacles
facing legislators involved with growing political demands and obstacles
Postal reorganization is instructive on this point. Congressmen have
seen the removal of the postal service from their direct political and
administrative purview as a relief from an unending series of demands
and complaints. Even without a role in appointing postmasters or
con-
firming the Postmaster General, and without extensive oversight func-
tions, Congressmen still receive many complaints. (After all, as a
public corporation with a long history of political activity, the postal
service is still perceived of as a governmental service.) But Congress-
men view this as the mere tip of an iceberg they would face if they
still involved themselves directly in budgeting and administration of
the postal system.^
Public corporations are often more acceptable than other forms of
public action to those who are uneasy with expansion of the public sec-
tor. In areas where they are considered necessary, often where no pri-
vate enterprise will tread, public corporations act in a manner consis-
tent with private methods of management and operation. This sits com-
fortably with those who espouse the superior efficiency of private
enterprise
.
Public corporations take varying organizational and structural
forms to meet different needs. A public corporation may be local (elec-
tric companies), state (liquor stores), regional (transportation author-
ities), federally operated but regionally applied (the Tennessee Valley
Authority), and national (the USPS, Amtrack) . There are numerous vari-
ations within each of these "geographical" forms.
These "geographical" forms are important within the context of our
federal system of government. Some public corporations grow out of and
parallel units of government, while others (such as regional public cor-
porations) do not. Some view this development as destructive of the
federal system; others point to the adaptive nature of a system
which
can accommodate mul tigovernmental needs, as in water basin
management.
In this sense, public corporations have served as tools of governmental
modernization and relevance, contrasting with the slow-moving process of
altering bureaucratic institutions.
Importance of the Inquiry into the Public Corporation
The public corporation is an important topic for two major reasons.
First, the relation between the public sector and the private sector has
been and continues to be a main point of contention in American poli-
tics.^ Second, as faith in the ability of government to act in the in-
g
terests of the public good is increasingly eroded, pressures on the
fabric of society increase. The ability of the government to provide
adequate services to citizens is an important part of constituent evalu-
ation of whether the public good is being approached, and this is a cen-
tral reason why public corporations play such a crucial role in modern
society
.
The public corporation holds a potentially large store of informa-
tion for the political scientist. To begin with, the value orientations
of American society which mold public policy are revealed through the
study of public corporations. This ideological framework is the agenda-
setting function of the American political culture within which the in-
stitutions of government operate. In this sense, constraints upon poli-
tical institutions are as important as powers granted, for both affect
the performance of public institutions and political actors. As Alexan-
der Hamilton wrote in Federalist #23:
It rests upon axioms as simple as they are universal; the
means ought to be proportioned to the end; the persons from
whose agency the attainment of any end is expected, ought to
possess the means by which it is to be attained.
^
In American politics, intense debate has revolved around discovering the
proper location for that actor and power; in the private sector, in
local government, or in the national government. The resultant public
agencies are significantly shaped by the nature of that discussion in
terms of the atmosphere within which the public sphere operates.
Furthermore, the way in which government approaches public corpora-
tions sets the boundaries within which legitimation of the public sector
occurs. The debate will be affected both by the operation and by public
perception of the operation of the public sector. Judgment of the suc-
cess of public corporations relative to private enterprise relies on
this framing of important definitional criteria. If private enterprise
is perceived to incorporate such desirable traits as profitability,
growth, and diversification, while the public enterprise model is viewed
as resulting in chronic deficits, increasing bureaucratization, and de-
teriorating service, then debates over the size of the public sector
relative to the private are already skewed in favor of the latter.
Employment is an example. An increase in private sector employment
is generally viewed as positive, bringing jobs to the community, mean-
ingful work to individuals, and tax revenues to the various levels of
government, as well as secondary effects which in turn create more jobs,
general economic improvement, and further revenues. By contrast, in-
creased employment in the public sector generally has negative connota-
tions. It indicates the inefficiency of government operations and func-
tioning, a further burden on the taxpayer, a work opportunity which had
to be "created" or is justified as "make-work"
, and a further demand on
limited tax revenues, having the secondary effect of diminishing indi-
vidual motivation and stultifying personal initiative, slowing the
growth of the economy, tying up capital, and doing all this without im-
proving general service trends. Yet these two pictures are simply re-
flections of the same process—creation of jobs—albeit by the different
sectors
.
Finally, the terms of legitimation then sanction particular types
of behavior by the constituent elements in the political process. Dif-
fering expectations for public agencies and private enterprise result in
distinctive ways of operating and evaluating public agencies. The pre-
vailing stereotype of public sector operation reinforces the norm. For
example, when problems occur in the Medicaid program the blame is usually
laid on government rather than on the private vendors of service (doc-
tors, hospitals) who profit from public programs. This "proves" the in-
efficiency of government programs while not raising private operations
as a significant point in the debate.
Traditional Approaches to the Study of Public Corporations
Public corporations as a research topic have received a fairly nar-
row and limited treatment. Work in this field has focused on the areas
of public administration, management, organization theory, and eco-
nomics. These studies have defined politics narrowly, and, in a way,
have dealt with public corporations on their own terms. This means that
the organization and limited goals of public corporations leads to dis-
cussions concerning whether management, organization, or administration
8can be improved, or if public corporations are economically efficient or
not. The analysis of the public corporation as a political instrument
and in light of political processes is not adequately treated, if con-
sidered at all.
The existing literature does raise issues which are related to poli-
tics and public corporations. First, there is the issue of the public-
ness of public corporations. Public ownership is generally the defining
criteria for these entities. But public ownership, while a necessary
criterion is not a sufficient one, for as William Shepherd writes, "pub-
licly owned enterprises can be essentially private in behavior and anti-
public in their performance."-'-^ Annmarie Hauck Walsh describes public
corporations as, "corporations without stockholders, land] jurisdictions
without voters or taxpayers . "-'-'• Thus, the nature and extent of public
control over these public agencies is one significant element in consid-
ering their character. Since the American political system allows for
a great variety of public corporations, each with a different relation-
ship to the public and its representatives because of the uniqueness of
its construction, constituency, and mission, public corporations are in
many senses mixed enterprises.
Shepherd cites certain elements which define the publicness of pub-
lic corporations: 1) public cost, such as subsidies and the provision
of capital, 2) public control, 3) management, 4) degree of monopoly, and
5) scope of geographical coverage. 1^ Although these elements allow for
a formal definition, the manner in which public corporations operate and
the implicit ends they pursue may cloud the issue of publicness. But
Shepherd's list does incorporate a more comprehensive notion than simple
ownership. Similarly, Arthur Selwyn Miller says that to identify public
corporations, one must ask: 1) who owns them? 2) where do they get
their financing? and 3) how much control is exercised by the government
13
over them? (Miller is generally concerned with private enterprises
which serve increasingly public functions.)
Since the range of public corporations is great (with no standard
model) publicness is an important consideration in examining each indi-
vidual case. The nomenclature may indicate "public," leading to expec-
tations of services to fulfill public needs, when the organization,
management, scope of activity, and other criteria may in fact mitigate
against any extensive publicness. Public corporations, as Shepherd and
Wilcox argue, must be understood within the context of their mandate,
their control mechanisms, the scope of their activities, and their
market orientation.
In addition, the notion of "public" should include a consideration
of the political dimension of their operations. Ties to legislators and
the executive branch ground public entities in a public role which, if
ignored, hold the potential for claims of political illegitimacy. As
Walsh states, "The widely accepted premise that the operation of public
authorities should be protected from politics influences the selection
of politics and programs and precludes certain changes."!'^ The concen-
tration of financial and technical aspects of running a public corpora-
tion often allows the political or public dimension to be ignored. In
turn, failures of responsiveness to public needs become identified with
the shortcomings of public agencies and government in general. This
undermines the belief in governmental operations and the legitimacy of
10
public institutions.
Postal Service as a Topic of Study
The United States Postal Service (USPS) is an example of an Ameri-
can public corporation and offers the opportunity to evaluate prevailing
attitudes toward public corporations in the United States. As in all
modern industrial democracies, the postal service is a major component
of the society's infrastructure, and a service covered by a unique type
of monopoly in the United States. It is one vital component of the over-
all communications network, processing 114,049 billion pieces of mail
in Fiscal Year 1982.-'-^ The postal service is primarily a mail delivery
service, yet it also manifests other important properties.
The literature concerning postal service tends to deal less with
the political results and dimensions of its operations than with more
narrowly conceived understandings of postal service. Efficiency of
operation has been a central concern. There has been considerable ef-
fort in minimizing the amounts of public resources used to produce a
given level of public benefits. This is evident in the criteria by
which the postal service specifically and public corporations in general
are evaluated:
(1) economic efficiency,
(2) productivity increases, and
(3) managerial and administrative efficiency.
A brief description of these will contrast the dominant approaches to
postal service as a public corporation with the tack pursued in this
study.
11
Economic efficiency
.
The application of economic efficiency criteria to the postal
service aims at minimizing deficits or achieving self-sustenance. Most
recent evaluations of the postal service are explicitly economic in this
way. While controlling costs is admittedly a worthy endeavor, the con-
cern with economic efficiency of public corporations often neglects
broader issues of political values, purpose, and service.
Recent studies reflect this emphasis on the USPS as an economic
enterprise guided by criteria of economic efficiency. The Economics of
the Postal System
,
by Alan L. Sorkin, does this explicitly. He writes:
In spite of the size of the U.S. Postal Service budget and
work force, and the importance of timely mail delivery to
business and consumers, there has been very little economic
analysis of this significant activity. This book focuses on
various economic aspects of the postal industry in an attempt
to provide a guide to policy. 16
Economic analyses offer interesting clues to the values built into the
approach, such as viewing the USPS as the postal industry . In any
event, Sorkin 's emphasis on economic considerations is joined by others
studying the postal service, though perhaps not so explicitly.
Perspectives on Postal Service Issues , an anthology edited by Roger
Sherman,-'-'' is divided into the economic, legal, and political for, as
William J. Baroody, Jr., writes in the Foreward, "economic calculations
must be tempered by political prudence just as political enthusiasms
must be restrained by economic realities."''-^ But even with this recogni-
tion, the book is generally imbued with a certain fascination with eco-
nomic rationality. In the last chapter , "Politics and the Future of
12
Postal Services," James I. Campbell, Jr., concludes that:
The most important effect that politics will have on the
future of postal services will be the degree to which the
political game grants the overpriced and increasingly obso-
lete Postal Service protection from competition. 19
Thus, even in considering the political, Campbell takes a rather narrow
focus as to the effects, concentrating on the issue of postal monopoly
and competition, which is central to the economic assessment of postal
service. Although nominally a political analysis, Campbell's article
reflects a deemphasis of a political understanding of the place of the
public corporation in a political system, and the effects of actions on
that political system.
Similarly, an earlier volume by John Haldi, Postal Monopoly: An
Assessment of the Private Express Statutes ,^ argues that, "It is time
to discover whether the postal monopoly is necessary and economical, or
whether it has outlived any usefulness it may have had and is now a bar-
rier to further progress. "^1 Clearly, Haldi is advancing economic con-
siderations to make his case, including arguments concerning economies
of scale and whether the postal service is a natural monopoly. The pri-
macy of economic rationality is evident, and in discussing the role of
politics in the postal service, Haldi relates that:
Undoubtedly the most constructive step which Congress could
take to eliminate politics and impose economic rationality on
the postal system would be to abolish the monopoly enshrined
in the Private Express Statutes.
Haldi does not include the public service functions of the postal serv-
ice in his argument, implicitly recognizing these to be indicative of
13
the inappropriate politics involved in the postal monopoly.
Productivity increases
.
Productivity increases are an important topic for much of the busi-
ness and government worlds, as managers try to raise productivity per
worker to compete with foreign labor, tight budgets, and demands for
profits. The USPS boasts that:
Productivity increased 3.6 percent this year [1982], with
pieces of mail processed per worker rising from 161,879 in
fiscal 1981 to an all-time high of 167,650 in fiscal 1982.
Since passage of the Postal Reorganization Act, the Postal
Service's productivity has climbed 43.4 percent. In compari-
son, the productivity of private, non-financial corporations
has gone up just 18.4 percent in that time. Postal produc-
tivity gains have exceeded those of the private sector for
nine of the last 13 years. ^-^
Critics raise questions about the methodology of the postal service's
productivity measures, but regardless, the relationship between the
primacy of economic efficiency and resulting concern with productivity
is clear. The emphasis on economics and on productivity measures leads
the USPS to consider these narrow perspectives of public service while
downplaying a broader relevance to issues such as employment in the
society, the nature of public service in a democratic state, or the re-
lationship between democratic politics and the structure of institutions
designed to carry out public policies.
Managerial and administrative efficiency .
Another perspective from which the postal service has been ap-
proached is that of management and administration. But by looking at
the postal system as a corporate administrative tool, rich political
14
dynamics are ignored, excluded, or implicitly rejected as undesirable
and illegitimate. The study of management and administration, while
valuable, limits the conceptual boundaries of an analysis of a public
postal service. John Tierney recognizes the role of politics in postal
management and the conflicting signals sent to the USPS by the political
process, but the focus of this information is applied to evaluation of
management rather than to the relationship of postal management to con-
stituents of the political process. He writes in the Preface of Postal
Reorganization :
This is a study of the management of the nation's oldest and
largest business—the U.S. postal system. The book aims pri-
marily to analyze and explain what difference the 1971 reor-
ganization of the U.S. Post Office Department has made in how
the huge mail delivery organization is managed.
My purpose in offering this analysis is neither to cata-
logue the perceived weaknesses of postal management nor to
offer prescriptions for improving the system's performance.
Rather, I am trying to identify and explain what features of
the Postal Service's task and environment make it difficult
for the organization's executives to apply "businesslike"
solutions to the postal system's problems. ^5
Tierney is not as concerned with the political dimensions and ef-
fects of postal service as with the effects of environmental influences
(politics included) on the pursuit of management's agenda. He finds that
multiple goals keep the reorganized postal service from fulfilling its
mandate, because:
Despite the stated intent of the 1970 Postal Reorganization
Act, members of Congress to date have chosen to place limits
on postal executives' freedom to pursue efficiency and economy,
especially when the savings might come at the price of lessened
public convenience . 2^
15
This interferes with economic rationality and managerial autonomy.
Tiemey indicates that the various political and social goals are
inconsistent with economy and efficiency, and that
Congress alone can solve this problem, and it can do so only
by making difficult choices among irreconciliable goals. Mem-
bers of Congress will have to move beyond their stock harangues
at postal management and decide whether they want a costly
postal service that meets an assortment of conspicuous poli-
tical needs or whether they want a lean and cost-effective
mail delivery system that will fit more cleanly in a changing
communications environment
.
His analysis contains evident bias, such as that arguments over postal
service and management are "harangues" to be avoided rather than an as-
pect of the political debate over the public role of the USPS, and that
politicians can simply decide to ignore the assorted political needs of
the society. He also is positing a choice which may not be a "problem"
to be "solved" at all and approaching the issue as a problem of efficient
management and administration, concerned with agenda-setting, goal ori-
entation, organization, and managerial prerogative. Tierney's approach
results from his view that "the whole postal reform movement was essen-
tially to attempt to secure managerial autonomy."
Similarly, The Evaluation of the United States Postal Service , a
Report by a Panel of the National Academy of Public Administration com-
missioned by the USPS , is an assessment of the USPS's implementation
of the Postal Reorganization Act. "The Academy was chosen," according
to the USPS, "because of its record of unbiased and informed studies in
the field of public administration and its technique of bringing together
panels of distinguished experts to make such reviews. "^0 So the report
16
was designed to evaluate the effectiveness of managerial implementation
of the Postal Reorganization Act, and recommend improvements in areas of
deficiency. It was not intended as an evaluation of the political nature
of the postal service, except in terms of how well postal service had
been insulated from Congressional and Executive branch politics.
Both these studies, in different ways, seek to understand the postal
service in a framework of managerial or administrative efficiency. Al-
though valuable, they are indicative of the lack of attention to the
postal service as a public institution, one tied to government and poli-
tics in important ways for the functioning of American democratic govern-
ment. The political connection is not tangential but essential, for the
history of the postal system, from its beginnings, has been steeped in
politics. In many ways, this has been the postal service's strength.
The Approach of This Study
This study of the postal service has been done through the histori-
cal development of the Post Office beginning in the 1770s. This his-
torical approach allows us to compare the Post Office Department and the
United States Postal Service, and to analyze the differences. The Post
Office has changed in structural and organizational form during the past
200 years, from an agency within the Treasury Department to a department
of government to a governmental corporation. This reflects certain
changes in the understanding of politics within the American political
system, which can then be posited and discussed. This allows for an un-
derstanding of how public corporations differ as political institutions
from more (historically) traditional forms of government organization.
17
Three prominent tensions emerge from this historical study of the
postal service. They include that between 1) the postal service as a
service organization and as an economic enterprise, 2) the postal service
as a community-oriented national political institution and the postal
service as a corporate national organization, and 3) the primacy of po-
i
litics as against that of businesslike operations. These tensions have
been resolved in different ways during postal history.
The issue of service versus economics has never been a critical is-
sue of postal operations and policy until recently. The early resolu-
tion of the tension served as a model until the postal deficit reached
alarming proportions in the last several decades. Congress had been
willing to underwrite the expansion of postal services through the years
despite having to draw money from the treasury to do so. The benefits
of distributive politics in a nation which was expanding rapidly over-
whelmed the fiscal constraints which were present.
The operations of the Post Office in the middle of the twentieth
century produced deficits which were too large, at a time when competing
demands on the national treasury were growing. Thus, a new accommoda-
tion was styled which made service delivery more dependent upon the eco-
nomic circumstances of the Post Office rather than letting the financial
picture be formed by service demands.
The second tension has been that of a postal service rooted poli-
tically in the community versus a post office oriented to national con-
cerns. The Post Office has been a national government operation since
its creation, but it has had important ties to communities throughout
its history. This is evident both in the post offices which were and
18
are situated in localities and in the conception of how national ad-
ministration relates to the community. The founding era Post Office was
closely aligned with local needs and politics because of the nature of
the postal mandate of the time, including Congressional prerogatives in
postal policymaking and the roots Executive administrators had in the
community. The important figures in the society were essentially local
figures, recognized as having the proper attributes to inhabit public
office by the constituents of the community
.
The rise of party government changed orientations toward administra-
tion but retained the ties to community politics. After all, the parties
maintained their strength at the local level and responded to (varied)
local conceptions of public needs. This represented a different empha-
sis in how to properly formulate public policy including the nature of
the actors involved, but it still left the prerogatives of that power
accessible to the community.
The Progressive Era signalled a shift to a national government
which would limit local prerogatives in order to minimize the venal in-
fluences of parties and bosses and the inability of local interests to
conceive of the national "good," while promoting statesmanship and the
pursuit of proper policies. Proper government policies would be gener-
ated through national administration held responsible to the elected
chief Executive and insulated from particular local jealousies repre-
sented by Congress, bosses, and interest groups. While this presented
an idea of representative government based on notions of administrative
responsibility and efficiency, it did so by removing the political ties
to the local political units and representatives. (The Executive would
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be held accountable by "public opinion ." -^2)
This culminated in the reorganization of the Post Office, wherein
administration and management was further removed from community control
by taking the Post Office out of the Executive branch of government al-
together and making it a public corporation. Thus, the Postal Service
became estranged politically from localities; its local policies tend to
take on a homogeneous character, rooted in marketing surveys and other
methods used by corporations to evaluate their operations. This may be
a legitimate way of providing postal service, but it highlights the
change which has occurred over the last two centuries.
The third tension is that between the political Post Office and the
businesslike USPS. As the Post Office moved toward a more nationally-
oriented service, it also came to a more bureaucratic and businesslike
understanding of its functions. Congressional politicking and interest
group pressure on postal affairs led to an attempt to make the Post Of-
fice more professional and less prone to purely political judgments and
machinations. Earlier ideas about reforming the Post Office Department,
such as the recommendations of the Hoover Commission in 1949 (see Chap-
ter V), were rejected in favor of a more drastic detachment of the Post
Office from the main political channels of Congressional and Executive
politics and budgeting. The USPS is still subject to Congressional
pressures in extraordinary circumstances and the Presidential appoint-
ment powers for the Board of Governors, but the extent of this influence
contrasts enormously with that of the old Post Office Department.
This study begins with the founding of the American Post Office in
the 1770s, with the establishment of an agency having certain political
20
bases and ties to the national government and communities, an accommoda-
tion between service and economic efficiency, and a formative relation-
ship with the private sector. The intent is to demonstrate both the
development of the Post Office as a public agency and the changes in the
understanding of politics in the American political system which have
occurred since the founding.
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CHAPTER II
POSTAL SERVICE IN THE NEW NATION
Postal service was not an invention of the New World or Europe:
its origins have been traced to Mesopotamia, Assyria and Persia, Egypt,
Greece, Rome, China and Japan. These older postal "systems" were de-
signed for quite different clientele than those presently operating,
being intended to deliver messages to government officials (and influ-
ential private citizens) rather than to provide a broad-based service
for the general population. The early systems demonstrate, however, the
Importance of a communications network in any developed or extended so-
ciety. Governments, whether limited or broad in their structure and
participatory vision, have viewed postal communications of some sort as
vital to their success. Later versions of postal service have empha-
sized citizen needs for, and even "rights" to, such service, indicative
perhaps of a general proliferation of rights among people throughout
society.
The American colonial post office was established by a grant from
2
William and Mary to Thomas Neale , on February 17, 1692. Neale was em-
powered to run the service as he saw fit, with an obligatory payment of
3
six shillings and eight pence made to the Crown annually.
Neale never visited the American colonies, running the system from
Britain and through a deputy postmaster in the colonies, Andrew Hamilton.
Neale had relieved himself of the patent by 1698, and the Crown bought
24
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4it back in 1710. The Crown never realized a profit from the post of-
fice during this early period.
In 1753, Benjamin Franklin became the deputy postmaster in the
colonies; and as early as 1761, the colonial post office registered its
first surplus for the Crown, in the amount of 499 pounds.^ In 1774, the
Crown received 3,000 pounds. Although the operation of the post office
benefitted from Franklin's financial and organizational skills, he in
fact spent all but five years (between 1753 and 1774) in Britain.
The history of the British-directed post office ended as the war of
independence began, a result of the creation of an indigenous Continental
post office and subsequent atrophy of the British system. The British
post office in the colonies closed on Christmas Day in 1775. This chap-
ter analyzes the establishment of that truly American post office, a
product of the increasing tensions between Britain and her colonies.
A Continental Post Office
Events in 1774 led to the creation of an indigenous American postal
service, a product of the Committees of Correspondence and an emerging
sense of nationhood. The need for and plans to establish a postal sys-
tem, neither supportive of nor administered by the British, heralded the
birth of an American post office.
William Goddard is credited with generating the idea and promoting
it into a practicing postal system, which he did within a relatively
short time. His trip from Baltimore through New York and New England
(in February, March, and April, 1774) led to a functioning entity by the
time he returned to Baltimore.
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Goddard proposed a "Constitutional Post office" to the New York
Committee of Correspondence, and then to several New England Committees,
the most important being the Boston Committee. By August 11, 1774, the
postal system was operating from Casco Bay, Maine, to Williamsburg,
. .
7Virginia
.
There were three main justifications for the establishment of an
independent postal system: the security of private mail deliveries and
the noninterference with newspaper deliveries, the denial of revenue to
the British ministry, and the positive motive of providing a unifying
force among the colonies.
The fear of British interference with the mails lay in the nature
of communications being made by the colonists in the atmosphere follow-
ing the multiple troubles with British authority. John C. Miller indi-
cates that Samuel Adams saw the Goddard plan as a chance to take action
towards his goal of ridding America of all Parliamentary authority:
Adams was eager to make a fresh assault upon British author-
ity, for he knew it would be fatal for the revolutionary move-
ment in the colonies to appear to stand still after the Tea
party. Moreover, he foresaw that if matters came to the worst
between the mother country and colonies, America would require
a separate system of postriders to prevent a stoppage of in-
tercolonial correspondence; hence his denunciations of the
constitutional [British] post office as "an usurpation of the
Parliament no longer to be borne. "^
In addition to possible interference with the regular letter mail,
"editors were worried about possible rejection of their newspapers in
9
the mail." The central role of letters and newspapers in spreading
news about British actions and fostering American resistance made secur-
ity of the mails of great importance.
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In many parts of the colonies men were already, through secret
committees, laying the foundations for the structure of revolt
which soon arose. There was constant danger that their plans
might be discovered through the interception of letters by the
postmasters. But if letters were at the mercy of the post of-
fice, the same was much more true of newspapers
.
Secondly, Goddard presented the British post office service as an
unconstitutional tax upon the colonists, which provided a considerable
revenue to the British crown. The Committees reasoned that there was
truth in the charge, and the Boston Committee thought "its fees were
just as unconstitutional as the tea duty, though the revenue was
smaller." The revenues were not inconsiderable, however, and this
coupled with the idea of "no taxation without representation" made swift
action by the Committees fully understandable.
The third factor was that of promoting a union among the states,
the only formal institutional entity in the yet-to-be-United States. An
important part of the unity of action with regard to the new postal sys-
tem very likely was the dismissal of Benjamin Franklin as postmaster of
the colonial post office. This occurred January 30, 1774, and was con-
13
firmed in the colonies by no later than April 25, 1774, though it had
been circulated as a rumor beforehand. Thus, what had been a reluctance
to institute a new system out of respect for Franklin was turned into a
motivation for a new system.
By this act the British had foolishly severed an important
link between the old Post Office and the Americans, who were
now less reluctant to erect their "Constitutional Post Office"
on the wreckage of the old one than they might otherwise have
been.l^
Indeed, one commentator viewed the goal of fostering union a prominent
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factor for pursuing the post office, more so than that of limiting
revenue to the British. Richard D. Brown writes that:
As the Boston Committee of Correspondence envisioned it, the
post office project furnished an ideal example of joint co-
lonial action and an excellent opportunity to develop the
cherished defensive union among the colonies. . . , Resist-
ance, after all, had already become a generalized colonial
phenomenon by the spring of 1774; the union needed to make it
effective was the vital remaining goal.l^
The new post office extended from Maine to Virginia within four
months of its establishment, and it was the first institution of na-
tional stature. It predated the founding of the nation and was central
to the successful revolution and founding. It was integral to the opera-
tion of the nation from birth and is as good a representative of ongoing
public enterprise in the United States as can be found. Its story is
one with excitement almost unparalleled, for it "witnessed" and partici-
pated in the much-celebrated revolution while never firing a single
shot. Its power represented most essentially that of words, to both in-
form and propagandize. The story of the United States Postal Service
thus began.
The Post Office of the Continental Congress
The Second Continental Congress met on May 10, 1775, and on May 29
appointed "a committee to consider the best means of establishing posts
16
for conveying letters and intelligence through this Continent." The
committee members were Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Lynch, Richard Henry
Lee, Thomas Willing, Samuel Adams, and Philip Livingston. On July 26,
1775, the Congress took over the postal system, and appointed Benjamin
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Franklin as Postmaster General. Thus, the establishment of a postal
service by the Continental Congress reinforced the central role of com-
munication, free from British surveillence
, in the emerging "nation."
It created a system intended to extend from Falmouth (now Portland)
,
Maine, to Savannah, Georgia, with a weekly post to South Carolina. Any
profits were to go to the treasury; deficits would be paid by the United
Colonies.
There were modifications of the essential system between 1775 and
1782, such as which routes were to be served and how often, what sal-
aries and payments would be made, the process for dealing with "dead
letters," and other matters. Two acts indicative of the perceived im-
portance of the post office occurred in 1776: on July 8, all postmas-
ters, during term of duty, were excused from any military service, and
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on August 8 post riders were likewise excused.
During this period a functioning postal service was able to carry
on the nation's business, from that of military officers to Congressmen
to private citizens.
Just as it had been an instrument for nurturing an American
mind and encouraging resistance to the British, so now it was
used to unite Americans in a common cause. At great cost and
at great hazard, postriders carried letters and documents of
one kind or another between a frequently moving government and
its armies in the field as well as between soldiers and their
families
.
The Post Office under the Articles
In 1781 the Articles of Confederation gained final adoption as the
working order of government for the United States. The Articles gave
30
the United States in Congress assembled
the sole and exclusive right and power of. . .establishing and
regulating post-offices from one State to another throughout
all the United States, and exacting such postage on the papers
passing the same as may be requisite to defray the expenses of
the said office. 21
As peace neared, the new Congress acted to develop a more elaborate
postal system. On October 18, 1782, "An Ordinance for Regulating the
Post Office of the United States of America," was passed into law. It
began by stating that
the communication of intelligence with regularity and des-
patch, from one part to another of these United States, is
essentially requisite to the safety as well as the commercial
interest thereof. . . . ^2
and was followed by the plan which was to govern the post office's oper-
ation for the following ten years.
In addition to setting up the mechanism by which the post office
would operate, the Ordinance was noteworthy for establishing an opera-
tion which was not a revenue-producing service. This orientation, under
the new government, indicated that profits from the post office should
be used for improvements in service (i.e., establishment of new post of-
fices and purchase of equipment with which to carry the mail) and not as
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a source of revenue. Nearly a century and a half later. Congressman
Clyde Kelly was able to look back at this period and write:
The change from profit seeking to service-giving was one of
those acts which made American Independence more than a mere
separation from England. It was a revolution in the principle
and purpose of government. The Post Office Establishment un-
derwent a change, not of method but of fundamental purpose.
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The principle of the public good was substituted for that of
government gain.^^
The distinction was important, for the orientation toward revenue recy-
cling played a significant role in the rapid expansion of post roads and
postal services.
Equally important, perhaps more so, was the establishment of the
postal service as a national institution which was unrivalled at the
time. Both the Articles of Confederation and the Ordinance of 1782 in-
dicate the national scope of the office. There was neither great debate
concerning the power of postal service as being too centralizing in in-
fluence nor jealousy evident on the part of the states. The Articles
were adopted, then the Ordinance of 1782, and the post office operated
pretty much within that framework until 1792, when the new government
under the Constitution passed a comprehensive statute governing postal
25
operations. Only two issues apparently challenged the national orien-
tation of the postal service during that period, although one finds
criticism of the service rendered (which seems the fate of delivering
the mail at almost any time and place)
.
The first question centered around whether to accept paper currency
as payment for postage. The period of the 1780s was, of course, charac-
terized by the issue of paper currency in the states: by 1786 seven
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states had issued some form of such currency. The impetus for paper
money is usually attributed to the needs of debtors and agrarian inter-
ests as opposed to the desire for specie by commercial and creditor in-
terests. The main concern as regards the postal service is that there
was a clamor to pay for postage with paper money; the Postmaster General,
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Ebenezer Hazard, ordered postal officials to accept only "hard" money.
He was backed by an act of Congress of September 20, 1786, which stated
the postmaster general is "to receive no money in payment other than
specie." This apparently resolved the issue, and the post office was
2 8able to collect specie for its services.
The second issue was one which more directly challenged the national
orientation of the General Post Office of the United States. The chal-
lenge was not to the operation of the post office in interstate communi-
cations or on the main post road; there was a question, though, of in-
trastate postal service. The main reference to this problem appears in
a letter from Postmaster General Hazard to the Congress. The Congress
recorded that Hazard "was
forwarding intelligence from Frederick Green, Postmaster at
Annapolis, informing that the Maryland legislature is consid-
ering taking control of the Maryland postoffice [sic] under
the idea that Congress had control in interstate postoffice
[sic] business and not within the state.
More specifically. Hazard reproduced Green's letter, which read:
Our assembly last Fall brought in a Bill to Establish Post
Riders to the different Parts of the State, and the Superin-
tendence thereof was put under my direction as Postmaster gen-
eral of the State; and I was told by the principal members
that the power given Congress by the Confederation was "es-
tablishing and regulating Post Offices from one State to
another throughout all the United States," and not to estab-
lish Post Offices within the State, off the Continental Line.
The Business was finally postponed to the next Session (which
will set in a few weeks) when I expect it will be again taken
up. 30
Apparently this issue never surfaced again,
torian Gerald Cullinan wrote that Hazard "gained
Although postal his-
Congressional approval
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of the principle that all post offices, whether or not they were situ-
ated on the main post road, were under the jurisdiction of the central
government," the Congressional records do not indicate such an action.
Other sources refer to the episode of Hazard's letter, more or less
obliquely, but no further mention is made either of Maryland's actions
or the Congressional reaction. It may be that the results of the Anna-
polis convention, i.e., a calling for a constitutional convention in May
of 1787, had diffused the issue. Regardless, even with this "false
alarm," the issue of national supremacy in all postal service was not
seriously challenged during the tenure of the Articles of Confederation,
a time certainly noted for its generation of state sovereignty debates
over many of the crucial political services and functions of the day.
That there was no serious debate concerning a national postal service,
one of the most extensive operations of national sovereignty and viewed
by influential figures representing the full spectrum of political be-
lief as a vital function of the society, is in itself quite remarkable,
either for the disinterestedness assumed or, more likely, in the per-
ceived inherent legitimacy of postal service as properly national in
scope and orientation.
If postal service occupies the same level of national justification
as such operations as the treasury and the military (indeed, perhaps
greater justification given the early general unanimity on its course of
conduct) , then it can be said that the postal service represents the
most fundamental type of commitment by the United States government, and
therefore is as proper a subject of study of public enterprise in the
United States as any. The post office provides the policy analyst with
34
the advantage of a public enterprise commitment which: 1) spans the en-
tire history of the United States, 2) plays an important role throughout
that history, 3) demonstrates an example of government commitment to the
successful operation of public enterprise, and 4) mirrors any changes in
policy attitude toward the operation of public agencies.
As noted before, there were difficulties with postal service which
in no way related to the issue of federalism. One was interference with
the mail, which did carry fines but was evidently a common occurrence.
George Mason wrote in a letter to Arthur Lee, in 1783, that:
I have lately received two or three Letters from Europe, Via
Philadelphia, every one of them broken open, and sealed up
again there, or at some intervening Post Offices; as almost
all the Letters I have had these two years past from Europe
have been. 32
Madison and Jefferson sent their most important messages to each other
in cipher to avoid discovery by interference, a further indication of
33
the insecurity of the mails in terns of inviolability.
A second problem was the irregularity of the mails. Conditions
were rather primitive in many areas, the roads not yet well-developed,
and conveyance of the mail dependent upon chance. A typical citation
comes from the pages of the Journals of the Continental Congress, where
it was noted that:
Congress having received information that the mail from the
southward has arrived here but twice for the last seven weeks
and then only from Virginia, and that mail from the eastward
has arrived here but once for the last three weeks, notwith-
standing travellers both on horseback and in carriages have
passed on the post roads
—
Resolved , That the postmaster gen-
eral be directed to inquire into and report to Congress the
reason for the aforesaid failures. . . .-^^
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The expectations for deliveries in that period were certainly not great
compared to contemporary standards, and yet even so there was trouble
with mail delivery. Though this type of complaint was to continue, it
is framed in a time and societal atmosphere quite different from that of
today. The culture of a preindustrial society would differ in its lack
of emphasis on routinlzat ion of postal delivery, as would a commercial
society (which was soon to develop)
.
A Constitutional Post Office
The debate in the Constitutional Convention did not enter into a
consideration of national versus state sovereignty regarding the postal
system. Although one observer indicated that the vote on the amendment
to add the phrase, "and Post Roads," to the powers of Congress* can at
most be interpreted as a general fear of national power, no such debate
is recorded, and any such interpretation is highly speculative, not cor-
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roborated by any evidence. Indeed, the evidence appears otherwise,
supporting the conclusion that there was no discussion promulgated about
the postal service as anything but a national power of Congress, and
that no plans emerged to alter the national postal power significantly.
The suggestion that Congress should be able to regulate stages on
post-roads was never reported out of the Committee on Detail, and Ben-
jamin Franklin's plan to add a power for "cutting canals where deemed
necessary" was defeated, but not on grounds pertinent to the postal
*The Congressional power in the Constitution reads, "To establish
Post Offices and post Roads."
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36power. (Although the Pinckney plan had included a clause that the
post office should raise a revenue, this was never discussed further.)
According to Lindsay Rogers, "In the state conventions there was prac-
T 7
tically no discussion of the postal power." James Madison wrote only
two sentences about the postal service in the Federalist #42:
The power of establishing post-roads must, in every view, be
a harmless power and may, perhaps, by judicious management,
become productive of great public conveniency. Nothing which
tends to facilitate the intercourse between the States can be
deemed unworthy of the public care.-^^
The national sense of the post office was already firmly established;
Madison reinforced this view, and the state conventions and Anti-Feder-
alists were quiet, presumably not greatly agitated and probably in
agreement
.
Anti-Federalist writings demonstrate the amazing lack of disagree-
ment over the construction of the postal power. The only discussion of
complaint centers around the partisan use of the postmaster authority in
operating the mails to the detriment of the Anti-Federalist position in
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ratification debates over the Constitution. Some Anti-Federalists
maintained that newspapers supporting their arguments were not delivered,
in certain cases. Yet these arguments did not touch the structure or
organization of the postal service, but only the use of the established
system (then under the Articles of Confederation) for venal and blatantly
political purposes. This attests to the crucial role of postal service
in the political culture of the time rather than to any disagreement
over a national postal service.
The Anti-Federalists who did mention the postal system in a context
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of national versus state powers, i.e., in any structural and philosoph-
ically meaningful sense, assumed the power over post offices and post
roads to be naturally a national power. The Federal Farmer, in a letter
of October 8, 1787, describes three forms of government, and concludes
that "the third plan, or partial consolidation, is. . .the only one that
secure [sic] the freedom and happiness of this people. "^^ In a three-
sentence description of the plan, the power over the post office is
41given to the general government. In a letter of October 10, 1787, he
writes that power over the post offices is a power which should be
"clearly. . .lodged" in the general government.
In "The Fallacies of the Freeman Detected by A Farmer," the author,
in discussing the relation of state to national power, mentions the lack
of state control over post-roads in passing but without discussion, im-
43plying an acceptance of that national power as legitimate.
A third reference in Anti-Federalist writings is that by Samuel
Chase, in April, 1788. He wrote that:
The greatest happiness of a people is to govern themselves.
Their greatest misery is to be governed by others; Our
state government is fully competent to all internal state
purposes .
For the safety and happiness of the people of this and
other states, external objects, or such for which the state
governments are not competent are to be provided for.
1. To provide a form to regulate commerce among the states
and to preserve peace between the states resort against
domestic empires, with Indian tribes, and to coin money and to
fix the standard of weights and of foreign coin and to fix the
standard of weights and measures to establish post offices
and post roads may be called a general internal or con-
tinental object. . . .
I am for the establishment of power in Congress for all the
above or similar purposes. '^^
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Therefore, there was little debate concerning the powers or struc-
ture of the postal service in the Constitution, and the only references
in this context by Anti-Federalists supported the powers as much as did
the Federalists. The issue was not simply not raised; there was impli-
cit and at times explicit agreement that the postal service should be a
creature of the national government. This basic consensus launched a
government enterprise which developed, from the very founding, in the
image of the American political system's approach to a legitimate and
important national public service.
Ultimately, the Constitution included a simple yet broad mandate,
the power of Congress "To establish Post Offices and post Roads. "^^ One
observer noted that, "To establish post offices and po.st roads is the
form of the grant; to create and regulate the entire postal system of
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this Government is the evident intent."
The absence of any disagreement over a national postal service, or
change from that already operating (under the Articles of Confedera-
tion) , was reinforced by the actions of the First Congress. On Septem-
ber 22, 1789, Congress adopted the following:
Be it enacted, &c., That there shall be appointed a Postmaster
General; his powers and salary; and the compensation to the
assistant or clerk and deputies which he may appoint, and the
regulations of the Post Offices shall be the same as they last
were under the resolutions or ordinances of the late Congress.
The Postmaster General to be subject to the direction of the
President of the United States in performing the duties of his
office. . . .^^
The act was to remain in force "until the end of the next session of
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Congress and no longer," but on August 4, 1790, the temporary act was
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extended, and a permanent post office act was not adopted until May 8,
1794.
The Postal Acts of 1792 and 1794
The postal act of 1792 was the first significant postal legislation
since the Ordinance of 1782. It was also temporary, like the acts of
1789 and 1790, to be in force only until June 1, 1794. The postal sys-
tem "established" in the 1792 act was reinforced and made permanent by
an act of May 8, 1794. The acts are sufficiently similar, excepting the
permanence of the 1794 act, so that for most purposes they can be
treated as one.
Three main themes arose from the act of 1792:
The first was that the Post Office must be self-supporting;
the second, that the Post Office make no profit, but use its
surpluses to extend its services; and the third, that Con-
gress, not the postmaster general, must establish the nation's
post roads.
The first theme assumed that rates could be set to cover expenses in-
curred, so that no introduction of treasury funds need be made. This
changed the orientation from the Ordinance of 1782, which stated that
the excess expenses from establishing new post offices and supplies
would be paid out by the treasury. But this self-sufficiency intent
was not adhered to in practice, and when the post ran a deficit in its
pursuit of the larger public policy of service provision, Congress ap-
propriated additional monies.
The second theme is that any profits should be plowed back into the
postal system to further the establishment of post offices and post
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roads, not unlike the provision of the 1782 Ordinance. This was to be
the controlling theme of the first two, since the priority of expansion
of postal services was greater than a self-sustaining post office. This
was a product, to a significant degree, of public influence on Congress,
and in this vein Congressional control over the establishment of post
roads was illustrative.
The role of post roads in an expanding nation was an extremely im-
portant one, which the House of Representatives was not going to dele-
gate to appointed officials.^"*" The Senate was willing to delegate this
authority to the Postmaster General, but Senators themselves were then
chosen by the state legislatures. The direct tie between House members
and their constituents exerted a pressure on Congressmen both to recog-
nize the central role of postal expansion in the late eighteenth century
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and to retain control over the process by which it would be achieved.
Congress did play the central part in the identification of post roads
and so subsequent internal development, whether it intended to promote
commercial development, the spread of political education, communication
with the western frontier, or a representation of the national govern-
ment throughout the country at a time when the national government was
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largely unknown, absent in any physical terms, and distrusted.
Why did it take so much time for Congress to act in formalizing the
postal service? President Washington, in his First (January 8, 1790),
Second (December 8, 1790), and Third (October 25, 1791) Annual Messages
to Congress repeated the need to pass a bill concerning the Post Office.
It was evidently one of the central concerns of national scope, for in
his Second Annual Message, Washington wrote:
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The establishment of the Militia; of a mint; of Standards of
weights and measures; of the Post Office and Post Roads are
subjects which (I presume) you will resume of course, and
which are abundantly urged by their own importance.
In the Third Annual Message, he again asserts the importance of acting
on those items, "some of which I cannot forbear a more particular men-
tion. These are, the Militia; the Post-Office and Post-roads; the Mint;
Weights and Measures. "^^
As Washington himself acknowledged, other urgent matters kept Con-
56gress from acting sooner on these important matters. The post office,
although in need of an official establishment act and also improvement
in service, was not in a terminal condition, whether considered in poli-
tical, service delivery, or financial terms. A founding act was impor-
tant, to be sure, as evidenced by Washington's concern that attention be
paid to this, yet it could also wait.
Congress was, however, working on postal service matters during
this period. During 1790 and 1791 proposals were offered to give the
Postmaster General and the President the power to establish the nation's
post roads. On June 16, 1790, for example, Mr. Sedgwick introduced such
a resolution. The result of the debate was that, "The motion was
. ^ . . . ,,58
negatived by a great majority.
Attempts to vest the Postmaster General and the President with such
powers were unsuccessful, and the act of 1792 formalized the Congres-
sional prerogative regarding post roads. The disagreement in drafting
legislation, then, was centered around the issue of power division within
. .
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the national government, with Congress taking an active position,
rather than any discussion of national versus state powers. Further, it
42
illustrates the nature of the discussion which preceded passage of a
bill establishing the postal service.
Another factor appears to have been at work, which is that the
nature and structure of the post office was basically settled by the
government under the Articles of Confederation, including its national
"nature," and so the particulars could wait. Questioning did not arise
about the fundamental nature of the post office under the new Constitu-
tion, and this lack of debate is striking considering many of the other
issues which dominated discussion at that time, especially relating to
their national as opposed to state-based operation. Yet the postal
service passed through this time generally, almost unanimously, accepted
as a legitimate exercise of the national government. How does estab-
lishment of such an important service and institution fail to engender
great debate?
One answer is quite clear. At the time, the size of the national
government in general, and the postal service as a particular part of
the government, was extremely small, so whatever the philosophical im-
plications of a national postal service, the physical implications were
not yet great. This is not neglecting the fact that the number of post
office employees was second only to that of the Treasury, or that the
philosophic considerations in the early days of the new government were
not well-debated, only that, again, experience (with the operation of
the post office under the Articles, and easy adoption in the Constitu-
tion) tended to make statesmen of differing hues view this service with
no great alarm. The postal service did not evoke fears which a national
militia or centralized taxation power did.
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Probably more important was the widespread support improvement and
extension of the postal system enjoyed as an exercise of democratic
government. Not generally perceived of as a threat, the post office
would act in the interests of all segments of the society, a truly posi-
tive functioning part of a rather limited national government and ex-
periment in liberal democracy. (The acceptance of this positive power
of government is itself a curiosity, being a statement of the type of
activity which was seen as legitimate in a positive liberal state.)
There was not, however, complete unanimity. Madison's work, as a
member of Congress, towards establishing "the best route for the post
6
1
roads between Maine and Georgia," as a national exercise brought forth
a strong reaction from Jefferson:
Have you considered all the consequences of your proposition
concerning post roads? I view it as a source of boundless
patronage to the executive, jobbing to the members of Congress
and their friends, and a bottomless abyss of public money. . . .
Does the power to establish post roads, given you by Congress,
mean that you shall make the roads, or only select from those
already made, those on which there shall be a post 7^2
This disagreement did not enter the public sphere, apparently, and pro-
vided no policy debate as the post office limped along on existing
6 3
roads, not making them as Jefferson feared.
This exception notwithstanding, the broad spectrum of statesmen of
the time appeared to envision an active purpose for the post office.
The development of postal service would serve to promote several aspects
of life and vitality in the society: knowledge, commercial activity,
agriculture, expansion, and communication. Diverse interests in the na-
tion would be served by a national entity which cut across the prevail-
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ing political divisions. George Washington wrote (in his Third Annual
Message) to Congress that
:
The importance of the Post-Off ice and Post-Roads, on a plan
sufficiently liberal and comprehensive, as they respect the
expedition, safety and facility of communication, is in-
creased by the instrumentality in diffusing a knowledge of the
laws and proceedings of the government; which, while it con-
tributes to the security of the people, serves also to guard
them against the effects of misrepresentation and misconcep-
tions. The establishment of additional cross-posts, especial-
ly in the Western and Northern parts of the Union, cannot fail
to be of material Unity. 64
Washington understood the promotion of knowledge, political and other-
wise, as essential to the practice of democratic government. He pro-
posed a national university as well as postal service expansion, both
being crucial to the diffusion of knowledge in the new nation.
Alexander Hamilton wrote of the value of the postal service as in-
frastructure necessary to the growth of commerce:
Facility of communication and cheapness of transportation are
matters of primary importance in the business of every coun-
try; but under the existing circumstances of the United States
they call for the earliest and most efficient exertions of
government. The good condition of the post roads especially
V7here they happen to connect places of landing on the rivers
and bays, and those which run into the western country will
conduce exceedingly to the cheapness of transporting and the
facility of obtaining raw materials, feed and provisions
.
The United States at the time was in need of improved transporta-
tion and communication facilities. The development of these necessary
components of the infrastructure was done "in the belief that individu-
als and corporations would be eager to build the superstructure upon
ft 7
it.' The post office was intended to play, and did play, an important
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role in American commercial development. In looking back, Ross Allan
McReynolds wrote:
The foremost element in post office development between 1789
and 1860 was improved means of transportation, shown in the
highway, canals, the streamboats, and the railroads, which
also enabled settlers to cross the continent more quickly and
the merchant and manufacturer to extend and multiply their
operations
.
The post office did much to promote the growth of "new" technologies by
both providing the infrastructure pivotal to their operation and by sub-
sidization of their operations.
By the Ordinance of 179 4, Congress was authorized to contract with
69private stagecoaches to carry the mail. But apparently because of the
priority accorded passengers over mall'^^ and the resulting unsatisfac-
tory service, the post office established a government-run public enter-
prise experiment, a post office stage between Philadelphia and Balti-
more, begun in 1799 . The system was never extended, however, and ter-
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minated within two decades.
Reflecting the new enthusiasm for private business and free
enterprise in this period, General Meigs [Postmaster -General]
ended the government-owned stagecoach line shortly after the
end of the war [of 1812], and the government ceased to compete
with private businesses in carrying mail and passengers . ^-^
There was a limit to which the postal service, as a public enter-
prise, could extend; beyond that lay the proper sphere of private enter-
prise. The postal service did test the boundaries of legitimate action
in this early period, as it has throughout its history, and settled upon
a role as a public enterprise which subsidizes private enterprise devel-
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opment through establishment and maintenance of an essential societal
infrastructure but which does not compete with private enterprise.
Congress and Policy
This early period can be generally characterized as one in which
policy determination was held relatively close at hand by the Congress.
The example of establishing post roads is indicative of this, although
even here the postmaster was empowered to make contracts with private
parties for the carrying of mail. This is not a broad delegation of
power as far as policymaking, but simply a (necessary) discretionary
power determined by the extent of postal operations. Even so, the let-
ting of contracts had to be done within a set of procedures drawn in de-
74
tail by the Congress.
Congressional control over policymaking, without broad delegation
of power to the administrative agencies of the executive, are character-
istic of the United States prior to 1886-1887, according to Lowi.^^
This earlier era was transformed "quickly" by the Supreme Court in 1886
76(in Wabash
,
St.L. & P.R. v. Illinois ) and Congress in 1887 (by estab-
lishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission, whereby Congress suc-
cessfully nationalized certain regulatory areas and delegated powers to
administrative entities to carry out that regulation) . The nature of
legislation changed as the language used gave broader and more accessi-
ble interpreted powers as mandates, to be administered not by Congress
but by the appropriate agencies.
During the early period, Leonard White noted that,
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in matters of revenue and in the control of shipping, closely
allied with the collection of customs.
. .large powers and
wide discretion were bestowed upon officials, but so limited
were federal activities that administrative authority over
persons or property was otherwise exceptional.'^^
And although Congress "gave great discretionary powers to the Presi-
dent.
.
.," it "distrusted discretion in the hands of subordinates."^^
Though White noted that discretion is to some degree inevitable, the
discretion he cited was narrowly defined and did not approach a meaning-
ful policy role such as Lowi indicates.
The founding era manifested a distributive pattern of politics with
Congress specifying post roads and the "opening" of new areas, fulfill-
ing constituent demands in a time of suspicion of national power. The
national government was thus able to make its presence felt in a posi-
tive, nonthreatening sense to rural residents and farmers desirous of
coimnunication and better roads, especially as they moved further west,
as well as to the more cosmopolitan interests.
80Moreover, even with limited struggles over discretionary powers.
Congress was the agent of policymaking during this period. Goals of
better communication for a more informed society, better roads to facil-
itate that communication as well as commerce, the provision of both ade-
quate mail service and roads to provide components with which to pursue
and formalize^*^ the expanding frontier, and the carrying of newspapers
all worked as conduits of Congressional policy goals which were dis-
cussed in depth and incorporated into the statutes of the period.
''In the sense of bringing the frontier into the mainline of Ameri-
can society institutionally and culturally.
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Insofar as the early postal service was concerned, while discretion was
necessary and delegation of power did occur, the general course of
policy was one of Congressional prerogative, actively exercised. The
Congress was active by establishing post roads, noting deficiencies in
service to be corrected, and making constant corrections in postal
legislation to deal with these and other problems. In an administrative
sense, discretion was evident in the actions of postal officials; in a
policy sense, it was not. Congress had not delegated sufficient power
to the postal service.
Conclusion
The founding period was a time during which the development of the
post office in many ways determined its operation for the next two cen-
turies. Three themes predominate in this early period which need fur-
ther emphasis. They are the post office as a service-provider rather
than a revenue-producer, a national and interstate rather than a state
and intrastate organization, and a facilitator of commerce, communica-
tion, and expansion.
Service provision .
The founding era is characterized by an explicit formulation (in
the form of the Ordinance of 1782) and general understanding of the
postal service as principally a provider of service and not a source of
revenue. Service and the facilitating of commercial activities were its
primary chores, with profits being used towards these purposes, despite
the belief by Hamilton at one time that it could be profitable (as it
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was under Franklin in colonial times)
.
Both Jefferson and Hamilton accepted this orientation. Jefferson
attempted, in 1792, to convince President Washington to transfer the
post office from the Treasury Department to the State Department, be-
cause the law of 179 2 had removed his doubts about the character of the
post office. He observed that it was not designed as a revenue-producer,
which would properly reside in Treasury, but as a service-provider,
since the law declared that (according to Jefferson) "the whole profits
of the office should be applied to extending the posts and that even
O-l
past profits should be refunded by the treasury for the same purpose."
Washington did not act according to Jefferson's wishes, but Jefferson's
perceptions of the nature of the post office were clear.
Hamilton understood this as well, although he did not act on it un^
til 1795, by which time Jefferson was no longer Secretary of State. His
action took the form of proposing a trade: Post Office to State in ex-
change for the Mint to Treasury.
Service provision during this period manifested two main traits:
establishment and extension. These two qualities were the realization
of the service provision needs of the society.
The establishment of the postal system encompassed its evolution
from the Committees of Correspondence through the Constitution and en-
abling acts. The structure, nature, scope, and legitimacy of the postal
service had to be dealt with in fundamental ways. By 1800, a stable
postal organization had been established. While many changes continued,
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they would be incremental and not revolutionary.
The establishment of a service-producing postal service was, how-
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ever, in its own way a radical departure from previous postal practices.
Although the degree of importance is arguable, the concept of a post
office which was not intended primarily to produce revenues or service
to a very limited clientele was different. Postal service as public
service, with the public denoting access to all citizens, was consistent
with and reinforced the idea of American democracy, spreading political
knowledge throughout the citizenry. By focusing on service, and not
requiring it to make a profit, the policymakers were freeing the system
from a rather narrow, city-oriented tool of the well-educated and well-
off. The postal system as a promoter of egalitarianism, of education,
and of expansion was partly a result of the founding era when the estab-
lishment of postal service allowed for a more expansive understanding of
public service than had heretofore been part of postal systems in Europe.
Establishment was not, then, a statutory pronouncement simply set-
ting up the institutions of postal organization. Instead, it was an
evolutionary process whereby an understanding of public purposes was de-
veloped through a series of events and laws which worked toward shaping
a system with definite goals. But this occurred through a legislative
and administrative process which formulated ideas responsive to condi-
tions, made adjustments and alterations, and promoted growth or exten-
sion to meet the demands of a vital nation in its early stage of inde-
pendence.
The establishment of the postal service with a service orientation
encouraged extension of postal service. The original services were ex-
tended to fulfill the needs and demands of a rapidly growing society.
In 1790, the United States system had 75 post offices and 1,875 miles of
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post roads, in 1812, 2,610 post offices and 39,378 miles of post roads,
and by 1829, there were 8,050 post offices and 114,780 miles of post
roads. The types of services did not change significantly, although
increasing use was made of private stagecoach contracts, but the ex-
tension of the existing service was the main goal in terms of service.
Wesley Everett Rich characterized the early period as one in which
The aim was service rather than revenue, and to this end the
receipts were put back into the extension of roads to all
parts of the country. For the period when the country was
young, and rapidly growing, the policy was undoubtedly of im-
mense value to the nation. 87
The character of an extending postal service, building on a narrow
foundation, was evident in the early years, and is reflected in the
records of the Postmasters and secondary sources concerning the postal
service. Leonard White wrote [of the Federalist period]:
The bulk of current business transacted by the General Post
Office consisted of the designation of post offices, the ap-
pointment of deputy postmasters, making contracts for carrying
the mail, receiving periodic reports from the deputies, and
keeping the accounts. 88
The push to provide communication between the northern and southern
stretches of the country, and then to move westward with the settlers,
meant that the existing postal establishment was incessantly being
forced to open up new post offices and servicing post roads. As stated
earlier, Congress had clearly given itself the exclusive right to estab
lish post roads (bringing with this, the post office's reactive role in
providing service, through post offices, contracting for mail delivery,
etc.), and Congress reacted to constituent and regional demands in iden
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tifying needed postal routes. (This continued into the 20th century.)
Americans petitioned [Congress] mostly for post roads, which
meant, of course, mail routes. This, at least, was true in
the nineteenth century, when from whatever point they set-
tled on their westward march.
. .they demanded post routes to
bring them the mail. And at session after session Congressmen
obligingly entered their petitions in the records of Congress,
passed law after law establishing post roads for their consti-
tuents, and blithely handed the postmaster general the task of
installing the postal service on routes they had created. ^9
Service provision during this early period was, therefore, identi-
fied essentially as establishment and extension of the basic postal
service system which has since served the nation. Added to the fact
that the orientation was to service rather than revenue-production, the
post office was, through Congressional appetite, an important and ex-
tremely fast-growing part of the national government. It also repre-
sented the national government in many areas of the new nation where
nothing else did, and unlike most officers of government (e.g., customs
officers, revenue collectors) , was a symbol of the positive aims and
achievements of government. Service as an identifiable goal which was
significantly promoted came to define the postal system. No more im-
portant a component of public policy could touch people in such a per-
sonal way.
A national system .
The establishment of the post office as an unquestionably national
system was integral to the character of postal service, and to the cen-
tral role of Congress in the development of both a coherent system ad-
ministered by the Postmaster General and the identification of suitable
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routes within and between the states. This fit into the visions of the
more nationally-oriented Federalists who held notions of a social wel-
fare removed from localism (i.e., a more cosmopolitan view of demo-
n90 ^ ,, 91cracy) and a government by gentlemen. At the same time, it ap-
pealed to the state-oriented Anti-Federalist view, which generally recog-
nized a need for improved communication and roads for rural residents,
farming interests (wealthy or not), and western settlers, and which un-
derstood the House of Representatives as representing the one true demo-
cratic feature of the new government, i.e., a representative institution
9 2tied directly to the people's voices and votes. The postal service
was, therefore, able to operate as a national public service which ful-
filled the interests of a variety of political advocates and whose Legl-
9 3timacy was tied to the machinations of a popularly-elected House.
The national scope of the postal service was crucial in the devel-
opment of an integrated road network and extensive postal system within
a short time. Whether the demand for postal services within the states
would have led to intrastate systems being quickly developed was ren-
dered moot; however, the resources of the national government being ap-
plied to these efforts most probably made the task a practical under-
taking, especially since the national government was willing to do so on
the back of the United States treasury. At a time when such large-scale
projects were untenable at the state level, the national government was
the only vehicle by which the postal network could have been extended so
widely over such a short period of time.
With the rapid growth of postal operations came the potential for
an increase in political importance. Although the post office did play
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a central role in the development of roads and communication, it did not
manifest itself as a major outlet of political power for which the post
office eventually gained a legendary status in later times. It can be
speculated that each interest saw in the post office and the development
of its potentials the fulfillment of their vision of the "good society",
whether this was in terms of national or local goals, or in terms of
commerce or agriculture; at the same time, few saw any threat posed by
a national government operating the postal system, unlike the threats to
state government autonomy and personal liberties posed by a national
bank or national military.
The national orientation established during this period gave the
postal service an effectively broadened and malleable operational base,
since: 1) the nation as a whole was a large physical area in which to
operate; 2) the ability to operate on a national level allowed room for
more integrated and unified action, less burdened by the more restric-
tive state government perceptions of interests; and 3) the national
government was still in its infancy and developing an essential charac-
ter, while the state governments were well-established in nature, and
94had a continuity which extended back into the colonial period.
The physical size of the new American republic provided unrivaled
opportunities as well as restraints for the postal system. The re-
straints involved the physical features, of course, but more importantly
the clamor for service to remote and newly settled areas. While putting
a strain on the system itself (for new areas were often inaccessible,
and served by poor roads), this also acted to justify the claims for
additional funds, well understood and continually approved by Congress.
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The size and possibilities for extension of postal services therefore
allowed the post office fairly wide latitude in expenditures, in service
provision, and in post office sitings.
The size of the American republic was an object of discussion be-
tween the Federalists and Anti-Federalists, most pertinently the ability
for republican institutions to govern in an extended republic. The ar-
guments of Madison and Hamilton were victorious, but regardless, the new
nation was a large and resource rich country, with a potential wealth
(agricultural and commercial) that would soon overwhelm Europe. The
postal service, crucial to communications of the era, played a critical
role in the development of this potential. Washington referred to its
educational and political potential, and Hamilton to its role in facil-
itating commercial development, while Madison assured in The Federalist
the harmlessness and the worth of a national post office.
The ability to operate as a national institution, free of state
jealousies, gave the post office a broad policy base. The more "re-
fined" view at the national level would produce a policy and service
conducive to the national interest rather than the varied parochial
state political environments. The postal service was not totally in-
sulated from state and local influence as demostrated by the Congres-
sional role in postal policy. This fairly direct representative input
was part of the general processes of Madison's national system, which
was intended to provide for a more qualified, enlightened representative
who could, even while immersed in his district's needs, contemplate some
notion of national interest. Although influenced by local concerns, the
postal service was nonetheless a national entity with the overriding
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goal of a national postal system where each state and locality would be
connected with every other, surely an orientation reiioved from localis-
tic visions of postal service geared to the city or, at most, the state.
The national government was a limited government and a "new"^^
government, which meant that the postal service was unhampered by an
"institutional memory" on the part of the national institutions. This
stood in contrast with the state governments which, even considering
changes and new constitutions, had an organic history which, had they
power over postal operations, would most likely have put greater con-
straints on the post office.
Facilitator of commercial development .
By establishing an infrastructure of communication and roads, the
postal system was providing two of the necessary conditions for economic
success and commercial development. The United States was blessed with
bountiful natural resources, relatively unused in contrast to the worn-
out European continent. A spirit of energy had been unbound by the
revolution, and coupled to the Protestant ethic which allowed for and
even bolstered the development of a commercial spirit—in contrast,
again, to the relatively limited conceptions allowed within the European
political, social, and religious world— the United States had few im-
pediments to development of a successful commercial tradition. Among
the most trying was the isolation experienced by many citizens,
"Isolation" in an agricultural society, based in self-sufficiency,
is not terribly vexing, at least if there is still some transmission of
communication. But to a budding commercial society, isolation deprived
57
the businessman of markets, ideas, capital, and natural resources. Of
course, the nation in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth
century was grounded in agriculture. Yet the purposes of early leaders
were tied to the development of a "commercial republic." And the post
office, from its early days, was not to fail in the promotion of com-
merce.
Facilitating commerce is but one aspect of a more general area of
what Edward G. Daniel described as "non-postal functions." Those serv-
ices, by Daniel's description, include, "the Post Office as a benefi-
cient agent for the encouragement of railroads, ocean shipping, westward
9 7migration, and other non-postal aims." Common to these 'non-postal'
aims was the promotion of private commercial development. During the
founding era, this consisted largely of the subsidization of private
carriers and stagecoaches through their employment to carry the mail,
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rather than a strict reliance on public carriers. A less direct sub-
sidization was through building of post roads which facilitated westward
movement
.
As early as 1785, operating under the Articles of Confederation,
the Postmaster General was authorized and directed to enter into con-
99tracts with carriers employing stagecoaches. The act of May 8, 1794,
also authorized the use of private stagecoaches to carry the mail."''^^
Wayne Fuller explained that this was authorized
because the mail had already become too heavy for horseback
riders to manage alone and because it was thought that the
letters and newspapers would be better protected from robbery
and weather in stagecoaches. , . . But it was also done—and
this was typical of Congress's double use of the Post Office
—
to encourage stagecoaches, subsidized by postal money, to go
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where they otherwise would not have gone and thus establish a
transportation system throughout the young Republic. 101
The postmaster evidently used his authority to so use the stagecoach
lines and, except for a brief flirtation with the government line from
Baltimore to Philadelphia, relied on and subsidized the private lines.
This underwriting of private commercial development is indicative
of the postal service's role throughout its history, beginning at this
early point. Carter Goodrich, in his volume The Government and the Eco -
nomy, 1783-1861
,
picks out "one significant element of continuity,"
which transcends American history, which is
the deep-seated preference of the American people to employ
the powers of government to influence the economy at strategic
points needing special attention rather than attempt its opera-
tion in detail. 102
The post office was the legitimate national government agency which
could stimulate private business without arousing any great cry of in-
dignation: a perfect tool for the government influencing the economy
towards a more commercial and private enterprise development. By 1816,
even Jefferson indicated a more appreciative perspective in his letter
to Benjamin Austin:
We must now place the manufacturer by the side of the agricul-
turist. . . . He, therefore, who is now against domestic
manufacture, must be for reducing us either to dependence on
that foreign nation, or to be clothed in skins, and to live
like wild beasts in dens and caverns. I am not one of these;
experience has taught me that manufactures are now as neces-
sary to our independence as to our comfort. 103
By that time, the United States Post Office was promoting not only
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stagecoaches, but steamships as well."'"^'^
As early as 1791, in his report to Congress, Hamilton had written
extensively about the need to provide the proper conditions to help
stimulate the infant manufacturing abilities of the nation. "'^^ His
closing sentences display the recognition of a need to help provide the
capital necessary for "prompting and improving the efforts of industry."
He wrote that:
In countries where there is great private wealth, much may be
effected by the voluntary contributions of patriotic individu-
als; but in a community situated like that of the United
States, the public purse must supply the deficiency of private
resource
.
In one sense, the postal service was the 'public purse' which 'prompted
and improved' the conditions under which private commercial interests
operated, for the subsidization of their efforts (through employing
their private services as a means of achieving the public goal of postal
service) was an important, if not determinant, boon to their development.
Hamilton also understood, "The Facilitating of the Transportation
of Commodities," as being one of the "principal. . .means by which the
growth of manufactures is ordinarily promoted. ""'"^^ Hamilton recognized
the national government's power to construct public roads and canals,
and wrote that, "This is one of the improvements, which could be prose-
cuted with more efficacy by the whole than by any parts of the Union.
""'"'^^
He feared the sacrifice of the "general interest" to local interests,
and argued against any such local "jealousies" as unwarranted. He then
turned to an extensive quotation from Adam Smith to demonstrate that,
"Good roads, canals and navigable rivers. . .are. . .the greatest of all
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109improvements." Smith had written that even local opposition had been
shown to be in error, in that when previously opposed turnpike roads
were put in place, "Their rents however have risen and their cultivation
has improved . ""^'"^
This provides a basis for understanding tne utility of providing
infrastructure, capital, and promotional support for the development of
more commercial ability in the United States. The Constitution allowed
for this type of activity, and Congress supported this process in the
form o^ a benevolent postal service (even if it opposed promoting com-
merce through a national bank)
. In the early years the operations of
the postal service were not as wide-ranging as they would later be, or
even as some proposed they should be at the time, but its role in that
period as a growing public enterprise, a central visible and positive
representative of the national government, and a promoter of private en-
terprise, is an indication of the enduring character of the United
States postal service.
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9 3Among the various interests who viewed the postal service on a
national scale as having a greater utility were the whole range of poli-
tical actors. Commercial interests welcomed the extension and improve-
ment of the road network to facilitate commerce, but so did everyone
else
.
Wealthy farmers wanted to promote agricultural trade, and so saw
road development as essential, especially those farmers located inland.
Settlers moving westward demanded postal service to keep in communica-
tion with the society they had left behind. Those concerned with the
political development of this experiment in republicanism, such as George
Washington, thought communication essential for an informed populace, and
so that the bulk of the population could have contact with and informa-
tion about the national government, and so lessen the inherently perva-
sive distrust of centralized power. All in all, there was widespread
support for a comprehensive and reliable postal service which would im-
prove and extend the road system; this would materially improve the
lives of almost everyone while being no threat of an substance. A na-
tional postal system brought with it the best of convenience from a gen-
eral government without the baggage of threats to notions of sovereignty
or bas ic rights
.
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CHAPTER III
THE POSTAL TELEGRAPH
The history of the early post office is one of establishment and
extension of the fundamental services expected of a postal service. The
means employed were all toward a purpose of letter carrying, whether by
horseback, stagecoach, steamship, or the emerging railroads. The post
office played an important role in subsidizing the steamship and rail-
road industries early in their development, which in turn provided im-
provement in the post office's service, speed, reliability, and extent
of operation. At the same time that the post office remained a political
tool of Congressional prerogative, it became increasingly politicized
through Andrew Jackson's appointment of William Barry as Postmaster Gen-
eral .
'
During the first year of the Jackson administration, an es-
timated 54 3 postmasters, or about 7 per cent of the more than
8,000 postmasters in the country were removed for political
reasons. This figure may seem comparatively small, but it
represents almost all the postmasterships worth bothering
about. Most of the changes were made in New York and the New
England states, the stronghold of the Eastern establishment .
^
Leonard White cited a House Report from 1835 which stated that the Post
Office was not "a political department.
. .in the partisan sense of the
word," but that, "Since the 4th of March, 1829, the removals of postmas-
ters have not fallen much short of 1,300, and in a great majority of the
cases without the assignment of any cause." That Barry represented
70
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Jackson's interests in political appointments seems clear, but his ap-
parently inept administrative activities and poor relations with Con-
gress eventually caused his removal in 1835.
The greatest innovation in communication lay ahead and is the sub-
ject of this chapter~the introduction of the electromagnetic telegraph
by Samuel F. B. Morse. The change of speed from that of horses or ship
or trains to the almost instantaneous telegraph wire was a critical ad-
vance
.
Communication had from the beginning of history been tied to
transportation. Messages could travel no faster than the
messengers. The limitation disappeared [with] the invention
of the magnetic telegraph.'^
Morse relied on government funds to prove his system practical in opera-
tion, and operated it under the Treasury Department and the Post Office
in its initial stages. An analysis of why this revolution in communica-
tion was allowed to assume completely private ownership rather than pub
lie (postal) ownership will help clarify the attitudes toward public en-
terprise during the late 1830s and 1840s. The opportunity missed for
successful government enterprise can be measured by the enormous subse-
quent success of the Western Union Company.^
The Post Office Department went through years of changing steward-
ship: Barry until 1835; Amos Kendall (1835-1840); John Milton Niles
(1840-1841); Francis Granger (1841); Charles A. Wickliffe (1841-1845);
and Cave Johnson (1945-1849). Barry's inept administration and patron-
age; Kendall's sharp business and administrative acumen; Wickliffe's
"alarming" mismanagement; Granger's differences with President Tyler
—
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these personalities helped lead to the Act of 1845, which reformed pos-
tage rates (by weight rather than number of sheets), changed methods for
contracting out mail routes, and established the star-route system.^
According to Cullinan, Cave Johnson
had little interest in the postal system as such. He was
principally interested in using the Post Office Department as
a base for his political manipulations. He was Polk's closest
friend, personally and politically, and the President's liai-
son man with Congress.'
Postal policy concerning the telegraph grew out of this atmosphere of
politically-minded administration, as well as of the economic conditions
of the period. The general political trends toward less government in-
vestment influenced whatever public (and postal) policymakers attempted.
In this sense, the larger arena of public policy conditions was impor-
tant in assessing why the post office was not granted the logical power
over the telegraph. The literature on the post office is brief and gen-
eral in this area and calls for futher development.
In any event, despite the requests for a public telegraph urged by
central figures such as Samuel Morse, Postmaster General Johnson, and
the House Committee of Ways and Means, the telegraph came into private
operation. Leonard White described the prevalent mood of the time:
Laissez-faire trumphed. Congress not only would not buy the
patent rights, it was indifferent to the regulation of the
telegraph system. Both the "safety of the citizen" and the
threat of disastrous competition to the post office by a pri-
vate monopoly yielded to the predisposition of the time, [dur-
ing] an age deeply committed to the less government, the bet-
ter and to primary reliance on the states for what regulation
seemed unavoi dabl e .
^
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Robert Luther Thompson wrote that ultimately, despite Postmaster General
Johnson's repeated appeals for public control of the telegraph in 1846.
"The government, now busily engaged in prosecuting the war with Mexico,
could not be bothered with anything so trivial as the telegraph. "9
Wayne Fuller cited a sudden "lack of interest in government ownership of
the telegraph"10 in 1846, attributed to apparent fears about the ineffi-
ciencies possible in government operation of a telegraph system.
Yet a more complete picture is warranted here to help explain the
reasons Congress ultimately failed to create (or sustain) a postal tele-
graph in the 1840s. The economic histories about the period do not in-
dicate an unwillingness for government to be involved in promoting im-
provements, although enthusiasm was dwindling, and the post office in
particular was the foremost example of a willingness to extend operation
as far and as wide as possible. What were the special conditions in the
relationship of the telegraph technology to public operation, what was
the general relationship of the government to private enterprise during
the period in terms of developing improvements, and how can the decision
to let private interests develop a telegraph system be understood within
the context of American public policy?
The story of the telegraph in the United States is generally con-
sidered to be "so closely bound up with the life of [Samuel] Morse that
the story of one can scarcely be told without touching upon that of the
other. "11 Thus, most accounts do detail the Morse "connection," leaving
others such as Joseph Henry, whose "discoveries were fundamental," by
the wayside. 12 Alfred Still, in Communication through the Ages , con-
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tends that asking, "Who invented the electric telegraph?.
. .is rather
silly." Each country has its own socialization process and values,
which lead to a result wherein Morse is America's inventor of the tele-
graph; Cooke and Wheatstone, Britain's; von Seiranering, Germany's, etc.l^
In America, such questions are addressed to the child, because
the child is more up to date and consequently more knowing
than his elders. The American child, who learns at an early
age that glorification of his country is his first duty, while
veracity is largely a matter of expediency, promptly produces
the name of Samuel F. B. Morse. 15
While the contributions of various actors in the international scienti-
fic scene were obviously crucial, the fact that the most heavily pursued
attempts to put a telegraph to public use in the United States were
those revolving around Samuel Morse makes his contribution to public
policy formation especially relevant.
As early as 1837 Morse advocated a government telegraph, in answer-
ing a circular letter sent from Secretary of the Treasury Levi Woodbury
in compliance with a resolution of the House of Representatives of
February 3, 1837. The circular was intended to procure "from the most
intelligent sources, such information as would enable Congress.
. .to
decide upon the propriety of establishing a system of telegraphs."!^
Secretary Woodbury, "from these communications, and such other investi-
gations as the pressure of business has enabled me to make," was
satisfied that the establishment of a system of telegraphs for
the United States would be useful to commerce as well as the
Government. It might most properly be made appurtenant to the
Post Office, and, during war, would prove a most essential aid
to the military operations of the country.!^
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Morse's response, dated September 27, 1837, cited five advantages to the
construction and operation of a postal telegraph
1) nearly instantaneous communication of the "fullest and mostprecise information" between points
2) the above at any time and in any weather
3) the process achieved in a fairly small space
4) the message recorded in a "permanent manner," and
5) the message made in secret.
He prefaced the argument for the development of a telegraph system with
the reasoning that it should be under the auspices of the Post Office
Department, because
The mail system.
.
.is founded on the universally admitted
principle, that the greater the speed with which intelligence
can be transmitted from point to point, the greater is the
benefit to the whole community. 18
Indeed, the history of the post office had been steeped in attempts to
improve the speed and scope of mail service. Morse asked rhetorically,
"The only question that remains.
. .is, what system is best calculated,
from its completeness and cheapness, to effect this desirable end?"l^
The answer was the telegraph, and he wrote that.
if the perfecting of this new system of telegraphs. . .shall
be thought of as public utility, and worthy the attention of
Government, I shall be ready to make any sacrifice of personal
service and of time to aid in its accomplishment.^^
Morse took his telegraph instrument and demonstrated it in Washing-
ton in February, 1838, and it
so impressed the
chairman, F.O.J.
House
Smith
Committee
of Maine
—
on Commerce—especially its
that an enthusiastic recom-
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mendation was made for an appropriation of $30,000 to permit
the construction of an experimental telegraph line to test thepracticability of Morse's invention.
. .but the panic of 1837
the skepticism of Congress, and the pressure of other business
intervened, and no money was appropriated . 21
The Commerce Committee held Morse's demonstration in its meeting room
and, "On February 21, President Martin Van Buren and his entire cabinet,
at their own special request, visited the room and saw the telegraph in
operation." ^ But ultimately Congress did not act. It appears that
economic conditions and skepticism ran ahead of Morse's enthusiasm, and
that Congress felt that public monies for a questionable technology were
no better spent than the private ones Morse had been unable to acquire.
It was not until 1843 that Congress finally appropriated Morse the
$30,000 initially proposed in 1838.
The conditions in 1842-1843 had been altered by the enhanced image
of the science of the telegraph. A report from the House Committee on
Commerce, dated December 30, 1842, cited the international recognition
hich Morse's invention had received (particularly in France and Bri-
tain), and further promoted the American spirit, for
it is a matter of national pride, that the invention of the
first electro-magnetic telegraph
,
by Professor Morse, as well
as the first conception of using electricity as the means of
transmitting intelligence, by Doctor Franklin, is the off-
spring of American genius. 23
The substance of the report develops the potential for the telegraph in
7 A
terms of defense, commerce, and social relations. Further, the poten-
tial for revenue from the operation of a telegraph system was apparently
"so inviting" that to pass up the chance for the regulation or operation
w
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of the system might lead to such development by a private company, and
"might be used to the serious injury of the Post Office Department," and
would be beyond interference because of considerations of "justice or
public opinion ."^5 The Commerce report introduced "A Bill to test the
practicability of establishing a system of electro magnetic telegraphs
by the United States. "^6
A later report of Mr. Chappell, from the House Committee of Ways
and Means, concluded that the constitutional basis and significance of
the postal power allowed the post office to operate a telegraph. The
Post Office had always seen its obligation to keep up with the newest of
technologies, and it would have been
a gross and manifest dereliction to have permitted it to lag
behind the improvements of the age, and to be out-stripped by
the pace of ordinary travel and commercial communication. To
be outstripped by private expresses, or by the ordinary lines
of travel, is deemed.
. .a thing.
. .not to be permitted.
This great and fundamental principle upon which the depart-
ments acts [sic].
.
.led necessarily to subsidizing the steam-
engine into the service of the post office; and it must and
will lead, with equal certainty, to a like adoption of any
other newly discovered agency or contrivance possessing de-
cided advantage of celerity over previously used methods. ^7
The report emphasized that the sole question to be considered was whether
the advantages of the telegraph were "of sufficient value to justify the
expense of engraftment on the system. "^8 xhe report also discussed the
arguments for a telegraph, the foremost being the "rapidity of transmis-
sion" and its corollary benefits. Communications would be secret. They
foresaw that the telegraph would soon be developed by private enterprise
if not by the public, so that
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then a state of things will inunediately develop itself whichthe people will never endure or tolerate the government inpermitting to exist. The state of things would be that the
post office, in its transportation of all correspondence and
news would lag not hours, but days, behind the transmission
of the same things through another medium; and that, a medium
belonging to private individuals, and controlled by private
views and interests. 29
And the corollary of a private development of the telegraph would make
it "manifest how greatly government and the people would lie at their
mercy." The report affirms in detail the power of the post office to
develop the telegraph, and operate it in the public interest, and fur-
ther states that the government has the power to establish the telegraph
for its own use: "the committee deems the constitutionality of the mat-
ter incontrovertible. "^1 This seemed to resolve any constitutional or
jurisdictional questions, although the telegraph was initially put under
the Secretary of the Treasury instead of the Postmaster General. -^^ The
resolution passed the House February 22, 184 3, and then the Senate in
the last hours of the session. -^-^
Morse, who had been unable to attract private capital to fund his
experiment to demonstrate the practicality of the telegraph, had finally
convinced the government to do so, after five years of effort. Whether
Congress acted simply out of the failure of private enterprise to risk
the funds necessary to provide for this pilot project or whether it was
a more positive statement of policy, such as that embodied in the House
report of December 30, 1842, cannot be readily ascertained. A broad in-
dication, though, is that a mere three years later, after the line had
been built, the practicability of the technology proven, and an ongoing
(if somewhat erratic and curious) enterprise in operation. Congress did
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not see fit to
_buyj:he patent for the telegraph from Morse and continue
to operate a public line or system, but rather allowed the whole tech-
nology to be run privately. The commitment to a public system, operated
for public rather than private benefit and under the control of the Post
Office Department rather than its potential competitors, was lacking.
There were proponents of a public telegraph system, although they
were ignored or rejected. These included Morse, Postmaster General
Johnson, and the President of the Magnetic Telegraph Company and ex-
Postmaster General, Amos Kendall. Morse was foremost along these. Hav-
ing achieved success in the establishment of an operating line.
He felt that he had earned repose. To this end he sought to
carry out his long-cherished idea that the telegraph should
become the property of the Government, and he was willing to
accept a very modest remuneration. 34
His offer of $100,000 to be paid to him and the other proprietors was
rejected.
Congress did not accept the repeated recommendations in 1845 and
1846 of the Postmaster General, Cave Johnson. Johnson did not envision
an immediate profit in the establishment of the telegraph, but
Its importance to the public does not consist in any probable
income that can ever be derived from it; but as an agent vast-
ly superior to any other ever devised by the genius of man for
the diffusion of intelligence, which may be accomplished with
almost the rapidity of light to any part of the republic, its
value in all commercial transactions, to individuals having
the control of it, or to the government in time of war, could
not be estimated. The use of an instrument so powerful for
good or for evil cannot with safety to the people be left in
the hands of private individuals uncontrolled by law.35
Johnson feared that a partial government operation of the telegraph would
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lead to skimming by private services, and that those private interests
might use the telegraph to "perhaps become the most potent instrument
the world ever knew to effect sudden and large speculations - to rob the
many of their just advantages, and concentrate them upon the few. "36 in
1846 Johnson again advocated the purchase of the telegraph, arguing that
the Post Office
must necessarily be superseded in much of its most important
business in a few years, if the telegraph be permitted to re-
main under the control of individuals. It is the settled con-
viction of the undersigned that the government should get the
exclusive control of it, by purchase, or that its use should
be subjected to the restraints of law. 37
ers
,
But Congress neglected Johnson's counsel and Morse's wishes and off
The failure of the Government to appreciate the value of what
was offered to them was always a deep source of regret to
Morse. For, while he himself gained much more by the opera-
tion of private companies, the evils which he had foretold
were more than realized. 38
The result was that, "Dozens of private telegraph companies were born
overnight
.
"-^^
This period in the development of the telegraph illustrates both
the extent to which the government would go in promoting a novel tech-
nology and the limits to which it would hold itself in operating a public
enterprise. The time from Morse's letter to Secretary of the Treasury
Woodbury (in 1837) to the "explosion" of private companies in the after-
math of Congress' inaction is an indication of how the government ap-
proached public service issues in the nineteenth century.
One interesting fact is that state capital was never sought by
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Morse, and state telegraph operation neglected, despite increasing state
involvement in capital funding and regulation during the Jacksonian
period. ^0 The regional (and then national) competition and the rapid
growth of the private telegraph system may have inhibited the involve-
ment of the states, but this surely contrasts with state involvement in
canal and railroad construction. But since the government of the period
was flexible in terms of subsidization, the need for national funding
may have eclipsed a state role. George Rogers Taylor wrote, in The
Transportation Revolution
, about the limited perceived constitutional
role of federal government during the period,
having to do with defense, the mails, Indian affairs, and in-
terstate and foreign commerce.
. . . With the exception of
transportation, not many new fields existed where the federal
government might easily have entered during this period. But
where a real need for federal ownership of facilities appeared,
practically no opposition to it seemed to have developed. ^1
The period in which Morse was developing the telegraph was one in
which the national government was, in general, restrained in its powers
and its role in promoting internal improvements. Why this did not
translate into schemes for state and local funding of either Morse's de-
velopment or the infant telegraphs system is probably due 1) to the pri-
macy of the national government in postal affairs, or communications anc
2) to an implicit understanding of the nature of communications technol-
ogy, which required a national rather than piecemeal or state focus,
something recognized since the founding period. The first point is ad-
dressed in Chapter II, where it was shown how there existed a remarkable
lack of conflict between the states and the national government over tht
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complete monopoly of government postal functions given the national gov-
ernment. ^2 second point is reinforced by the notion that the promo-
tion of union, and feelings of national felicity, would be an important
byproduct of a national postal service. ^3 This was important to a na-
tion which was, at the time of the founding, in danger of separation in-
to many parts, and later was threatened by the increasing regional pres-
sures afflicting ante-bellum society. In both cases, postal service and
efforts for improving communications were important tools for helping to
bring about moderation. Moderation would help to alleviate the pres-
sures which factions would inevitably put on a democratic nation, and
the flow of information to an increasingly "learned" society would help
induce such moderation.
The most striking element of the development of public policy toward
the telegraph is the relationship between the political tenor of the
times and the approach to public sector activity. Until the 1830s, na-
tional government involvement had been viewed as legitimate in promoting
enterprises which private capital could not promote. '^^ But with the ad-
vent of the Jacksonian period, national government involvement became
suspect in relation to state government action, and much activity de-
volved to state government. Debate centered around the propriety of na-
46tional versus state action.
This switch to state government activity does not have a relevance
to the issue of the telegraph, though, for there never was a question of
state action, just as with the development of the postal service. What
was at issue was national action versus leaving the field to private de-
velopment. And although private capital was unwilling to fund Morse's
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experiment, it is not at all clear that it unable to do so, and in
fact, as soon as the (potential and immed iate) benefits began to be
realized, investors jumped right in
This falls in line with other examples of national promotion of
commercial development, especially in the internal improvement projects
concerning the canals, steamships, and railroads. A7 But,
Direct support to transport was less important after the
1830s.
. . .
One reason for diminished public involvement was
the crisis of confidence in internal-improvement subsidies
created by the Panic of 1837. Also, the conquest of the mid-
western prairies in the 1840s and 1850s was less risky for
private enterprise than the conquest of the Appalachian bar-
rier, which took place largely before 1837. Finally, by the
1840s both capital markets and corporate structures had become
better equipped to mobilize and manage the large units of
capital required.
Although national government subsidization was on the decline by the
1840s, in relative terms, the telegraph was a new technology in need of
a subsidy. It took five years for Morse to receive a subsidy, and the
success in making the development of the first electric telegraph in the
United States a project under purely public auspices was probably moti-
vated by a number of factors, including: 1) the historical role of the
government as a promoter of new technologies; 2) the national govern-
ment's operation of the system of intelligence transfer or communication,
which had up to that point included letters and newspapers, but was now
apparently being expanded; 3) the unwillingness of private enterprise^^
to enter into a project which was, by all evidence, developing a tech-
nology which would revolutionize communications and society; and 4) the
relatively small investment which would be required to finance Morse's
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experiment, especially considering the potential benefits, to the public
treasury, to coimnercial development, and to the prestige of America and
its genius. So the willingness to fund an internal improvement was a
national policy outcome given the specific policy area (communications-
postal/transportation policy), and the type of promotion involved, i.e.,
"seed" money to insure that a telegraph would be built, not dissimilar
from the use of stagecoaches, steamships, or railroads used by the post
office. That this action was taken despite some hesitancy to use govern-
ment where private enterprise could potentially develop was probably due
to the long-term involvement of the national government in postal policy,
postal subsidization, and so communication, all of which was uncontrover-
sial. Added to this is the fact that although the effects of the Panic
of 1837 were still being felt.
No other nation in modern history has experienced less diffi-
culty in meeting its financial needs than did the United
States in the years between the second war with England and
the Civil War. 50
Finally, whatever the contrary trends within the period, the time be-
tween 1815 and 1860 has been characterized as one in which government
(often at the state level) was active, for
in no other period of American history has the government been
so active in financing and actually promoting, owning, and
controlling banks and public works including turnpikes,
bridges, canals, and railroads
.
The initial funding for Morse's demonstration project between Wash-
ington and Balitmore was undertaken, then, as a logical developmental
step well within the scope of American public policy of the time. It
85
was consistent with what had gone before and what was still developing.
But despite the logic of this investment in the telegraph, the Congress,
ignoring pleas of the Postmaster General and Samuel Morse, refused to go
further to operate or expand a public telegraph system under the direc-
tion of the Post Office. The relinquishing of tnis new and innovative
system to the world of private enterprise provides several indications
about public and congressional attitudes toward the role of government
within the environment of the period.
The first is that, despite the government's willingness to provide
some money where no private capital was available, it was not so gladly
given within the political atmosphere of the period. Increasingly,
private development was preferred, and increasingly it was able to be
used. As W. Elliot BroiMilee indicated, money was much more readily
available in the 1840s and 1850s to be "mobilized and managed" to pro-
mote private development. At that, the telegraph technology was not as
capital intensive as other improvements, while at the same time it of-
fered "the most drastic change" in an era "of revolutionary developments
in transportation and communication . "^^ Thus, for a relatively small
outlay, potential receipts were enormous. As soon as this became
evident.
Dozens of private telegraph companies were bom overnight.
Telegraph poles suddenly sprouted along the nation's roads and
railroads as mile after mile of message-bearing wire were
hauled aloft and strung from pole to pole, while down on the
grotjnd such confusion spread that a telegram from New York to
the frontier town of Chicago would have to pass through as
many as four companies. 5
3
And,
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Wxth the great extension of the lines, the original hesitancy
to use the telegraph disappeared. The whole method of gather-
ing news was rapidly revolutionized, and business, financial,
and transportation interests soon began to make use of the new
device. -'^
Quickly, private development of the telegraph made a public monopoly on
the patent almost irretrievable, as Morse had feared. Discussion of
making the telegraph publicly-owned continued, but the topic was pretty
well closed by 1846, until the first World War.
The subsidization of the first Morse telegraph line (with $30,000),
and a later grant of $8,000 to cover expenses and for structural reor-
56ganization within the government, was all that the public sector, in
the form of Congress, was willing to provide. One last appropriation of
$4,000 was made,^^ and "Congress authorized the Postmaster General to
lease the line to any person who would keep it in operation for its
earnings, or sell it under the direction of the President of the United
58States." The Postmaster General did first lease it and then ultimate-
59ly sell it to the Magnetic Telegraph Company,
Congress went as far as founding and operating the first signifi-
cant telegraph line, but no further. Its role was dominant in postal
policy, and it was able to determine the scope of Post Office activities,
It had time to act when no private interests would adequately fund fur-
ther development, but this time span was very short, and Congress did
not act. Samuel Morse, Cave Johnson and Amos Kendall all urged the
government to buy the patent to the telegraph system and run it as a
government enterprise. Yet there was no action on this. Evidently,
Congress could extend the post roads and order improvement in the postal
system without fully appreciating the importance of the telegraph as a
communications device and its effect on the transfer of information
through society.
The only protracted discussion in Congress concerning the merits of
the telegraph in the 1843-1847 period took place in the Senate on Febru-
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ary 28, 1845. It indicates a reluctance to act, whatever the advan-
tages. Whigs generally favored the telegraph, with some reservations
(of Senator George Evans), while Democrats opposed it.
Senator George McDuffie, Democrat from South Carolina,^"'' asked,
"What [will] this telegraph do? Would it transmit letters and news-
papers?" Along with Senator Thomas Hart Benton's^^ question as to
whether "there was a call for it by the merchants of the country?", this
indicated a concern as to the commercial viability of the proposed ex-
tension of the telegraph from Baltimore to New York. (Senator Benton
was a Democrat from Missouri.) Senator Jabez William Huntington, a Whig
6 3from Connecticut, said that "no petitions had come from the merchants
in favor of that telegraph, because they thought its value and impor-
tance was too evident to require being brought to the notice of Con-
gress .
"
64Senator George Evans, a Whig from Maine, wondered, "Why should
the government wish to work the telegraph for the benefit of private in-
dividuals? If merchants wished the benefits of the telegraph between
here and Baltimore, let them pay for it." Senator Alexander Barrow,
6 5Whig from Louisiana, had earlier indicated that operation of the tele-
graph
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erected by the government and controlled by the Post Office
Department, would not only pay its expense, but be a source of
revenue. He hoped to see the day when it would be extended to
Boston and New Orleans
.
However, Senator Evans' suggestion that the powerful interests would
benefit through a government telegraph was not readily answered, and he
seemed to reflect the general outlook of the period, as characterized by
contemporary historians, such as Richard Hofstedter:
The Jacksonian movement grew out of expanding opportunities
and a common desire to enlarge these opportunities still fur-
ther by removing restrictions and privileges that had their
origins in acts of government; thus, with some qualifications,
it was essentially a movement of laissez-faire, an attempt to
divorce government and business. 66
*t
The maintenance or growth of public enterprise in order that the estab-
lished interests might be served had a disquieting effect on the Con-
gress of the time, so that both Evans and Benton might raise such an is-
sue within an effective political atmosphere acting as a stage. Con-
tinued maintenance of the telegraph line, and extension of that line,
would be a public subsidy to private business. The money for Morse's
development of an experimental line from Washington to Baltimore was
enough; if business wanted a telegraph badly enough, they could surely
construct it.
There was no effective argument against that, for Huntington ad-
mitted that its value was evident enough, the implication being that
business was waiting for the government to develop the telegraph. There
was no indication that capital could not be raised, or that the risk was
too great, so it appears that the line was rejected, in economic terms.
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to lessen the benefits to private business. Further government subsi-
dization was understood as simply allowing business to concentrate on
its ongoing operations. What Senators Evans and Benton missed was the
business potential of the telegraph itself, which Barrow understood to
be a "source of revenue" for the Post Office Department. While the Post
Office has throughout its history been just that, a subsidizer of com-
mercial (as well as educational and political) expansion, senators now
argued against further expansion through Jacksonian lenses: to be care-
ful in exploiting the national government so that established interests,
6 7no matter what their fiscal (or moral) integrity, would not retain the
advantage.
Senator McDuffie worried that "the telegraph might be made very
mischievous, and secret communication after communicated, to the preju-
6 8dice of merchants." However, Senator Huntington, "thought no danger
would result from its establishment, owned as it would be by the govern-
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ment, and controlled by the Postmaster General." As early as 1842,
the House Committee on Commerce had voiced concerns as to how the tele-
graph, "if monopolized by a private company, might be used to the seri-
ous injury of the Post Office Department . "^^ And the House Report Num-
ber 187, presented three days after McDuffie's Senate rhetoric, voiced
the same fears of injury to the Post Office. Furthermore,
if the government shall not speedily embrace the project. . .
he [Morse] will be necessitated to look elsewhere for his in-
demnification. And, should the arrangements into which he may
find it necessary to enter with private individuals or associ-
ations, stipulate exclusive rights in their favor, it is mani-
fest how greatly government and the people would lie at their
mercy
.
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McDuffie also asked, "Under what power in the constitution did
senators propose to erect this telegraph? He was not aware of any
authority except under the clause for the establishment of post roads. "^^
No one answered directly, although everyone presumed the power would be
exercised by the Post Office Department, since chis power was being used
by the Post Office Department to operate the Baltimore to Washington
line. But three days later, the House Committee of VJays and Means did
answer McDuffie by detailing an argument of constitutional justifica-
tion. The Committee found that the operation of the telegraph was
legitimately a post office power. As the post office subsidized steam-
ships and railroads, it could equally do so with telegraphs. In addi-
tion to the postal power, "the government undoubtedly possesses the
authority to establish the telegraph for its own use in the transmission
of official orders and communications." Together with the postal power,
"the committee deem the constitutionality of the measure incontroverti-
m73ble." Whether McDuffie was aware of the report which was about to be
74
released is not known, but his line of argument was forcefully re-
butted by the reasoning of the Committee of Ways and Means and by the
practice already ongoing in operating the Baltimore-VJashington line as
part of the Post Office.
Congress took no further action, and the telegraph system was de-
veloped by private individuals. Whether Evans and Benton would have ac-
cepted "some system"—any system—is questionable. But the point is
moot, since government deliberation was running a race with the rapidity
with which private enterprise appreciated the implications of the tele-
graph as a revolution in communication. And as Congress failed to act,
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Morse asked Amos Kendall to serve as President of what came to be the
Magnetic Telegraph Company. The story developed from there is a private
enterprise success. Although discussion of the public control of the
telegraph system surfaced at times, significant action was not taken un-
til 1918, when the exigencies of the first World War led to a government
takeover of the telegraph and telephone systems.
As a public policy question, the failure of Congress to listen to
those pushing for a telegraph system under the Post Office illustrates
how the postal service as a public enterprise has been instrumentally
operated to achieve certain limited ends. The subsidization of private
enterprise has been central to postal policy throughout the existence of
the postal service, but the ownership of stagecoaches, steamships, rail-
roads, or the telegraph has been seen as undesirable. Subsidize busi-
ness, but do not displace business or inhibit its development.
The main characteristic of the telegraph example is borne out in
the nature of public enterprise in the United States as a subsidizer of
commercial development. The government, specifically Congress, went as
far as necessary to stimulate development. Whereas the post office had
earlier used the stages, ships, or railroads as a means by which to de-
liver mail, in the case of the telegraph the post office more straight-
forwardly developed the technology. When this was done, the telegraph
was set loose by Congress to develop and compete with the Post Office.
The warnings of Cave Johnson in his annual reports as Postmaster
General (reports of December 1, 1845, and December 7, 1846) were not
heeded. He wrote that.
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It becomes, then, a question of great importance, how far the
government will allow individuals to divide with it the busi-
ness of transmitting intelligence—an important duty, confided
to It by the constitution, necessarily and properly exclu-
sive?.
. .
The use of an instrument so powerful for good or
for evil cannot with safety to the people be left in the hands
of private individuals uncontrolled by law. 75
Apparently Congress was willing to let the Post Office Department absorb
the onslaught of the telegraph. Although the postal service still
exists, this is an early indication of the way in which Congress would
allow the post office to be inhibited in certain ways, developmentally
(in terms of new technical possibilities) and financially, whereby Con-
gress sets conditions allowing private enterprises to operate success-
fully against the post office and to skim profits (despite the first
class mail monopoly). Thus, in the promotion of commercial development
relating to the telegraph, Congress not only allowed but ordered the de-
velopment of a technology which would ultimately compete with the Post
Office, and yet could not be used by the Post Office. This public en-
terprise was therefore having its potential for qualitative improvement,
profit-making, and public recognition and approval undermined. So pub-
lic policy in this instance not only limited postal abilities and sub-
sidized private commercial development, it subsidized and established a
competitor to the very post office it operated. This is a very differ-
ent endeavor altogether, for in the past the promotion of commercial
development had to do with general economic growth, education, or trans-
portation, while in this case Congress had subsidized and developed an
alternative communication system . This introduced a new dimension into
American postal policy. In this case Congress demonstrated to the
postal service that it favored private enterprise over public enter-
prise, and that it would not hesitate to allow competition in the com
munications field. The implications were immense for the United Stat
Post Office in particular and for public enterprise in general. The
"loss" of the telegraph, from the viewpoint of the postal service as
public enterprise, was significant.
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graph lines along these routes, and then to build the numerous side or
feeder lines necessary to serve the entire country." (Thompson, op. ^
cit., 39.)
56T^hompson, o£^. cit .
, 31.
^^Ibid.
, 33.
Ibid .
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Ibid
.
, 56. During the period of 1845-1846 Kendall, while "work-
ing earnestly for the development of the telegraph by private enterprise
. . .strongly favored the sale of the patent rights to the government."
(Thompson, o£. cit
. ,
40.) Others involved disagreed, specifically for-
mer congressman F. 0. J. Smith, who "had made up his mind that he would
never again be a party to any application to the government to purchase
the telegraph." ( Ibid . ) Kendall ultimately agreed to a time limit until
which the government could buy the patent, a limit which passed.
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Co ngres s ional Globe
,
February 28, 1845, 28th Congress, 2nd Ses-
sion, p. 366. From: Sketches of the Debates and Proceedings , edited by
Blair and Rives (City of Washington: Globe Office, 1845), Volume XIV.
The following quotes in the text are taken from this debate of February
28, 1845.
6
1
Senator George McDuffie was Senator from South Carolina, a Demo-
crat who was representative of the Jacksonians, although his disagree-
ments over the Bank of the United States and nullification left him dis-
pleased with the administration. See: Dictionary of American Biography ,
edited by Dumas Malone (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933), and
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Biographical Dictionary of the Ame.ri ran Congress 1774-1971 (Washington
United States Government Printing Office, 1971).
'
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Senator Thomas Hart Benton was Senator from Missouri, a Democrat
He was more representative of the Jacksonians, being Jackson's spokesmanm the Senate, and Senate leader against the Bank of the United StatesHis ties to Jackson were intricate, including the fact that either he orhis brother left a bullet lodged in Jackson's chest (in a brawl, of
sorts), an incident they later let rest. Dictionary of American Blo-
graphy
,
op
. cit
.
, Volume II. ~
6 3
Senator Jabez Williams Huntington was Senator from Connecticut, a
Biographical Dictionary of the American Congress 1774-19 71
. op^.
Whig
cit.
64„
Senator George Evans was Senator from Maine, a Whig (or "i
Republican")
.
He is not being stereotyped as a Jacksonian, but (
^-._„.„_
. . . .....
'national
. .
,
only as
reflective of the Jacksonian era which permeated national politics.
Evans was a strong supporter of the protective tariff, of the United
States Bank, and of Internal Improvements. He admitted during the de-
bate that, "He was not hostile to the extension; and he thought it next
to useless unless extended to New York. [My emphasis.] He thought,
however, that some preliminary arrangements would have to be made before
such an extension was authorized. It would be necessary to acquire the
right to the land, and prevent the government from being overcharged by
the owners. The telegraph was now on the railways, and no one could say
how long the company might allow it to remain there." See: Congres -
sional Globe
,
op
.
cit., 366 for quote; Dictionary of American Biography
,
op
. cit
.
, Volume X.
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Senator Alexander Barrow was Senator from Louisiana, a I^Jhig.
Biographical Dictionary of the American Congress 1774-1971
,
op . cit .
^^Rlchard Hofstedter, The American Political Tradition and the Men
Who Made It (New York: Vintage Books, 1974), p. 70.
6 7
Matthew A. Crenson, The Federal Machine: Beginnings of Bureau-
cracy in Jacksonian America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1975), p. 24, wrote that: "Such things as Internal Improvements
and the banking monopoly could be useful conveniences, as Jackson him-
self conceded, but he thought that the moral impediments of these con-
veniences outweighed their public utility. Internal Improvements would
Inflame petty, parochial jealousies and might be 'resorted to as artful
expedients to shift upon the Government the losses of unsuccessful pri-
vate speculation, and thus, by ministering to personal ambition and
self-aggrandizement, tend to sap the foundation of public virtue.'"
6 8Congressional Globe
,
op . cit .
Ibid
.
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70„
House Report 17, op^. cit
.
^"hlouse Report 187, o£. clt
.
72
Congressional Globe
, op . cit .
73
House Report 187, op^. clt .
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Although a familiarity with the affairs of Congress in general
might be expected, the fact that the Senate was engaged in an encompas-
sing debate concerning Texas/Mexico evidently was taking attention away
from other matters. The telegraph question, although "pressing" because
of the inevitable push for private development in a very short interval
(and as an indication of public policy sentiments) could not adequately
compete with proposals concerning the Texas/Mexico situation. Thus,
McDuffie may well have been quite unaware of the Ways and Means Commit-
tee report. However, it should be understood that Congress had put off
this question for a long period, during which adequate attention might
have been focused upon it.
^^Senate Document 1, 29th Congress, 1st Session (December 1, 1845),
p. 861.
CHAPTER IV
RURAL FREE DELIVERY
The period between the 1840s and the 1880s was one of improvement
of existing postal services, extension of their geographic scope and
volume, and expansion of the postal service into new endeavors. Though
outside the parameters of this work, events of significance occurred
during these decades, beginning with the Act of March 3, 1845. This
legislation created a new set of postage rates based on the weight of a
letter rather than the number of sheets it contained, restricted the use
of the franking privilege, and made the procedures for the bidding for
transportation contracts more effective."*" The use of adhesive postage
stamps began in 1847, and compulsory prepayment of postage was mandated
2by the Act of March 3, 1855, which also created a registration system
for domestic letter mail. In 1860, the Pony Express began making its
historic runs, but it was eclipsed (and discontinued) in October, 1861,
3by the completion of the transcontinental telegraph line.
The Civil War period was one of innovation, as new services were
added. Free city delivery began operating "in forty-nine of the larger
Northern cities and towns" on July 1, 186 3, through the Act of March 3,
4
1863. Domestic money orders were created by the Act of March 17, 1864,
and a Railway Mail Service (by which Railway Post Offices sorted mail
in transit) was established by the Act of March 25, 1864.^
Post cards were introduced in 1873, free franking privileges
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abolished and redefined the same year, and special delivery begun in
1885, and extended to all classes of mail and all post offices in 1886.^
This series of reforms represented an improvement in the technical means
by which postal service was achieved, and expansion of the actual ser-
i
vices offered by the postal system. The growth of the postal service
from the time of the founding was remarkable—by 1890 there were 62,401
post offices, with revenues of over $60 millions—and the role of the
Post Office was still central in the affairs of the nation.
The return of the Republicans to the White House, in the person of
Benjamin Harrison, in 1889, also brought a new Postmaster General, John
Wanamaker. Wanamaker was the successful Philadelphia businessman who
headed the nationally famous department store, Wanamaker & Company, and
he was an innovative merchant who used novel techniques and technologies
in pursuing his business ends. He is credited with being the originator
of the "Money-Bank Guarantee", and he successfully used advertising to
promote his business. He employed electric lights in his store in 1879,
and also installed steam heating, both of which were novel applications
for these technologies. As a respected businessman, he was able to
raise and coordinate capital for Harrison in the campaign, and was of-
fered the Postmaster General position on the advice of Republican party
leaders and, apparently, Harrison's personal friend (and first choice
g
for Postmaster General) , James Clarkson of Iowa.
During his term of office, Wanamaker made four proposals which re-
late significantly to the role of the postal service as a public enter-
prise. They include rural free delivery (RFD) , parcel post delivery
service, establishment of a postal savings bank, and the public owner-
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ship of the telegraph and telephone systems (as a part of the Post Of-
fice Department). Only the first of these, RFD, was a new suggestion
by a Postmaster General, and only RFD became any sort of reality during
Wanamaker's tenure. The experience with rural free delivery offers an
example of how a successful extension of the Post Office's services pro-
vides insight into public enterprise in the United States.
The delivery of mail to individual houses or dwellings in cities
had been a fact of life since the Civil War, but as of the late 1880s,
farmers still had to travel to town to collect their mail. In many
cases, this was an arduous journey, given weather and road conditions.
In addition, the long hours a farmer worked made trips to town the ex-
ception rather than the rule, and so mail collected until the farmer
could make the next all-purpose trip.
The importance of mail to farmers, while not to be overstated, was
not as minimal as those of us with a late 20th century perspective might
expect. Without the immediate proximity to friends and relatives, the
mails brought important news and communication, and so the isolation of
rural life was broken by the mail service. The prospects of outside
commerce were limited. The only way one could order merchandise was
through the express companies, which served only certain markets. Mail
service opened up a whole new world.
Furthermore, as farmers were becoming involved in an increasingly
nationalized (and even internationalized) economic structure, news of
faraway events became evermore meaningful. Crop fluctuations, futures
markets, national policies concerning currency—all had increased effect
on the farmers' lives. Their need for information, and timely informa-
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tion at that, outpaced their ability to collect the mail and news of the
day at the 4th class post offices. And the increasing communication
among farmers—as evidenced by the Grange and the Farmers' Alliances-
may have stimulated a perceived need for better communication. At the
very least, these relations did foster a common feeling that the farmers
needed rural delivery, and deserved service that was equal to what city
dwellers received.
John Wanamaker was the first public official to propose a rural de-
livery service, and the first person to do so who gained any widespread
notice. John Stahl apparently originated the idea of rural free deliv-
ery in 1879, "But," as Wayne Fuller has written,
it was one thing to propose that the government carry the
farmer's mail to him, and another to get such a service es-
tablished. Thousands of people had to be enlisted in its sup-
port before Congress would consider such a plan, and until
Postmaster General John Wanamaker began to agitate for rural
delivery in 1891, few people had ever heard of it.^
Wanamaker, then, put RFD on the political agenda, and it was a proposal
which farmers and many of their organizations quickly endorsed.
The National Grange endorsed it at its annual meeting in 1891,
and across the land local and state Alliances passed resolu-
tions favoring it . . . . The Greenwood Grange of Marshall
County, West Virginia, Poplar Grove, Whitcomb, and Star of the
West Granges of Indiana, Economy Grange of Mississippi, the
Flat Rock Grange of Ohio, the Farmers' Institute of Connels-
ville in Lafayette County, Pennsylvania, the Elm Tree National
Farmers' Alliance in Ohio, these and hundreds of other organi-
zations, equally unknown but equally important, let their con-
gressmen know that they wanted rural free delivery.-'-^
Wanamaker actually began experimenting "to test the practicability
of extending the free delivery system to farmer s ,
""^"'' by authorization of
105
a joint resolution of Congress of October 1, 1890.^^ Although the tests
were apparently not conclusive as a tool for evaluation, by 1891
Wanamaker was telling the American people that the test had
proven the feasibility of carrying the mail to rural areas and
that a rural delivery service should be started at once. 13
The support from the Grange, Farmers' Alliances, and citizens translated
into rural delivery petitions, which Congressmen entered into the Con-
gressional Record. Although these organizations were also supporting
establishment of a postal savings bank and public ownership of the tele-
graph system, the petitions on behalf of RFD provided a more widespread,
grassroots expression by farmers, and these demands for RFD were start-
ling to Congressmen. Congressmen felt pressured to act, although there
appeared to be little chance of establishing a nationwide rural delivery
14
system. But by February, 1893, Congress appropriated $10,000 to ex-
periment in rural delivery. Though the amount was extremely small, es-
pecially in comparison to Wanamaker 's requested $6 million, there were
great financial pressures on Congress at the time which mitigated
against further expenditures.'^^ No comprehensive system was in place,
but by the time Wanamaker left office some appropriation had been made,
and a recognition of the demand for RFD for farmers was achieved.
The sponsor of RFD in the House of Representatives was Representa-
tive Tom Watson, Democrat of Georgia, who would be a Populist Vice-
Presidential nominee in 1896, and the Populist Presidential nominee in
1904. Watson successfully guided the legislation through the House,
with the support of the Democratic Chairman of the Committee on Post
Offices and Post Roads, Representative John Steele Henderson of North
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Carolina. The legislation "escaped debate in the Senate, was signed
by the President, and became law."^^ Watson frequently alluded to his
sponsorship of RFD in later years, with every rural mail delivery box
serving as testimony to the subsequent success of the program.
But this $10,000 appropriation in no way secured RFD's future for,
besides being a miniscule sum for such a large-scale project, the new
Postmaster General appointed by Grover Cleveland, Wilson Bissell, was
unalterably opposed to using this money for any rural delivery experi-
ment, saying that, "To inaugurate a system of rural free delivery.
. .
would require an appropriation of at least $20,000 ,000 .""'^
Bissell was an old friend of Cleveland's from Buffalo, and shared
with him a "conservative temperament."
How the mail could be carried to the farmers every day he sim-
ply could not see; nor could President Cleveland. Bissell
called in one of his subordinates, August W. Machen, the man
who had been pushing the service.
. .and lectured him sternly.
Rural delivery would bankrupt the nation, he said, and he
wanted to hear no more about it. Machen was to stop agitating
the question. 2^
Bissell retired in 1895, and Cleveland appointed William L. Wilson,
21
a Democrat and ex-Congressman from West Virginia. Wilson began ex-
perimenting with a rural delivery system, for which Congress had appro-
priated $40,000. The experiment began on October 1, 1896, during the
election campaign of that year, in Wilson's home county in West Vir-
22
ginia. The election, however, proved unsatisfactory to the farmers
and the Democrats, for both common and distinct reasons, and the Repub-
licans returned to power with no permanent RFD plan in sight. The ex-
periment had just started, and the future course was still uncharted.
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Further, how much could the farmers expect of a McKinley administration?
By 189 7, whether because of the support for Bryan and his loss, or be-
cause of the general conditions surrounding the farmers' movements, the
Populist surge was subsiding, at least on the national level.
William McKinley chose a Baltimore businessman, James A. Gary, to
be Postmaster General. Gary resigned after little more than a year in
office, in April, 1898, in opposition to the war over Cuba.^"^ His main
achievement, in terms of RFD, was his Annual Report of 1897, which "con-
tained a detailed and glowing account of the [rfd] experiment" begun in
24West Virginia. He concluded the report by writing that,
I think the reports of rural free delivery hereto annexed will
prove conclusively that this experimental service has rendered
benefits far in excess of the expenditures involved, and that,
under wise restrictions, it can be continued and extended with
great advantage to a class of our citizens who, rightly or
wrongly, deem themselves neglected in legislation— the agri-
^
cultural class—and without serious detriment to the revenues.
The push for RFD was carried on by the First Assistant Postmaster
General, Perry S. Heath, and the Superintendent of Free Delivery, August
Machen. Heath had been a close political operative of McKinley 's during
the Presidential campaign, and Machen had managed to remain in his posi-
tion despite the change in administrations. Together they most likely
"realized that the administration would gain the political loyalty of
2 6
rural areas that were given a successful delivery service." With an
appropriation of $150,000 for 1898, they were able to expand the scope
of RFD.
Heath and Machen made a significant move in June, 189 8, which put
unique pressures on Congress to force the development of a full-fledged
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rural delivery system. To help determine the demand for routes, and
where routes were likely to be successful, and given their limited re-
sources, Heath and Machen announced a new Post Office policy on June 30,
189 8. The policy was published in the form of a circular letter, which
was sent in response to all inquiries about rural mail delivery, and
which read, in part:
The amount thus appropriated is obviously insufficient for
the establishment of rural free delivery in every community
where the necessity exists, and the Department has therefore
adopted a plan of locating the experimental service where it
seemed to be the most desired, and where the results promised
to be the best. As a preliminary to the establishment of the
service, it has usually required that the citizens of the
district should forward, through their Representatives in
Congress, a petition, setting forth the nature of the country,
whether it is thickly or sparsely populated, the leading
avocations of the people, the character of the roads, whether
good or bad, and the distance which the petitioner has to
travel or send under existing circumstances to receive his
mail.
If the Member of Congress representing that district or the
United States Senator residing therein, familiar with local
conditions, should forward this petition to the Post Office
Department with a favorable indorsement, a special Agent is
then sent out to look over the ground, to map out a suitable
route or routes, to select carriers for appointment, and to
recommend the establishment of the service, if in his judgment
it can be successfully and economically carried out.^^
As Fuller noted.
These directions proved to be the turning point in the de-
velopment of RFD as Machen and Heath had probably foreseen.
When word passed around among the farmers that all they had to
do to have their mail delivered to their farms was sign a pe-
tition, the rush was on, and every new route established
brought a demand for a dozen or so more. Once this began.
Congress could have as easily stopped an Oklahoma tornado as
have stemmed the demand for rural delivery. ^8
The petitions put pressure on Congressmen to file the requests with
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the Post Office Department, producing an opportunity of wide extent for
the practice of distributive politics by Congress. Yet the control over
this had somehow transferred beyond Congress to the administrative de-
partment. The Post Office Department defined the agenda, and Congress
was given the financial burden and the political pressure. The Post
Office Department had forced upon Congress an expansion of the ongoing
experiment which resulted ultimately in a permanent RFD program, and
then hired an extensive RFD bureaucracy to administer the program.
The potential financial repercussions were addressed by Congress.
Senator Eugene Hale of Maine, a "self-appointed watchdog of the United
30States Treasury," believed that the RFD experiment would soon become
permanent, as more routes were added each year. He led other Senators
in trying to kill rural delivery in 1899,
and only the timely intervention of the Grange and interested
Congressmen saved the service. Learning of the Senator's ac-
tions, the officers of the National Grange raised an enormous
petition of some 75,000 names in support of rural delivery and
presented it to Congress.
A House-Senate conference committee restored the money, and the develop-
32
ment of the service was never again seriously endangered. By 1902
there were eight thousand rural routes, and by 1905, thirty-two thou-
33
sand. Once unleashed, the farmers' demands for rural delivery service
had resounded through Congress. Congress then acted to encourage the
Post Office to promote RFD, while at the same time (implicitly) admit-
ting that the expenditures would outweigh receipts in providing the
service
,
This victory of the farmers was of a paradoxical nature. To begin
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with, the Post Office Department (through Heath and Machen) put the
critical pressure on Congress to promote an RFD scheme, and it appears
as though the Post Office Department did this by understanding the
farmers' desires and frustrations, and by translating these into a poli-
tical success, RFD. In providing a political victory for the farmers,
who could point to little else as a political achievement in national
politics, it was intended to draw this constituency into the Republican
party, while at the same time damaging the Democrats and the third party
movement
.
But this incident also reflected an important change in the poli-
tical balance. The Post Office Department had acted politically in a
manner unthought of at the founding, in an effort to court popular
favor. And it had done so by putting pressures on Congress which Con-
gress was unable to resist, providing public benefits with relatively
hidden costs (in the form of postal deficits in RFD service).
At the same time as being an apparent "success" in Congressional
politics, it built an administrative presence which diluted Congres-
sional prerogative and increased the federal bureaucracy in the form of
the Post Office, both in Washington (to administer RFD) and throughout
the nation (both to administer and to carry-out the program). Thus,
although RFD can be considered a victory of Congressional politics and
of the sensitivity of Congressmen to constituent demands, it can also be
interpreted as indicative of the emerging political order of the twen-
tieth century.
RFD was a point at which Populism and Progressivism converged, in a
way, so that although the demands of farmers were met, it was done so
Ill
within the developing Progressive framework. This is indicated by
several factors.
The first was the manipulative aspect of the Heath-Machen policy,
which not only produced an avalanche of popular demand for RFD, but then
required an administrative entity to fulfill the service needs. This
translated into a growth of administration, both in terms of discretion
(e.g., in establishing rural routes, and identifying rural carriers) and
35influence. This occurred during the same time period as significant
growth in other vanguard areas.
Secondly, the influence of the Executive was growing relative to
that of Congress. The McKinley victory brought Republican control of
the White House and an increasingly active Presidency. Theodore Roose-
velt was a strong President, whatever his political leanings, and he
asserted himself in domestic regulatory and reform affairs as well as in
37foreign policy. Though Taft's reputation is not as a Progressive per
se, he did consolidate many o'f Roosevelt's actions. And by World War I,
Wilson was able to motivate the national government in the pursuit of a
large-scale war effort requiring great amounts of administrative coor-
dination. In the meantime. Congress was stirring, and the 1910 deposing
of Speaker Cannon marked the beginning of a long decline in Congres-
sional influence vis-a-vis the Executive.
Thirdly, reform in the political system had begun to affect the
postal service significantly, as extension of the Pendleton Act to the
Post Office Department enveloped more areas. In 1885, only approximate-
ly 15,000 postal employees were covered by civil service rules. By
1896, the figure rose to over 87,000, although "of the 72,371 classifi-
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able but unclassified jobs still left in government in 1896, 66,825 were
fourth-class postmasters!""^^
Theodore Roosevelt brought about 9,000 RFD employees into the civil
39service in November, 1901, admittedly after he was able to make signi-
ficant Republican appointments, and "rural mail carriers were put under
civil service regulations in 1904,"^^ soon after RFD became a permanent
program. This acted to diminish patronage opportunities in the postal
service. RFD made fourth-class post offices redundant, and (as the
stated policy of the Post Office Department) they began to be discon-
tinued as RFD routes proliferated. Congressmen were in a dilemma be-
cause initiation of RFD, a popular cause, meant discontinuing the fourth-
class post offices, an unpopular act among the shopkeepers who housed
many of these. So, "congressmen often induced the Department to estab-
lish the rural routes and close its eyes to the little post offices that
41
stood in the way." In 1908, Roosevelt included "all fourth-class
postmasters east of the Massissippi and north of the Ohio River," under
42
civil service rules. Taft ultimately classified the rest of the
fourth-class postmasters in 1912, though the regulations were amenable
to (limited) political influence. By the time Wilson took office,
then, much of the Post Office Department was subject to civil service,
bringing the postal service into the Progressive framework.
Reform in the political system during this period encompassed more
than just civil service classification. There were issues fundamental
to the processes of democratic government which were debated and which
led to action. The battle the farmers and their organizations had
fought against consolidated power and for democratic institutions and
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government was not subsumed by the pursuit of democratic procedural
mechanisms within a political culture increasingly dominated by consol-
idated corporate and government power. Such issues as the referendum,
the recall, the initiative, secret balloting, and direct election of
Senators endured from the days of the Populists (who unsuccessfully pur-
sued these aims) to the Progressive Era, when reforms were passed in
state after state."
Though many of these procedural remedies desired by both Populists
and Progressives were similar or the same, the ends to be served were
decidedly different. Populists hoped to democratize state government,
and to increase access to government by the farmer and the worker^^ at
the expense of industrial corporations and big businessmen. The Pro-
gressives sought the same or similar reforms, "all of which were aimed
not primarily at giving the people more power as a matter of principle,
but at breaking the power of political bosses." (The Progressives did
not aim at breaking the power of big business, but, at most, controlling
the harmful externalities of big business as well as big government.)
The contradiction goes to the center of the problem faced by groups pro-
posing that the government serve democratic ends; the form was there,
but not necessarily the substance. As RFD entrusted power to adminis-
tration, at the expense of more directly "popular" power, so did the
success of electoral reforms shaped by Progressive politicians.
The change was not simply one from Congressional to Executive
power. Progressives (such as Woodrow Wilson) believed that a return to
Executive fulfillment of administrative functions more closely resem-
bled the founders' intentions than did the party politics of the latter
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part of the nineteenth century. They understood the change to Executive
direction of policy as a move toward administrative responsibility and
to purposeful activity. The founders, after all, envisioned an ener-
getic and responsible Executive as being central to the exercise of good
government
.
The difference lay, however, in the manner in which the Executive
was tied to the polity. In the founding period, administrative respon-
sibility would be ensured by identifying able men to carry out the poli-
cies of government. Those men would be rooted in communities, tying the
national government to the various local situations in the nation. ^'^
Promotion of national purposes, whether those of commerce or of educa-
tion, would* be understood in meaningful local as well as national terms.
This contrasts with the Progressives who did not root their adminis-
trative power in the localities but in the national government, which
was viewed as eliminating the politically debilitating effects of local
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politics. The understanding of checks and balances on the Executive
was altered. In the founding period, the political ties to community
were much more evident. Administrators were the products of localities,
and closely tied to those communities. Congressmen were elected in
their districts. Senators were chosen by state legislatures, and Presi-
dents were chosen by electors who were picked by state legislatures or
conventions. This was a system dependent upon a multitude of local
situations and the leaders who arose from this process would be respon-
sive to those communities.
By the early 1900s, however, circumstances had changed. Adminis-
trators were members of burgeoning bureaucracies, and not identifiable
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public figures in the localities. Congressmen were still elected in the
districts, but Senators were directly elected, and Presidential electors
were the product of direct elections also. This freed the Senators and
Presidents from those local constraints, and allowed an identification
with "the people"—as an undifferentiated whole—to provide a base of
support (and potential check) , rather than the reliance on local and
state support.
In a similar sense, commerce had been freed from the constraints of
the communities in taking on a national and even international charac-
ter. Founding era commerce was based in the local merchants, farmers,
and other respected figures in the community, while the new businesses
of the twentieth century were divorced from the localities and increas-
ingly able to ignore the communities in which they operated, and the
pressures which the localities attempted to apply.
These changes represent a degradation in the understanding of poli-
tics. The effect was not simply a change from the politics of Congress
to that of a bureaucratized Executive, but rather a change in the basis
of the nature of government. As politics and commerce were increasingly
insulated from local conditions, a system emerged which emphasized na-
tional administration and national business, absent meaningful local
control or input. This was a sharp departure from the founding era un-
derstanding of the relationships among government, administration, and
commerce, and paved the way for the development of a politics without
clear ties to the polity, and commercial interests less interested in
their effects on individual communities, a situation which has intensi-
fied throughout the twentieth century.
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The Increasingly broad coverage of postal workers under civil
service classification generated a response of organization among postal
workers. The National Association of Letter Carriers was organized in
1880 (August 30, 1889), and the National Federation of Post Office
Clerks the next year (February 3, 1890).^^ They were among the earliest
public employees to unionize, responding to the new administrative cir-
cumstances created by the Pendleton Act and civil service reform. The
Post Office was changing from a more openly (and meaningfully) political
organization to a professional, bureaucratic-oriented enterprise
.
This was furthered by the decline in the number of fourth-class post of-
fices, and their eventual classification (in steps) during the early
twentieth century.
All this occurred in a society which was becoming increasingly cen-
tered around national entities, in business, education, government,
newsprint, literature, transportation, communication, and politics. The
Post Office, as the first national governmental institution, represented
a department which was almost universally accepted as legitimate, and
one in which administrative powers and reforms could be accepted. And
in a more nationally-oriented society, the extended postal service could
play a central role. RFD brought the farmers and rural residents into
the mainstream of American postal affairs, and so the isolation of
rural areas was breached. Thus, the transition to a more national con-
sciousness was facilitated.
In a manner parallel to that of the failure of the farmers' coop-
eratives and the perceived need for government intervention at the na-
52
tional level, attempted through Macune's subtreasury plan,''* the sue-
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cess of RFD also relied on a national government presence, and looked to
the administrative state which was emerging. The transition to a more
active national government was reflected in regulatory activity, civil
service reform, and the stirrings of a national structure for the Repub-
lican party growing out of the disparate state parties, and understood
the weakness of the farmers in maintaining their independence from the
greater currents of national events. As the farmers gained RFD, there
was a concurrent weakening of Congressional control over postal matters,
as the Post Office Department enlarged its bureaucracy and began to
practice greater discretion. With the inception of RFD, the Post Office
Department for the first time began to establish the routes for post
roads— a prerogative which had been previously guarded by Congress.
Since
More money was spent, more men employed, and more paperwork
done to lay out the rural delivery system than to establish
any single extension of the postal system.
the Post Office Department ultimately created an
RFD bureaucracy that embraced eight rural divisions, with
headquarters in every section of the country and at the height
of its activity laid more than 9,000 routes in one year.^^
*Robert C. McMath, Jr. wrote that Charles Macune's sub-treasury
plan was one which, "called for the establishment of federal subtrea-
suries along with warehouses and elevators in which farmers could store
certain nonperishable commodities. Upon depositing his crop, a farmer
would receive negotiable treasury notes equal to 80 percent of the
crop's value." See Robert C. McMath, Jr., Populist Vanguard (New York:
W.W. Norton & Company, 1975), p. 91. More complete descriptions and
analysis are available in the books listed in footnote //52.
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This was a significant administrative load, which pointed towards a
transfer of activity to the Executive branch.
The Post Office of the period reflected these trends as well as the
increasing influence of civil service, so that RFD as a permanent service
came under civil service provisions, and the political usefulness of the
Post Office declined. Thus, the program which embodied the avowedly
political program of the farmers soon became insulated from such poli-
tical influence, and was the focus of administrative control and growth.
All this fit into the increasing professionalization of American
life, including the aforementioned postal workers' associations. Move-
ments for good, efficient government followed the organizing of private
associations in various fields, such as medicine, law, and social work.
Burton Bledstein makes the point succinctly:
In its very idealism, the culture of professionalism bred pub-
lic attitudes of submission and passivity. For instance, re-
formers in the late nineteenth century proposed to make Ameri-
can politics more attentive to the will of the individual
citizen rather than to the desire of the venal boss. But a
significant consequence of that democratic reform was to dis-
courage the public's participation in its own political af-
fairs. 55
Participatory movements gave way to Progressive politics (profession-
alized, concerned with efficiency and with an emphasis on good govern-
ment)
,
and this lessened the legitimacy of such a directly political
event as the promotion of a rural delivery system by large numbers of
farmers themselves acting toward specific political ends.
Establishment of RFD as a permanent program in such a relatively
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short time indicates the possibilities as well as the limits of the post
office as a public enterprise. Even considering the important features
of RFD, such as 1) equality of service to almost all residents of the
country, 2) extension of information and intercourse throughout society,
or 3) facilitation of a greater market for goods and service (especially
with the creation of parcel post service in 1913), there remains a ques-
tion as to how RFD came into being considering the predominant business
culture of the time.
RFD did not pose a great threat to anyone, and certainly not to any
very influential and active groups. Some merchants in rural areas did
view rural delivery as a possible threat, as farmers would no longer
have to visit town for their mail. But their lobbying was confined
mainly to trying to make sure that rural routes originated in their
towns
.
The other people who were vulnerable to displacement by RFD were
the country postmasters, whose "little combination stores and fourth-
class post offices.
.
.had been the heart of the old rural mail system
from George Washington's day to the beginning of rural free delivery."
The post office was important because it drew trade to their stores. The
dramatic decline in the number of post offices after the establishment
of RFD is indicative of the effect this did have on small post offices.
In 1901, there were 76,945 post offices, of which more than 70,000 were
fourth-class post offices; by 1920, there were only Al,102 post offices
in operation. Though the fourth-class postmasters lost the overall
battle, the local problems were often solved by the Post Office Depart-
ment "overlooking" the particular post office's existence.
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The other threat was to public finances, which Postmaster General
Bissell envisioned to be severe. But since this threat was almost in-
visible, it was subdued by the potential for distributive politicking,
and by early indications of financial success (e.g., by Postmaster Gary).
There were strong proponents of RFD, especially the farmers who had
been generally frustrated in their political efforts. The issue of RFD
was unique, though, because it required no political organizing and no
political vehicle (party or otherwise) to go forward: the farmers only
had to forward their petitions to their Congressmen. This was a rela-
tively simple political act, and it generated an enormous response, put-
ting great pressure on Congressmen to act. They in turn pressured the
Post Office Department bureaucrats who, in the persons of Heath and
Machen, were eager to act.
Postmaster General Wanamaker, successful businessman, gave a strong
endorsement to RFD in business terms:
To the business man in town the extension of the free delivery
would be of immense value. 1 have for years advised young
merchants to get into earnest correspondence with persons whom
they would like to do business with. It results in more cor-
respondence, and that results in business. I suppose the ex-
act benefit to the merchant, due to the regularity and dis-
patch with which mails went out from an office in the city and
then went back into it, can not be calculated; but if this
regularity and dispatch supplant the irregularity and sloth
of the method of delivering and collecting the mails once or
twice a week the benefits would surely be incalculable. The
country is always tributary to the city; it makes the city.
The extension of the postal facilities will make the business
man more prosperous and enterprising
.
In another sense, RFD broke no new ground: it did not require new
technology, and it simply extended the basic service of the post office,
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delivery of letters, newspapers, magazines, and small parcels (up to
four pounds), to the whole nation. In this way it did not involve an
expansion of postal activities into new areas, as did the proposed pos-
tal telegraph and telephone, did not generally threaten business, and
did not engender constitutional objections. It was debated on financial
grounds, but other issues did not intrude. (After it had been estab-
lished as a permanent program, RFD carriers began to use automobiles on
their routes, and in 1915, Postmaster General Albert Burleson established
automobile routes where possible.
Thus, RFD was, in policy terms, an expansion of an existing system
of free city delivery. No newly established powers gravitated to the
Post Office Department (with the exception of identifying post roads and
choosing rural carriers)
, no great struggle over doctrine took place,
and, essentially, the formal powers of the Post Office Department re-
mained the same. What did change was the relationship between the Post
Office Department and Congress, giving greater discretion to the execu-
tive department, a situation which was symptomatic of the times in the
administrative departments of the national government.
Indeed, since RFD threatened almost nobody, and gave the postal
service no great advantage in generating funds, its enactment is con-
sistent with the definition of public enterprise in the United States.
The postal service gained new service responsibilities, but did not
impinge on any profit-oriented activities desired by private interests.
In contrast to RFD, proposals for public ownership of the telegraph
and telephone systems did not succeed. Since the original Post Office
Department ownership of the telegraph in the 1840s, there had been
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sporadic talk of a renewed government telegraph. Representative Elihu
Washburne, Republican from Illinois, reintroduced the idea in 1868,
but no significant action was taken. When John Wanamaker became Post-
master General, he brought the issue to the forum again, strongly ad-
vocating a postal telegraph, and now including a postal telephone. Yet
his efforts were for naught, for no strong public movement expressed it-
self, and no part of the Post Office Department bureaucracy pushed for
such a program, as had Heath and Machen with RFD.
Furthermore, a postal telegraph did certainly threaten vested in-
terests, and powerful interests at that. Among the directors of the
Western Union Telegraph Company, at the time of Wanamaker 's Postmaster-
ship, were Jay Gould, Russell Sage, Alonzo Cornell, J. Pierpont Morgan,
6 2John Hay, Collis B. Huntington, Chauncey Depew, and other notables.
Wanamaker claimed there was public demand for a postal telegraph at the
same time as acknowledging private opposition;
There is a deep and far reaching conviction among the people
that the telegraph service is by right a part of the postal
service. To carry the postal system from pony-riders to
stage-coach, and on to railroad service, and stop all further
progress because three thousand owners of telegraph stock op-
pose, is not in accord with the genius of our people or the
spirit of the times. ^3
The postal telegraph proposal did have significant business opposi-
tion, and from some of the most important and powerful men of the era,
at a time of the height of their power (as a group) . In combination
with the absence of any broad public support (such as large numbers of
petitions) , there was little impetus for Congressmen to risk their power
in support of such a proposal, even if they thought it legitimate. And
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the leaders in the Congress at that time were certainly not sympathetic
to the control of private business in such a manner
. Although Wana-
maker pushed the scheme, and therefore implicated the Post Office Depart-
ment in this, there was no clear bureaucratic drive on the issue as
there had been with RFD, and no great Presidential support. And it
was still early, before Progressive reforms had emerged, so that the
latitude of operation was still great for big business and for Con-
66gress
.
There were arguments against the postal telegraph which noted a
contradiction between limited government and the extension of government
ownership to a telegraph system, thereby potentially abridging freedoms
6 7
of press and commerce, Wanamaker believed the constitutional argu-
ments vacuous, stating:
The courts of highest appeal have settled this question. Con-
gress settled it, in advance of judicial action, by making the
United States the owner, and the Post Office Department the
manager, of the first line of wire constructed for commercial
and public uses. The old government telegraph schemes were
constitutional.
. .and. . .the [new] limited telegraph plan
. . .is constitutional.^^
Subsequently, on July 16, 1918, a joint resolution of Congress author-
ized the President to take control of the telegraph and telephone sys-
tems, an act Woodrow Wilson took six days later, on July 22, 1918, plac-
69
ing those systems under the Post Office Department.
RFD and the Wanamaker proposals for a postal telegraph and telephone
differed in major ways. The first was the orientation of the operation:
RFD was primarily considered a service provision to farmers and other
rural residents, revenue considerations be damned; telegraph and tele-
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phone service were debated mainly on revenue grounds, and the potential
for government to efficiently run these enterprises for a profit, while
servicing the citizens' needs. Those who were opposed to public owner-
ship of the telegraph and telephone systems generally cited profit-
oriented revenue reasons, threats to private business, and constitution-
al considerations; while Wanamaker debated those, he also emphasized the
service benefits which would emanate, particularly to residents who
would not be served by the private companies. He cited the history of
mail service, where
No one believes that the mail service would have been so
widely extended by any private corporation that had to pay
dividends to its stockholders.
and the advantages of a public post, for
If the mails were only run to self-sustaining or profit-making
points the extent of the service would be cut off 40 per cent.
The postal system is not a scheme for profit.
. . . The postal
service is the Government's kind hand, promoting and protecting
the correspondence of its people, and communication by tele-
graph as well as by mail is essential to its best development,^*^
Thus, RFD was established as a postal service in unique circum-
stances, and centered around considerations of service, distributive
politics, popular politics, bureaucratic finesse, and administrative
growth. The postal telegraph was not enacted (except briefly during
World War I)
, and was considered on issues of revenue-production poten-
tial, freedom of press and commerce, and only secondarily in terms of
7
1
service.'-"- Its failure is one of not allowing the postal service, as a
public enterprise, to act in a forthright profit-making role, at the
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expense of private business profits, thereby helping to insure an in-
ability of the Post Office to operate as a successful entity, both in
72
monetary and related terms.
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72Profit-making also implies considerations of research and devel-
opment, and the purchase of new equipment, which then help to produce
long-term success. By limiting public enterprise profits, these areas
were also neglected, except in provisions suggested by the Post Office
Department and appropriated by Congress.
But, as we have seen. Congress was much more willing to do the pub-
licly visible, while underfunding the less visible and less glamorous.
So, research and development and equipment procedurement suffered, ulti-
mately hurting the twentieth century performance of the Post Office dur-
ing a time of unprecedented technological change. This became most ap-
parent in the 1960s (e.g., the breakdown of the Chicago main post office
in October, 1966, and difficulties with the parcent post system), but
this can be traced to earlier origins, and to the depoliticization of
the Post Office Department, which meant that postal affairs were of less
interest to Congressmen. This occurred at the same time as many other
matters became part of the Congressional agenda. Thus, postal procure-
ments in general suffered, and the least "important" areas suffered the
most
.
CHAPTER V
THE NEW ERAL POSTAL SERVICE: CONTEMPORARY TIMES
Recent History of the Post Office
The Post Office stabilized after the turn of the century. Rural
Free Delivery had been made permanent, and so the number of post offices
peaked at 76,945 in 1901.^ There were changes in the early part of the
century, such as the introduction of parcel post in 1912, and regular
air mail service, beginning in 1918, between Washington and New York.
But until zip codes appeared in 1962 and reorganization effected in
1970, the Post Office changed little in terms of services offered or
organizational structure.
The New Deal did not signal a period of postal expansion. In fact,
the Economy Act of 19 33 resulted in a 15 percent reduction in postal
wages.
^
The focus of administration efforts was on minimizing deficits
in the Post Office Department, and streamlining the department."^ This
was intensified after World War II when a whole new range of programs,
foreign and domestic, were competing with the postal service.'^ There
was no great demand for new postal services, and postal officials con-
centrated on efficiency and economy.
This put the Post Office Department in a tenuous long-term posi-
tion, for its physical plant, its transport system, its letter sorting
technology, and its administrative structure were increasingly out-of-
date. In addition, postage rates remained the same; and so, in order
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to minimize growing deficits, officals reduced service and spent little
on capital investment. By the late 1940s, the postal system was appar-
ently ripe for reorganization, which was the central concern of the Hoover
Commission in 1949.^
The Hoover Commission
.
The Hoover Commission began with certain questions in mind, from
which the eventual recommendations grew. When the Commission asked,
"What Is Wrong With the Post Office?"^ they made several points. In
summary, these points dealt with: 1) administrative structure and or-
ganization, 2) ratemaking and rate structure, 3) political appointments,
and 4) budgeting. Specifically, the Commission thought the administra-
tive structure to be outdated and cumbersome as well as "obsolete and
overcentralized.
. . . Although the Post Office is a business-type es-
tablishment, it lacks the freedom and flexibility essential to good
business operation."^
Rates had not risen with costs, and the Congressional ratemaking
procedure created pressures to limit any rate hikes. This occurred at
the same time as subsidies (from class to class as well as between
services) were hidden within the rate structure. And this had led to
years of deficits, with alarmingly large recent and projected deficits.
Meanwhile, "Political appointment of first-, second-, and third-
class postmasters and certain other officials produces inefficiency and-
9
militates against the incentives of promotion." In other words, poli-
ticians managed the post offices, people who were assumed to be unskilled
in a business sense and tied to the primacy of political considerations,
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while at the same time the career postal officials (who, it was im-
plicitly agreed, would manage the post offices well) were kept from ad-
vancing, and so were unmotivated.
Finally, the budgeting system was cumbersome and inaccurate, and
made "impossible the most economical and efficient conduct of the
..10
service. Since the Commission assumed that the Post Office was "of
a business nature [and] revenue-producing and potentially self-sustain-
ing," proper budgeting would be crucial to its successful performance
.
These assumptions ground the first Hoover Commission in the mold of
administrative responsibility, rational administration, and attempts to
organize the administrative agencies in an efficient and orderly manner.
Within these assumptions lay an altered view of politics, and its role
in governmental administration. The role of administration was being
expanded at the same time as Congressional politics, being by its nature
the embodiment of conflicting goals and dilemmas, was an inhibiting fac-
tor to efficient administrative performance.
The Commission stated in its first report that
the foundation of good departmental administration is author-
ity from Congress for the Postmaster General to organize and
control his Department. Separate authorities to his subor-
dinates should be eliminated . -'-^
The Commission believed that a clear line of administrative authority,
headed by and lodged in the Postmaster General, was necessary. This
would combine with the restructuring of the department to provide for a
better organized and more responsible Post Office Department, which
would then be given greater prerogatives with which to carry out its
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mandate.
The administrative restructuring would be achieved by:
1) taking the politics out of the Postmaster General position
by providing that he not be a political party official, and
changing his mandate so that he would be responsible for
defining general departmental policies, rather than running
the Post Office Department's daily operations, although he
would remain a Cabinet officer selected by the President;
2) appointing a Director of Posts, who would be the operating
head of the department. He would be chosen by the Presi-
dent and confirmed by the Senate, but with no definite
term, the object being a long-term director who would bring
managerial stability to the department;
3) creating a board of seven advisors who would be appointed
by the President, serve part time, and represent "the dif-
ferent elements of the public. "13 Along with the Director
of Posts and Postmaster General, they would advise on Post
Office Department policy orientations.
These three actions were intended to change the nature of manage-
ment to more closely resemble that of a proper administrative model with
clear lines of authority and a board of directors (later adopted in the
Postal Reorganization Act of 1970) . In addition, the Commission sug-
gested a decentralization of the Post Office Department into fifteen re-
gions. This would allow for more flexibility in management and adapta-
bility to regional and local conditions and needs. This was in reaction
to the almost legendary centralization of the Post Office Department,
epitomized by the Postal Manual.
In line with the lessened political orientation of the Postmaster
General, and the depolitization of the rest of the top management (re-
moval of politics and an infusion of business/organization aptitude).
the Commission proposed that Senate confirmation of Postmasters be
ended. 1^ "The primary responsibility for personnel selection and
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management other than the Postmaster General and the Director of Posts
should rest in the service. "-^^ Thus, the appointment power should rest
in the Executive department, based on civil service criteria."'"^ Together
with reorganization of the top management structure, this would temper
political demands on the Post Office Department by interest groups and
Congress. Therefore, administrative responsibility and efficiency would
dominate the department rather than more direct political expediency and
responsiveness
.
The department would also change its budgeting procedures and adopt
a "business form" of budget accounting and audit which would both sim-
plify its operations and provide more flexibility to the department.
This would also help i4entify costs so as to better set rates which
would continue to be set by Congress. However, the Commission suggested
that Congress instruct the Postmaster General to make rates for certain
special services sufficient for self-support. These included registered
mail, insured mail, money orders, post cards, postal notes, special de-
livery, and postage due mail. In addition, subsidies for services (to
common carriers, such as railroads and airplanes) would be made by
direct Congressional appropriation rather than being hidden in the mail
rate structure. (Of course, the Post Office Department had a long his-
tory of such subsidies, from the time of the stagecoach.)
Some of the Hoover Commission recommendations were acted upon,
the most conspicuous being Postmaster General Arthur E. Summerf ield '
s
18
attempt to decentralize the Post Office Department, beginning in 1953.
Congressional resistance was evident, and the Post Office Department
plugged along, not much changed, still woefully unprepared to meet the
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challenges of the second half of the twentieth century. Its physical
plant (post offices) was aging and inappropriate both for the new trans-
portation demands posed by trucks and truck docks and for mechanization;
it was slow to respond to the change from railroads to highways as the
chief arteries of travel; and it was either unwilling or unable to
mechanize and modernize its letter sorting methods. The blame was in-
creasingly focused on the nature of its organization, specifically its
administrative structure and political basis.
The Kappel Commission.
If the Post Office Is given a single goal of providing the
nation with a superb mail service, and given as well the
management capacity and operating freedom to achieve that
goal, the energies of workers and managers can be turned to
the creation of a postal service appropriate to a vigorous
economy, an innovative society and a purposeful nation. 1^
The 1960s were a time of conflicting agendas and action. The na-
tion experienced four different presidents: Eisenhower, Kennedy, John-
son, and Nixon. There were civil rights marches, landmark domestic
legislation, foreign intrigue, intervention, the Vietnam War, and domes-
tic turmoil. Through this period, the Post Office muddled, at least
until the "collapse" of the main Chicago post office in October of 1966
The 13-story, 60-acre Chicago Post Office was flooded with a
monumental pile of unprocessed mail; railroad cars and trailer
trucks full of mail clogged the roads to the post office, de-
laying millions of cross-country letters and parcels. Ten
million pieces of mail, most of them advertising and circulars,
were simply shoved aside and neglected for weeks.
This led to the organization of a Presidential Commission (Execu-
138
tive Order 11341 of April 8, 1967), at the urging of the Postmaster Gen-
eral Lawrence O'Brien. The Commission, named the Kappel Commission
after its chairperson Frederick Kappel (who was the retired Chairman of
the Board of the American Telegraph and Telephone Company)
,
reported its
findings in June of 1968. The basic suggestion was that the Post Office
Department be eliminated and replaced by a government
-owned public cor-
poration.
The professional credentials the members of the Kappel Commission
brought with them are instructive as to the type of expertise which was
seen as being germane to evaluating the postal service. In addition to
the Chairman, Frederick Kappel, the other members were: George P. Baker,
Dean of the Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administra-
tion; David E. Bell, Vice President of the Ford Foundation; Fred J.
Borch, President of General Electric; David Ginzburg, of the law firm
Ginzburg and Feldman; Ralph Lazarus, Chairman of the Board of Directors
of Federated Department Stores; George Meany, President of the AFL-CIO;
J. Irvin Miller, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Cummins Engine
Company; W. Beverly Murphy, President of the Campbell Soup Company; and
21Rudolph A. Peterson, President of the Bank of America.
The Commission's report immediately identified what it thought was
the main problem of the Post Office Department:
Although the Post Office is one of the nation's largest busi-
nesses, it is not run as a business but as a Cabinet agency
of the United States Government.
The crux of the matter was considered to be that while the Post Office
Department was being operated as an "ordinary Government agency. . .in
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what it does [it] is a business
. Implicit in this is the belief that
a government agency, dependent upon Congress, cannot meet business-type
challenges adequately. The political process is not sufficiently ra-
tional to allow for an efficient exercise of responsibility. The Kappel
Commission maintained that since the Post Office Department was provid-
ing service for a fee, it should therefore operate as a business does.
This makes two rather large assumptions: first, that managerial
and economic efficiencies will lead to the goal of good (or in the Com-
mission's words "superb") service, and second, that economic acumen is
more important than political judgment, i.e., that the economic reali-
ties of a self-supporting "business" enterprise are primary, and the
social purpose of the activity of postal service is secondary. As the
Commission later stated, the Post Office "is far more important as an
economic activity than as an instrument of public policy. "^^ The im-
plicit is later made explicit:
If the postal system had begun after the country had reached
an advanced stage of technological, social and economic devel-
opment, it would in all likelihood have emerged as a private
industry suitably regulated to ensure satisfactory service
levels and fair prices. Most members of this Commission would
favor an investor-owned postal system.
We recognize that formidable barriers stand in the way of a
transfer of the existing postal system to private ownership.
The Post Office has had two hundred years as a Government
operation. Time had nurtured the attitude that the postal
service must be a Government responsibility
.
This statement ignores much of what transpired in the Post Office's
history. First of all, much of the technological, social, and economic
development that occurred was a direct consequence of Post Office activ-
ity and subsidy. Although it may not have been inevitable for the
140
postal system to develop before the automobile or the computer, one does
not have to resort to historical determinism to state that the postal
system is an integral part of societal development (cross-culturally in
western civilization) which did occur because of certain needs which
arose in civilized societies. This historica] role cannot be ignored or
uprooted.
Secondly, the Commission's argument assumes the regulatory method
to be the appropriate response to the operation of such service opera-
tions. Thus, if a postal system landed in twentieth century American
society, it would of course be an investor-owned postal system, "suit-
ably regulated."
The Kappel Commission based its recommendations for reorganization
on several aspects of Post Office Department performance. The first was
the poor quality of service received by postal consumers, and the lack
of sensitivity to the public's service needs. Second was the postal em-
ployment scene, including methods for hiring employees, the working con-
ditions and chances for career advancement, the adherence to the Postal
Manual, and the lack of positive labor/management relations.
The third identified area was the financial picture, beginning
with the growing deficit, the high cost of service, the lack of in-
creases in productivity, including savings possible through mechaniza-
tion and managerial efficiency, and the "irrationality" of the postal
rates.
In essence, the Commission concluded that
the Post Office's principal failure is one of management. . . .
The organization of the Post Office as an ordinary Cabinet de-
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partment guarantees that the nominal managers of the p nst-alservice do not have the authority to run the postal service. 27
The main reasons given were the dependence on Congress for financing,
the lack of executive prerogative in management, and the political
nature of postal management. These sound much like the Hoover Commis-
sion's basis for restructuring the Post Office Department, although
whereas the Hoover Commission connected reorganization to administrative
responsibility within the Executive branch, the Kappel Commission sought
to remove the Post Office from direct governmental input.
Congressional budget authority meant that capital needs were not
being met, that managerial autonomy was severely limited, and that the
Post Office Department did not have to be consumer-oriented. The third
item is of particular interest, for the Commission stated that, "Trea-
sury financing [means that] there is little need to be concerned with
customer desires if all costs are paid regardless of customer satisfac-
28
tion." This ignores the role of Congressmen as political representa-
tives of the broad constituency of postal customers. The political pro-
cess is the mechanism of accountability rather than the market or regu-
latory procedures. Though cumbersome and inexact, the political process
provided for responsiveness to consumer service needs as well as to in-
terest group demands, even if these were difficult for an administrative
department to meet.
The lack of executive management prerogatives was evident in the
rate-setting function of Congress. The Commission noted that, "Author-
ity for pricing is a necessary attribute of a management to be held re-
29
sponsible for performance." Secondly, post office labor relations
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were identified as undermining postal management autonomy, since postal
worker organizations were so successful in lobbying Congress on their
own behalf at the expense of postal management control. (Indeed, the
postal wage bill was one of only two overrides of Presidential vetoes
during the eight years of the Eisenhower administration.)
The variety of political inputs needed to be reduced from the Post-
master General down, according to the Commission. For example, at the
local level limits on residence as well as political affiliation were
seen as limits on good management.
Management within the Post Office Department was considered both
fragmented and unduly centralized. The basic complaint was that local
management was afraid to initiate, yet was unable to use standardized
guidelines to fit the myriad of physical and organizational conditions
they faced.
Ultimately, the promotion of a government-owned public corporation
by the Kappel Commission was a much greater change in political emphasis
than that suggested by the Hoover panel. What were the reasons for the
change from the one to the other?
One was the further erosion of postal service in the mid-1960s.
Although Gerald Cullinan indicated that
in many informed circles, the belief remains that the postal
crisis of 1966 would never have reached disaster proportions
if the capable Postmaster General [Lawrence O'Brien] had been
allowed to devote more energies to the postal service and less
to the promotion of non-postal administration programs on
Capitol Hill, 31
the difficulties of the Post Office Department were apparent. It needed
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to modernize, to improve delivery service, to deal with competition
(such as the United Parcel Service), and somehow articulate reasons for,
or solutions to, the growing deficit.
In concert with this was the increasing competition for funds in
Congress, and the lack of attention from Congressmen who had many new
programs for which to appropriate money. Also, this was occurring dur-
ing a period when there was a reduction in the domination by rural con-
gressmen; rural congressmen had always been the champions of a strong
postal service.
By the 1960s, the government corporation idea was more accepted
than when the first Hoover Commission reported, so that the Kappel Com-
mission could refer to a model of governmental organization which had
been tested and justified as a solution to the burgeoning demands on
government. In addition, the move toward business efficiencies in
government was strong, and the reorganization along principles of busi-
ness organization was consistent with the introduction of more advanced
accounting and management methods in government.
In this atmosphere, the Kappel Commission made its recommendations.
They included:
1) Establishing a postal corporation owned by the government
to operate on a self-supporting basis.
2) Vesting management responsibilities in a Board of Directors.
3) Improving the quality and kinds of service offered, how
the service was provided, and work conditions.
4) Making all appointments on a nonpolitical basis.
5) Transferring employees to a career service within the
postal service (from the Civil Service Commission)
.
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6) Giving rate setting power to the Board of Directors, afterhearings by Rate Commissioners, subject to a veto by Con-
gressional concurrent resolution.
Much of what the Kappel Commission suggested was legislated, al-
though Congress lost its authority over rate making (to the Board of
Governors and a Postal Rate Commission)
. The Postal Service was made a
government corporation, with a managerial autonomy far greater than un-
der the old Post Office Department. And this is the postal service with
which we now live, the central subject of this chapter. Its organiza-
tion, service delivery performance, organizational goal orientation, and
future direction are the concerns to be addressed.
The Postal Reorganization Act of 19 70 .
The Postal Reorganization Act (PRA) was signed into law on August
12, 19 70, with a newly organized United States Postal Service (USPS) ef-
32fective July 1, 1971. The PRA provided for an organization which
would no longer be an Executive department of government, but a govern-
ment corporation. The Postmaster General was not to be appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, but be a creature of the new
Board of Governors of the USPS.
Specifically, the policy orientation of the postal service was to
be determined by an eleven-member Board of Governors. Nine members,
with no more than five from one political party, were to be appointed by
the President with Senate confirmation, for nine-year, staggered terms.
These nine choose a Postmaster General, and the resulting ten choose a
Deputy Postmaster General, thus creating the eleven-member Board.
In this way, managerial authority was vested in a corporate form,
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with the Postmaster General and Deputy Postmaster General using their
grant of power to determine postal policy on a daily basis. The absence
of any significant Congressional role is noteworthy.
The PRA created a Postal Rate Commission (PRC) to oversee postal
rate deliberations, and make recommendations subject to review by the
Board of Governors. The PRC was to be composed of five commissioners,
appointed to six-year, staggered terms, with no more than three from one
political party. There was no mechanism for Congressional review of
rate making (as had been suggested by the Kappel Commission); the rate
making powers of the USPS and the PRC were insulated from Congressional
purview. Criticism of this mechanism has been widspread.
The PRA mandated that postmasters be appointed on a nonpolitical
,
managerial basis. It established a postal personnel service to be based
on merit selection, withdrawing personnel functions from the Civil
Service Commission. The PRA provided for collective bargaining between
the postal unions and postal management.
The act changed the financial management of the Post Office so that
the USPS
was authorized to retain and use its revenues without going
through the usual executive and congressional budget. In addi-
tion, it had the power to borrow up to $10 billion. . . .^^
This mandate brought with it a gradual diminution of Congressional sup-
port, so that the USPS was expected to be self-sustaining by 1984.
The PRA had clearly moved the postal service toward a business
orientation. Congress was removed effectively from any ongoing involve-
ment with postal activities so that oversight occurred only during a
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perceived crisis situation. The Postmaster General's access and respon-
sibility to the President, or to the political party, was abrogated.
Thus, the notion of administrative responsibility (as opposed to ad-
ministrative efficiency) disappeared. The politics of the Post Office
had been redefined. Clearly, the USPS was heavily politicized as an
agency 1) based on a corporate model, 2) responsive to the criteria of
economic efficiency and attention to large customers, 3) Insulated from
direct public Input, and 4) vulnerable to the available forms of poli-
tical Input, such as PRC hearings, the exchange of top management be-
tween business and the USPS, and the philosophical foundations of con-
sidering the postal system In light of a primary ethic of self-susten-
ance rather than one of entrenchment In Congressional politics.
Evaluation of the United States Postal Service
Several books and articles have evaluated the postal service since
reorganization, from broad, comprehensive standpoints to narrow, spe-
cialized characteristics. The purpose here Is to describe the condition
of the postal service today, and to evaluate It In terms of the history
of the Post Office Department which has preceded It. What about the
USPS gives us a better understanding of how American politics has shaped
public enterprise, and what behaviors does this modern public corpora-
tion exhibit which define the contemporary approach to the provision of
public sector services? The debates In specific service areas or
management areas are part of this whole, but do not define the success
or failure of postal service as much as the critics and supporters would
like. Reduced service in certain areas does not prove a failure, much
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as financial deficits throughout the years did not necessarily mean that
the Post Office Department was a failure. Indeed, finance deficits may
have held the clue as to why, in many people's eyes, the Post Office
Department was considered a success.
Of course, the very nature of the corporate model implies certain
measures of success if one views the form of organization as the deter-
minent criteria. The fact that the USPS is 1) a public corporation, 2)
created as a government service, and 3) intended to meet the service
needs of the citizenry, makes for a ready distinction between it and a
regular business corporation. And in evaluating a public corporation,
it must be kept in mind that goals are multiple. Although the Kappel
Commission was able to recommend a corporate form (and the PRA institu-
tionalized it), and even stated that it preferred a private, investor-
controlled system, its intentions did not completely define the charac-
ter of the present postal system.
Even in establishing a postal corporation, Congress also made sure
that broader social goals would be part of postal considerations, such
as by guaranteeing that rural delivery service would be continued.
Tlius it is evident that Congress understood a public postal corporation
to contain a large measure of public service goal commitment. In years
subsequent to the passage of the PRA, Congress has proven, even in its
severely limited oversight of the USPS, its concern with services which
touch the public, through legislation dealing with the maintenance of
six-day delivery (at least through Fiscal Year 1984) , rural post of-
fices, and the preservation of local postmarks (if not local postmark-
ing!) .
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How much of this the USPS has internalized has been questioned by
various critics. In this vein, it is fascinating that the most recent
edition of The History of the U.S. Postal Service 1775-1981 .^^ published
by the USPS, does not list any service goals in its "Summary of Provi-
36
sions" of the PRA. Of course, business considerations, public scru-
tiny. Congressional pressure, and interest group lobbying force postal
officials toward acknowledging the service area generally.
The material concerning the evaluation of the USPS tends to concen-
trate around certain categories of measurement, similar in many in-
stances to those criteria for reorganization put forward by the Kappel
Commission. Thus, researchers and others discuss the USPS in terms of
1) managerial restructuring and autonomy, and institutional decentrali-
zation and flexibility, 2) economic efficiency, including budgetary
freedom, 3) personnel policy, including labor/management relations and
safety /health considerations, 4) rate structuring and rate setting pro-
cedures, 5) research and development, including consideration of coming
technologies, such as generation III electronic transmission capabili-
ties, and 6) service characteristics.*
^Although the USPS contains "service" in its name, and many of the
evaluations begin with an implicit recognition of the corporation's main
role being that service, the analyses are generally lacking in more than
superficial considerations of service. (This is not to say that service
measurement figures are not included, or that attention is not paid to
service, only that understanding of the depth of the service role(s) is
generally lacking.) The Postal Precipice , -^'^ written with a consumer
perspective in mind, is the major exception in its emphasis on service
as primary rather than an inevitably dependent variable.
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Managerial restructuring and autonomy, and i nstitutional dP.Pn. i
.
tlon and flexibility
.
The first two criteria, managerial restructuring and autonomy, and
institutional decentralization and flexibility, reflect on issues of ad-
ministrative efficiency and the attempt for government to mimic private
corporate models. The Hoover and Kappel Commissions certainly viewed
these (to varying degrees) criteria as crucial to a successful Post Of-
fice, given the modern conditions under which it operates. As John
Tierney writes in Postal Reorganization
.
The reorganization of the Post Office Department in 19 71 was,
above all else, an effort to increase the managerial autonomy
of the mail agency. The architects of the reorganization be-
•
,
lieved that the mail delivery system was essentially a busi-
ness operation that could be managed more efficiently and ef-
fectively if it were converted.
. . to a government coporation
.
Application of business-like management was viewed as a solvent for
the accumulated grime of governmental managerial lethargy. A corporate
structure geared towards cost efficiency and economic self-sustenance
would better control expenditures than a line agency with the gilded
pockets of Congress at its disposal. The Kappel Commission certainly
identified needed managerial improvements ensuring better service and
more economic efficiency.
Likewise, decentralization was viewed as crucial for postal flexi-
bility in changing times. The ability of regional and local postmasters
to react to demands of their particular conditions was deemed essential,
as was the ability to move mail from urban bottlenecks to more suburban
locations. (Many urban post offices were built near railroad lines,
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based on earlier transportation patterns, and were as ill-equipped to
receive tractor- trailer trucks as were the increasingly crowded streets
to receive the level of automobile traffic then occurring.)
But the assumptions made in the PRA (and the Kappel Commission and
its background reports) may have been inaccurate in the sense that
government corporations might not actually provide the relief sought by
reformers. As Tierney indicated, the conditions under which a public
postal corporation operates are much different than those of a private
corporation. Although government corporations "occupy an area in which
the distinction between governmental and business activities become
hazy," and they are "Theoretically freed of the direct control of poli-
tical institutions [and] expected to use efficient, businesslike proce-
dures in carrying out their chartered activities, ""^^ their mandates are
still political and governmental, and so provide the corporation with
conflicting goals and a need to prioritize among those conflicting goals.
Since the nature of the structure and goal orientation concentrates on
"businesslike" goals, and the original impetus was for a movement to
such an orientation, postal managers will tend to act in a manner empha-
sizing the businesslike. A political postal service dominated by Con-
gress and direct political responsiveness had been rejected.
So, although it may be true that managerial autonomy has increased
through restructuring, the object of that autonomy has been concentrated
on economic and cost-related goals rather than on fulfilling political
demands of various interests. As the National Association of Public
Administration stated recently in the Evaluation of the United States
Postal Service:
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Management has given first priority to PRA mandates to operatein a more efficient, cost-conscious manner. These effortshave occasionally run counter to the perceived interests ofthe public. Congress, postal customers, and postal employees.When serious conflicts have resulted, postal management has
either retreated voluntarily or been forced to withdraw. The
t';?Sc''u
^^""^""^ disclose any instance in whichUSPS has been publicly criticized for continuing to render a
service which might be reduced or eliminated in the interest
of cost reduction. Hence, postal management's defeats havebeen ^exclusively the result of advocating a more "business-
like operation of the postal system.
In addition, the removal from the avowedly political Congressional
world to the more autonomous world of the public corporation only frees
the managers from the purview of the Congress to the wider world of
business-like politics. An evaluation concerned with modern management
techniques, managerial autonomy, and nonpolitical appointments assumes
emphasis on efficient administration removed from the greater political
conflicts of society.
But the truth is that the political world of the contemporary United
States includes the great business-like operations in society. The in-
teraction between the state and the corporations is a defining charac-
41teristic of modern capitalist society. And even in a more mundane
fashion, the traffic between government agencies and their corporate re-
lations has traditionally been heavy. So it has been with the USPS.
The autonomy of the management structure, then, can be understood
to be autonomy from government control and even Progressive notions of
responsibility and not from the constraints of the society within which
the service operates. To understand this as autonomy is to limit the
focus in an artificial fashion, for although it may be true that freedom
from government controls has certain benefits, it also provides a
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greater dependence on the existing corporate structure of the society.
Economic and administrative efficiency
.
This switch to the corporate model brings with it a hierarchy of
values concerning economics, product provision, the role of labor, and
business relationships. Managerial autonomy does not operate in a vacu-
um of business-like flow charts, but in the real world of corporate re-
lations, much as the Senate does not debate (often) in the oratorical
style of its heights but at the visceral level of its political needs
and desires.
Thus, when the National Academy of Public Administration states
that the USPS has consistently favored business-like cost-consciousness,
this is merely a reflection of the general goal orientation of a cor-
porate structure. However, even if management is successful in this
manner, there is no guarantee that service to the public will improve
or that overall finances will improve. The only guarantee is that the
organization will act in a way to maximize the financial side, with
42
varying results.
The inability of local postmasters to deal with local situations
was considered an impediment to efficient operations. "Managing for
economy was impossible at the local level because no information existed
on the costs of operating individual post offices, and there was no in-
43
centlve to reduce costs." There were even incentives to employ more
workers, for "a postmaster's salary was set according to how many em-
ployees were at his facility. "^^ Presently, however,
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The local postmaster is less bound by the rigid dictates ofthe organization's rules and regulations. He is encouraged to
experiment and introduce new methods— in short, to managefinding ways to hold down costs and improve service.
'
The emphasis is on financial considerations, as is consistent with the
PRA intentions. Postmasters now are more independent in terms of mini-
mizing costs, but this then permeates their attitudes toward general im-
provements. In addition, postal service "regional centralization" has
limited many service options. The following attempts to delineate this
result
.
First of all, I believe USPS's term "decentralization" to be, in
some ways, a misnomer, and so prefer the characterization "regional cen-
tralization." For instance, mail has increasingly been routed to fewer
offices for cancelling, sorting, and shipment, to take advantage of eco-
nomics of scale, mechanization, employee work shifts, and other organi-
zational efficiencies. Thus, (most) mail from Amherst, MA to Amherst,
MA goes to Springfield, MA to be cancelled, sorted, and then delivered
back to the Amherst Post Office. This regional centralization removes
employees from smaller local post offices, and replaces them with em-
ployees or machinery (or a combination) at these regional post offices
(Area Mail Processing centers). Thus, options concerning employment,
sorting activities, and mail delivery and pick-up schedules are actually
more removed from the control of the local postmaster. Costs, then, can
be cut, but they must be cut from a reduced number of options. Often
these reductions translate to reductions in service, or to resistance
to an increase in service when an area grows.
The USPS's computer forwarding program also fits into the regional
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centralization design. The postal service indicates that "As of October
1981, there were 1,124 computers at 171 sites nationwide. These units
processed 1.4 billion pieces of mail during fiscal year 1981."^^ The
postal service also indicates that it has done tests on advanced com-
puter models, and plans to introduce these models into fifteen large
post offices. Kathleen Conkey believes that this could be causing
slower mail service and more missent mail. She writes that
Before the centralized computer system, carriers each day
marked up the forwarded mail for their routes. They were the
best people for the job because they recognized names and ad-
dresses and noticed changes. If a piece of mail was mistak-
enly placed in the wrong carrier's load, that carrier could
pass it on to the correct carrier. Now, carriers cannot cor-
rect addresses even if they know where a piece should go.
Instead, they must send it to a computer center which for
some post offices is miles away, so the letter can be pro-
cessed with a computerized address sticker. Then the letter
is trucked back to the destination post office and delivered.
This procedure is followed whether the customer has moved a
block or across the country. '^^
Locally, customers at the Florence, Massachusetts postal station
have petitioned for the return of their own zip code and their old post
office hours. (See page 190.) The Northampton postmaster (who runs the
Florence station as part of the Northampton post office) has rejected
the request because there would be no saving for the post office.
What appears to the public is that cost minimization is a more important
goal than convenient service for the average customer. What this illus-
trates in the context of regional centralization is how a local post-
master's ability to frame postal service to local conditions really
translates into a more negative function, i.e., where to cut costs if
possible
.
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Perhaps more important is how flexibility and decentralization are
implicitly defined. These concepts hold their meaning within the
greater context of the primacy of cost reductions and minimization or a
more homogeneous managerial approach, and only secondarily in terms of
meeting local conditions. That is, the organizing philosophy is economic
efficiency and managerial autonomy, and the structuring of local service
around that goal is the driving force for that decentralized decision-
making. In an important sense, this "decentralization" is really more
centralizing a motivating force than the previous system, because it is
a concept of postal service which must be applied whatever the local
conditions
.
In contrast, the political postmaster was the epitome of decen-
tralization. It was the force of this outward pressure (towards decen-
tralization) that over the years led to the increasingly stringent and
comprehensive Postal Manual, and the Postal Inspectors. This political
input, though, guaranteed an attention to local conditions, desires, and
the potential for growth of services in the community. The political
element was important to the identity of the community, and the presence
of an active and service-oriented post office was both a result of and
a positive presence of the national government in the local community in
a decentralized, i.e., meaningfully local and noncoercive manner.
Now this and other actions of the old Post Office Department were
perhaps inefficient. Larger numbers of employees to provide service to
a constant number of postal customers would lower productivity, given a
constant amount of mail, and be the bane of anyone attempting to control
costs
.
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But the greater number of postal employees will have other residual
effects. It will put more money into the locality (or the general area),
as the employee shops, pays taxes, etc. This will be a stimulus to
business, and will increase local, state, and national tax revenues. It
can also improve service, or the customer's accessibility to service,
which will improve the image and legitimacy of government enterprise.
This, in turn, might lessen antagonism towards taxation, and transform
the image of government as a burden to that of government as a service
provider. Increased political responsiveness rooted in the community
and attention to local needs also help enhance interrelations and life-
style, which many people feel have been lost in the increasingly deper-
sonalized, mechanized, businesslike corporate world. Many people remem-
ber with fondness the mail carriers on their routes who, at a leisurely
pace, could pay more attention to delivery needs and also provide social
relationships in terms of neighborliness and familiarity. This is, in
many instances, assumed to be part of a bygone era, unrealistic in a
modern age, but it may in fact be the result of the conscious and uncon-
scious choices made about our public services. By consciously narrowing
the postal function to better approximate a business function of service
for fee, the nature of our community changes. The workplace, for the
mail carrier and mail clerk, is altered. And "decentralization" as a
managerial concept begins to better approximate homogeneity of result as
post offices, physically and in service terms, begin to more and more
often resemble each other.
Again, narrow economic efficiency criteria would mitigate against
more costly service delivery. But a broader interpretation of the
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postal mandate would include longer terms of measurement, and effects
beyond the immediate postal balance sheet.
The interpretation of what goals are embodied in a public corpora-
tion, and what the particular organization should be mandated to perform
as regards the public benefit, does not end in an analysis of rather
narrow and artificial bounds as laid down by the PRA. The fact that
broader economic considerations did not receive analysis (except in
terms of business and consumer costs) does not delegitimize this type
of perspective. In fact, the history of the postal system in the United
States practically demands it.
Postal deficits have historically been one factor which assisted in
the building of societal infrastructure for private business to grow
upon; this deficit spending also stimulated the growth of new private
industries (stagecoaches, steamships, railroads, and airplanes)
. These
developments returned benefits, many times over, both to the society and
49the postal system, including economic as well as other social benefits.
Among the latter might be better roads, development of frontier terri-
tories, a more educated citizenry, and a belief in government and poli-
tics as a potentially positive force in society. The government in gen-
eral has not abandoned this role, two modern examples being the develop-
ment of the interstate highway system and the extensive subsidization
of the nuclear power industry.
Personnel policy .
Thus, returning to employment, we might interpret higher employment
as socially productive and positive rather than the "horror" many find
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it to be. The Post Office Department employed approximately 740,000
workers at the time of reorganization; today's USPS employs approximate-
ly 670,000. Together with increased mechanization, regional centraliza-
tion, and presorting by mailers, productivity has increased. 51 USPS has
thus decreased the number of workers while at the same time increased
the volume of mail sorted, an impressive gain for postal management . 52
But is this really the gain it appears to be? Many changes had to
take place, some of which were partially initiated before reorganiza-
tion, in order for this success story to occur. Probably the defining
change had to do with mechanization. Changing the nature of the postal
worker's work environment will, most often, change job satisfaction
levels, service provision, and wage demands. Kathleen Conkey recently
wrote about some of the effects mechanization has had in postal service:
"Boring, boring, boring," is how a Chicago letter sorting
machine operator once described her work. She sits at a let-
ter sorting machine (LSM) all day long typing ZIP codes onto
a keyboard, as once every second, 60 times a minute a letter
passes into view.
If monotony were the only problem with working on such
automated equipment, it might be difficult to sympathize with
postal employees who earn more than $20,000 a year at this
work. But the rapidity of the changeover to mechanization has
caused more tangible problems. When the postal corporation
began operating in 1971, it used 282 LSMs in the entire coun-
try. But by 1981 it used 1,240.53
The results of the concentrating of mail sorting, mechanized and
stultifying, are adverse health effects, increased misdirected mail, and
the general dehumanization of the workplace . ^'^ Dissatisfaction with the
nature of the work alters the perspective which employees bring to the
job, and to the postal service as a service industry. As industrial and
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factory workers have reacted against the demands of the assembly line,
so postal workers have reacted against analogous postal operations.
This cype of work is done in large post offices, allowing tremen-
dous volumes of mail to be massed at larger, more industrial type
plants. The loss of feeling for community, or attachment between the
customer service aspect and the inside work, can readily be seen. In
exchange for the deteriorating nature of work, wage demands have in-
creased while service interest has receded.
The mechanization of postal sorting and regional centralization
necessary to make the sophisticated equipment cost-effective have re-
quired alteration of pick-up and delivery schedules. Mail has to be
rounded up from various locations to reach a, central point in order that
it may then be sorted and dispensed again for delivery. With local post
offices generally not sorting mail any longer, the trip to the sorting
spot is further. One result is that mailings later in the day or in the
evening must then wait 12-24 hours to be picked up at the collection
boxes. The mechanization has made sorting more cost-effective (although
even this is questionable), but it has changed consumer expectations,
employee working conditions, attitudes and satisfaction, and local
postal presence, thereby having effects on many aspects of community
life and on the societal view of public sector performance.
When the Kappel Commission promoted a postal corporation based on
business organization principles because they believed the post office
to be an essentially commercial enterprise, they betrayed an antipathy
to the public role of the postal service and to government services. By
ignoring the broad societal and community implications, such as loss of
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confidence in public service provision and turning away fro. the public
sphere as the arena of conflict resolution in the society, the ethic of
reorganization degrades the public sector and so promotes private ave-
nues of procuring service satisfaction. (This would be consistent with
the Commission view that the major part of the postal mission could be
served by private enterprise.) The business ethic brought to a public
service, held to different expectations and measures by a citizenry
viewing the public organization as the embodiment of democratic process,
thus tears at the very fabric of public life. Mechanization is only
symptomatic of this view, for many would agree that labor-saving machin-
ery will beget efficiency which will in turn free revenues for better
service provision. However, the broad implications of the human dis-
placement involved is something not addressed by the present USPS.
Reorganization brought with it a change in labor/management rela-
tions. Collective bargaining was included in the PRA, so that postal
management could deal directly with postal workers and their unions,
thus taking Congressional politics out of the process and concurrently
increasing managerial autonomy. John Tierney contends that the collec-
tive bargaining process has been destructive of post office solidarity,
so that the postal workers are now "union members first and postal
workers second. "^^ The nature of the political conflict has changed,
with Congress removed from the picture, but this has generally caused
divisiveness in the postal service.
Whatever the defects of the pre-organization method of setting
postal wages, the system had its virtues. The presence of
third-party decision makers (Congress, the President, and the
Bureau of the Budget) tempered relations between management
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and the rank-and-file employees. Now, however, the unions andmanagement face each other across the bargaining table withoutthe luxury of intermediaries on whom responsibility devolvesWhereas before the reorganization both parties saw themselves
as constituent parts of the same service agency, they now seethemselves more as independent adversaries . 57
Political creatures thrive on the ability to diffuse situations of
built-in conflict. Congressmen especially are masters of the political
compromise, so much so that they are attacked for lacking principles.
It seems evident that they, as representatives of the public and pro-
viders of the nation's services, would be well-suited to compromise the
demands of postal workers against those of postal administrators. And
a Postmaster General, appointed by the President, also has an abiding
interest in a satisfactory resolution of labor problems. Further still,
the Postmaster General had by tradition been the head of the victorious
party, master politician at the height of triumph. Between his skills
and those of the Congressional committee chairs, corporate-style manage-
ment must pale in comparison. It is no wonder that the amount of con-
flict has increased under reorganization, despite large pay increases.
The adversary relationship is also a reflection of the managerial
authority now lodged in the postal service. This authority leads to the
emphasis on cost control, at the possible expense of worker job satis-
faction and worker safety. Thus, issues of worker boredom at LSMs or
dangerous working conditions at Bulk Mail Centers (a creation of the
reorganized postal service) are indicative of the idea or rationale of
managerial prerogative checked now only by collective bargaining rather
than by Congressional oversight and political pressure.
When talking about the general "Effects of Management, by Legis-
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lature," the Kappel Commission reported that
lit l^K^lT.^^^ ""^^^^ rnanagerial decisions forthe Post Office--it sets rates and wages, approves postal fa-cilities and decides many other postal matters. When keybusiness decisions are made in this way, they do not neces-
sarily bring about what is best for the postal system and its
customers. This process.
. .is simply not a substitute for
sound decision-making in a business context. The mis-
sion of the Post Office is simpler and narrower than that of
most other Federal activities. It is by far more import.n^ as
an economic activity than as an instrument of public poli^
IMy emphasis.] For this reason, and even leaving aside manage-
ment considerations, we cannot help raise the question as
citizens whether the Congressional and Executive energy devoted
to the details of postal affairs represents the most productive
use of the talents of our national leadership . 58
However, the experience since reorganization has pointed up an interest-
ing comparative perspective on labor relations in a public corporation
as opposed to the politicized relationships of Congressional and Execu-
tive involvement in labor relations.
To begin with, the adversary relationship has apparently produced
more contentious labor relations, as described by Tierney. In addition,
average postal wages rose from $8,030 in 1969 to $22,849,^^ partly be-
cause of the unique economic conditions of the 1970s and because of the
political agreements made with the unions for support of the PRA (i.e.,
for large wage concessions). Despite this, many postal workers believe
that their working conditions have deteriorated, whether they are those
of the clerk who sits before a LSM or the carrier whose workload has
been rationalized. And many members of the public remember the old
Post Office Department with fondness, whether the memories are warranted
or not. Although the picture is not clear, there is at least some basis
to ask whether the reorganization has actually improved the labor situa-
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tlon for either postal management or postal workers.
Rate structuring and rate se tting procedurps.
Almost everyone has criticism for the USPS in terms of its rate
structuring and rate setting procedures. The relative rates between
classes are viewed as inappropriate with the first class mail users
bearing a greater burden than costs justify. 61 The PRA set up a Postal
Rate Commission (PRC) to monitor the rate setting process. Its role is
to hold hearings on proposed rate changes made by the USPS and to make
recommended decisions to the USPS on the changes.* The decision then
goes back to the Board of Governors of the USPS, who may approve the
decision, allow it under protest, or reject the decision.
If the governors allow the decision under protest or reject
it, it goes back to the PRC for a further recommended deci-
sion. When the governors get the second PRC decision, they
can, with an unanimous vote, actually modify the decision
after meeting certain minor criteria. 62
This is exactly what happened in the most recent rate change case, when
the USPS Board of Governors raised the first class postage rate to twen-
ty cents despite the PRC's decisions that eighteen cents was more appro-
priate .
There are several weaknesses in the process, which was aimed at
taking the plethora of interest groups out of the postal rate change
process by removing it from Congressional control. First, the PRC has
*In the literature it always seems to be termed rate "increases"
rather than changes, although, in fact, the PRC has at times recommended
reductions, such as in third class mail rates.
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mak-
no independent ability to conduct investigations or audits, thereby
lag it reliant on the USPS for its information used in the hearings and
decisions. And although the Kappel Connnission suggested that Congress
have sixty days to veto any rate changes by concurrent resolution^a (^he
House of Representatives pushed for the same condition), the PRA deleted
this check on the rate changing power of the USPS.
The hearing process has become more technical and involved in de-
tailed legal and economic considerations, in contrast to the legislative
methods in place prior to the PRA. Thus, although the hearings bring
together the USPS officials, mail user groups, and an Officer of the
Commission (OOC, to represent the broad public of mail users), the hear-
ings are by their very nature conducive to the large organized inter-
ests, at the expense of the general public. These interest groups also
promoted their causes in Congress, prior to the PRA, but at that time
the decisionmakers were representatives, subject to the whims of their
constituents, and access to Congressmen by a larger variety of interests
was more evident. By being put in an administrative atmosphere, ra-
tionalized and professionalized, they have also become removed from the
public forum of Congressional politics. The hearing process of the PRC
in rate cases is held
under strict administrative procedures. To participate is an
expensive process requiring expert knowledge of rate methodol-
ogies, court procedure and law. As many as 125 businesses and
associations participate and a core group have regularly ap-
peared since the first case. . . . Under the circumstances it
is not surprising that individuals only rarely participate . 64
And the OOC, "As an employee of the PRC. . .is in a difficult position
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to criticize Conunission decisions. As part of the PRC, he is also sub-
ject to all its limitations and weaknesses . "^^
John Tiemey has noted the extensive change in rate making since
the implementation of the PRA:
Before the reorganization, the [rate] hearings were handled in
an informal, hail-fellow atmosphere in which political maneu-
vering was the rule. ... The new process with its formaldepoliticized, legalistic, adversary hearings, is designed toinject more rigor and professionalization into setting postal
rates. "
This means that, "Economists and cost analysts are now especially pro-
minent in the revised proceedings ," but also that, "the lawyer's role,
has been most enhanced. "^^ Together with dramatically increased costs
in the rate hearings, information has gained a crucial role, resulting
in a position of increased importance for the USPS in the rate setting
process
.
But the procedures remain highly political, only the arena of poll
tics and groups participating have changed. The autonomy of management
has increased, although the regulatory procedures frame a rather weak
control over the USPS in the process. Thus, a public corporate entity,
unbound from the political controls of President, party, or Congress,
evidently enjoys greater control over rate setting than did the Post Of
fice Department. This is in contrast to earlier reformers, who envi-
sioned Executive control and responsibility central to performance and
accoun tability
.
In this context, nine criteria must be considered (by the PRC) in
the rate case process, these to guarantee the role of the postal system
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as a public servant. They are:
1) that rates and classifications are fair and equitable,
2) the value of service actually provided each type or class
'
of maxl service to both the sender and the recipient
3) the requirement that each class of mail bear the direct andxndirect costs attributable to it, plus a portion of allother costs reasonably assignable to it,
4) the effect of rate increases on the general public, busi-
ness mail users, and private enterprises engaged in deliv-
ering mail matter other than letters,
5) the available alternative means of sending and receivingletters and other mail matter at reasonable costs,
6) the degree to which a mailer has prepared a mailing before
It enters the postal system, and its effects on reducing
Postal Service costs,
7) a simple structure for rates and classifications, and sim-
ple, identifiable relationships between rates charged the
various classes for service,
8) the educational, cultural, scientific, and informational
value to the recipient.
9) other factors the Commission deems appropriate. 69
The guidelines provide for a wide latitude in interpretation, so that
while in writing the law Congress attempted to inject certain rather
political considerations into the rate making process, they removed the
most appropriate political forum. Congress. It is interesting that in
much the same way that Congress's absence has caused increased confron-
tation and rancor in labor/management relations, its absence in rate
making has caused almost universal displeasure, certainly to a much
greater extent than in pre-PRA days.
Congress was notoriously successful in keeping rates down, even to
the point of perhaps hurting the Post Office Department's capacity for
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research and development and capital improvement . 70 (However, revenues
were not so determinant in appropriations in Post Office Department days,
since the budget derived from the general treasury.) Nonetheless, for
all classes of mail, Congress provided low rates for mailers. First
class rates were two cents at the turn of the century, and only six
cents by the time the PRA passed. (Rates were raised from six to eight
cents on May 16, 1971, partially as a result of large wage increases
given to the labor unions in exchange for their support for reorganiza-
tion.) The fact that the rate structure was so open to pressure allowed
for a public free-for-all, even if weighted in favor of organized inter-
ests, and a public perception of political compromises. The political
skill of politicians is in reducing conflict, and in trying to either
accommodate all parties or make the losers understand the reasons for
their loss. And the losers always had the recourse to other legislative
attempts and strategies, and ultimately the ballot box.
This has largely disappeared with the new rate mechanisms. Highly
professionalized, the process excluded most people, and so allows the
organized interests—and the postal service itself— to make public policy
largely untouched by greater political consequences. Progressive-type
reform (in professionalism and administrative efficiency) mated with no-
tions of managerial autonomy and a private corporate model has bourne a
rate process out of public control, but with all-inclusive public ef-
fects. That is, despite the loss of visible political control, the pub-
lic still bears the effects of rate changes, producing a damaging rela-
tionship with the government, for despite all else the USPS is a public
corporation and is still considered the embodiment of the public— the
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govemment-for most people. This feeds on the feeling of political
helplessness, for the increasingly frequent rate hikes occur, unimpeded
by voting (i.e.. Congressional oversight, and a tie to one's ballot), in
an increasingly privatized manner, or outside the public scrutiny. A
rate hearing in Congress would provoke the best of political rhetoric-
public, visible, noteworthy, targeted for constituents-thereby
"inform-
ing" the public about public policy decisions concerning the most public
of agencies, the Post Office. Now, even if the news media present sum-
maries of PRC meetings, nothing newsworthy would occur except the final
statement about the rate decision. The public discussion, rich with
political maneuvering as well as political substance, is lost. And from
that loss stems different types of decisions, which have ultimately, un-
der the USPS, led to frequent rate hikes and intense displeasure.
The Kappel Commission believed that the argument as to
Whether every class pays its "proper" rate is a long-standing
controversy which cannot be resolved in the absence of func-
tional cost data which the current cost system [a Cost Ascer-
tainment System] does not generate.
. . . Postal management
.
.
.needs a modern cost accounting system, one that shows, by
each postal function, how costs vary with each class of serv-
ice, how each class contributes to peakload and the size of
the remaining pool of institutional costs. ^1
Criteria number three (page 166) mandated by the PRA directed the USPS
to change the cost ascertainment system. But it did not specify the
methods for gauging costs, and left that decision to the USPS.^^ xhe
ways in which the USPS has attributed costs and prices have generated
significant amounts of criticism. Almost no one seems satisfied with
their methods or the results. Varied interests all find fault with the
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relative costs for the different classes of mail. 73
Cross-subsidization between classes, a criticized practice of the
Post Office Department, was supposed to be ended by the PRA, with the
mandate of the above criteria. But since everyone involved, including
the PRC, has criticized USPS costing and pricing methods (and it would
be expected that relative changes would bring about great amounts of
controversy), a political scientist might assume costing and pricing not
to be a technical economic problem but an inherently and blatantly poli-
tical one, not resolvable by methodological tinkering. It is the mis-
understanding that removing Congress and the executive would solve poli-
tical problems which leads to groping for more accurate measurements,
more fair or honest processors, and less interest (in terms of political
pressure) in the whole matter. The rate setting process is probably
never susceptible to stable, accurate pricing, fulfilling the dream of
a decade-long postage rate based on such principles, since the institu-
tion of any such rate along with the subsequent unforeseen events and
changes in society will alter the figures, and so (mechanically) demand
new price structures. It was only^in the highly politicized atmosphere
of Congressional appropriations, rate setting, and influence that the
three-cent stamp lasted for twenty-five years.
In a postal business that is supposed to make prices reflect costs
in the different classes of mail and operate with little or no outside
financial assistance, the impetus will be to compromise between the re-
alities of pricing according to cost and the ability of each class to
absorb the "true" cost (as closely as can be ascertained). For example,
fourth class mail may in fact be underpriced if strict economic criteria
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and measurement are applied, yet other forces operate to mitigate the
rise in prices. If it is conceded that parcel post is underpriced (re-
lative to the cost structure), then should not parcel post rates be
raised? Alan R. Sorkin argues, e.g., that
Although cost-based rates would probably cost the postal sys-tem to lose some mail volume in classes such as parcel post
such an approach would also tend to reduce losses. The reasonfor this is that much of the business is being retained onlybecause rates are set below the average cost of providing the
service. t.
The problem with this reasoning is that USPS losses would be in parcel
markets with the most readily available competition, and not in the
markets which are most costly to service (such as rural areas, single-
parcel customers, and items private carriers will not carry)
. Full-
cost rates would tend to drive off the more profitable business to pri-
vate firms, which in turn would require even higher rates on the remain-
ing, low-profit mail. The problem is not solved by Sorkin 's advice, un-
less there is no parcel business at all. So there are reasons why the
USPS must moderate rates, despite cost analyses, because USPS is not
truly analogous to a private corporation, which can leave service areas
it does not consider profitable.
In terms of comparing the USPS in parcel post to United Parcel
Service (UPS), Kathleen Conkey writes that:
''Prices for all classes of mail have risen, dramatically, since re-
organization. See, for example, Table 4-2 in Alan R. Sorkin, The Eco -
nomics of the Postal System (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1980), p.
57.
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A comparison of UPS-USPS parcel rates reveals that the PostalService actually holds the rate advantage in the vast ma^o^Uyof weight and distance zones. However, UPS holds a definiteadvantage on parcels weighing 12 pounds and under, and theadvantage in those particular weights are a convenient umb;el-
for n^P^^ ^^^^^ ?^^'^^ UPS 11 pounds andUSPS IS 6 pounds. [Senior Assistant Postmaster General]Jellison claims that the United Parcel Service intervenes inFostal Rate Commission hearings to convince the PRC to put
more costs on parcel rates, "Then their rates are set by theInterstate Commerce Commission and they're able to use more of
u
P^,^c^;{8 strategy by planning their prices for the differentbreaks
.
Third-class mail (commonly referred to as bulk-mail or junk-mail)
is generally attacked as being underpriced and a major cause of high
first class rates. Defenders are many among bulk mailers, few among
those who write about the Postal Service. Yet there are arguments which
justify an "underpriced" third class rate, one of them being their (gen-
eral) lack of time sensitivity.^^ Thus, much third class mail can be
sorted at non-peak times, when underutilized personnel and equipment can
perform this secondary work.^^
Another justification of lower third class rates has to do with the
nature of the organizations which raise money by third class non-profit
rates. Congressional cutbacks in subsidies last year threw
many non-profit organizations into turmoil. This sudden loss
of expected funds hurt not only the non-profit groups that de-
pend on the [revenue forgone] subsidy but the many Americans
who depend on those groups. . .when non-profit third-class
rates jumped from 3.8 cents to 5.9 cents in less than a month,
the postage bills sent many charity groups scrambling to stay
on the tightrope [over the safety net].^^
Since many of these non-profit organizations rely heavily on con-
tributions in response to their mailing efforts, cutting back will mean
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m-
reduced contributions, less money for their causes, and less for the
dividuals who benefit from their research or service (e.g., from the ac-
tivities of the American Lung Association or the Salvation Army). At-
tributing a "fairer" share of the burden to some of these non-profit
mailers may be detrimental to those already suffering from a general
societal misappropriation of resources.
Some critics view subsidization of these "interest groups" as in-
equitable within a liberal society, where each user should pay the
proper costs of the service they receive. What this ignores, given the
context of a pluralist society in which groups compete for a piece of
the pie, is that the less powerful or influential groups may be properly
subsidized in the pubMc interest, by the public sector, because they
are often shut out of alternative means of fund-raising. This is not
the promotion of one group over another, but only provision of access to
all groups, many of which are unable to participate in the more costly
environment of the private sector.
Second class mail has historically been accorded subsidies in the
mails, beginning with Benjamin Franklin's free delivery of newspapers.
The educational, social, and political benefits have been considered as
crucial components in a liberal democratic culture, worth underwriting
as costs to society in order to promote a free exchange of ideas. This
is done through the postal system, in the least costly and noncoercive
way possible.
Critics contend that by subsidizing second class mail, we are sup-
porting publishers and their readers who should be openly competing in
the market place of communication.
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If we subsidize certain classes of mail because of their edu-cational, cultural, scientific, and informational value to therecipient, why do we not subsidize all educational, cultural
scientific, and informational transmissions . 80
In reply, there are significant differences between printed material and
broadcasting which are rather evident, such as control over editorial
content, the permanence of the transmission, and the role of the public
in providing the transmission. Most importantly, the fact that there
can be a public role in promoting all publications for a vibrant, educa-
tional, cultural, and social existence, is almost alien to those who
would "directly subsidize publications, not the costs of mailing them,
and.
.
.subsidize only those that are small, unprofitable, and below ef-
ficient scale. "81 For critics concerned with government overinvolvement
and its coercive power, this is manifestly a much more unlikely, coer-
cive, and irrelevant prescription, given the nature of postal service.
The intent, again, is not support of particular specialized interests,
but of the mail class of interests, which stimulates entry into the
market, survivability, and the genuine governmental role in promoting
values of education, of culture, of ethics, of politics, and of commerce
in an undifferentiated manner. When Benjamin Franklin allowed his com-
petitor's products— i.e., newspapers— into the mails as freely as his, i
Indicated the type of commitment the postal system has made ever since
to promote certain social values. The issue may be that cross-subsidi-
zation is not the proper tool for achieving this, although given the
present form of organization it is the primary tool.
First class mail is the focal point for much of the discussion con-
cerning the skewed rate structure. Almost every commentator agrees that
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too great a part of the costs are apportioned to first class, and so
first class rates are priced too high. This is also the judgment of the
Postal Rate Conmiission, which twice rejected USPS claims that they
needed a twenty-cent first class stamp. This has been an issue since
before reorganization, and was addressed by the Kappel Commission . 82
The reforms in the PRA have not solved the problem. Although all classes
of mall have had increased rates, first class rates have gone up the
most.
One reason for this is the procedure used by the USPS to determine
costs and so set the basis for pricing. Explicitly used in earlier rate
cases, and still implicitly used, 83 the inverse elasticity rule leads to
apportioning a greater amount of institutional (unapportioned) costs to
the class of mail with the greatest inelasticity. Because of the postal
monopoly on first class mail rooted in the private express statutes,
first class mail has been accorded an inordinate amount of institutional
costs. The pressures of competition, and other criteria (subsidies,
strong pressure groups, etc.), have moderated the rates in other classes.
Observers prod the USPS to more properly apportion costs, which would
result in lower first class rates.
One problem connected with so controlling first class rates is the
mission of the USPS: self-sustenance. To move toward this goal, the
USPS has had to increasingly apportion deficit-costs (which were borne
by Congress) to the different classes of mail. Each class has felt the
increases in varying intensities, and users have complained. But, as
the USPS argued earlier and now implicitly posits, the elasticity of
first class mail has allowed for a greater apportionment to that class
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without necessarily harming postal service business or receipts, which
is not true in other classes. A goal of economic efficiency moves postal
management into a strategy of focusing greater increases on first class
mail
.
The PRC, in its first recommended decision for an eighteen cent
stamp (on February 19, 1981), conceded that "demand for first class mail
was becoming more elastic because of electronic al ternatives . "^^ Ulti-
mately the USPS overrode the PRC, and kept the twenty-cent stamp. The
long-term implications may prove the increasingly elastic nature of
first class mail, but the short-term demands of economic results evid-
ently pushed the postal service in the continuing saga of a high first
class rate.
Research and development
.
There are other reasons for the rate structure being as it is, such
as the privacy of the sealed envelope, the timeliness in which it is
(supposed to be) delivered, and the pick-up stations maintained. But
those who study it carefully, whether in the 1960s or 1980s, criticize
the postal management for overcharging first class mailers.
Observers agree that research and development of new equipment and
service was neglected in the Post Office Department and that it is still
inadequately funded and promoted in the USPS. The area on most every-
one's mind is electronic communications. The National Association of
Public Administration study sets out three types of systems presently in
use:
1) Generation I: Hard-copy mail or messages are translated
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into electronic form for transmission, and then retrans-lated to hard copy for delivery to the recipient. Tele-grams are characteristic of this type of system.
2) Generation II: Information already in electronic form,generally from computer information systems, is electronic-
ally translated to a delivery service, where it is con-
verted into hard copy for delivery to the recipient USPS's
Electronic Computer Originated Mail (E-COM) is an example
of this type of service.
3) Generation III: Information from one electronic source isdirectly transmitted to a recipient's electronic terminal. 85
The possibilities for future developments are boundless, ranging
from USPS estimates that their workload will continue to increase to
some analysts predicting drops in Postal Service business, leading to
higher prices and eventually the system's collapse. ^6
The Postal Service has become involved in Generation II services,
such as INTELPOST and E-COM, despite vocal opposition and FCC claims of
regulatory jurisdiction. 87 it has principally relied on serving large
volume customers, although the original Electronic Mail Service System
(EMSS) was to have had the capability
to deliver first and third class letter mail to its destina-
tion mail box within one to four hours, for priority mail,
or overnight for non-priority, anywhere in the United States,
But because of uncertainties over the USPS role in the field of elec-
tronic communications, work on EMSS stopped, and only the spin-off,
E-COM, was retained. 89
It seems that for short- to mid-term success, the USPS must aggres-
sively pursue Generation II electronic mail service, including services
for individual mailers as well as large-volume mailers. Even in going
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this far, the opposition is (and will be) quite fierce, for oppo:)pponents
fear that USPS will use these [Generation II] services as astepping stone toward a more extensive use of electronic com-
"veroTth'
"''"^ generation III systems. Representatives of the telecommunications industry fear that the USPSwill be pushed m this direction by a rapid and substantial
sJI"L"5o°'
^^^^^-^1-^ to Electronic Communications
The issues abound in this new area, since it is evidently the wave
of the future. Electronic communications will increasingly permeate
American society and the definition of the postal service's role is not
yet clear, although it is being actively framed in a back door manner.
The Postal Service itself is eschewing involvement in Generation III
communications, even if this is eventually detrimental to its exist-
91ence
.
This is especially important because of the more traditional issues
of the postal service as a public service which inhabit the coming elec-
tronic world. The postal system has proven to be remarkably successful
in insuring privacy of the mails, in providing universal mail service,
free flow of publications through the mail, and international postal ex-
change. The electronic future, if not under as keen a service referee
as the postal service, might present some quite serious threats.
As the private control of the telegraph was feared for its value in
terms of speculation, "the new electronic communications offer a field
of speculation to profit-seekers— the field of communication barter. "^^
Possible barriers to access to information would be lack of universal
service capabilities, educational handicaps, and insufficient financial
resources
.
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But probably the most important kp.. ^^ ^o-r •
what instituucns an indLI"" t:iXsZr.\riT.T.:ll'
wn-n
^^^ysities, libraries, news services and publishers
rtaff^TcL:n?:NT^^ P-vlde aLess ^o^^their
How, then, can dissidents (from the large and acceptable institutions of
society) gain access to information? Non-profit organizations might .
lose their privileged status (albeit, an often attacked one) on special
rates. The privacy of the mails would be threatened, and freedom of the
press might be further endangered by everconcentrated corporate power '
(in electronic communications). The very privacy of the total of one's
life might be threatened by computer knowledge, through two-way interac-
tive systems, of what you read, where you shop, what you eat, when you
shower, etc.
Finally, what are the implications for democracy in a nation
where shopping, banking, reading a book or newspaper, or even
working can be done from the home?94
As was the case with the telegraph (see Chapter III), the USPS is
letting its role be defined by others in not aggressively pushing into
new technologies. This appears to be a reflection of two major elements
of the USPS and the postal system's institutional history (as the Post
Office Department and USPS)
: 1) the belief of the USPS in the corporate
model which narrowly defines the public role of postal service in this
burgeoning field, although theoretically allowing for more aggressive
entry into electronic communications; and 2) the historical circumstances
wherein the postal system has had the limited role of helping to develop
new technologies, but only until the private sector was able to fund the
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necessary development. Thus, although Mr. Morse developed the electro-
magnetic telegraph under the auspices of the Post Office Department, the
public realm hesitated, and private enterprise still operates the tele-
graph lines. In 1959, Speed Mail was put into development, only to be
killed in January, 1961, when J. Edward Day became Postmaster General.
Speed Mail would be prepared on a special post office form and
sealed. A machine would open the letter, scan it, transmit itto the receiving post office where it would be reproduced,
folded, sealed, and delivered. ^5
It is not just research and development which the postal service
lacks (or has lacked), but also the ability to act upon the developments
it makes. Repeatedly, the Post Office is restricted in its role, which
later undermines its service capabilities. Whether electronic communi-
cations will be the ultimate threat to USPS survival will be seen in the
next few years.
There has been a gap between the promises of service delivery im-
provement made by the promoters of reorganization and that actually de-
livered. The Postal Reorganization Act itself states that:
The United State Postal Service shall be operated as a basic
and fundamental service to the people by the Government of the
United States, authorized by the Constitution, created by Act
of Congress, and supported by the people. The Postal Service
shall have as its basic function the obligation to provide
postal services to bind the Nation together through the per-
sonal, educational, literary, and business correspondence of
the people. It shall provide prompt, reliable, and efficient
services to patrons in all areas and shall render services to
all communities. The costs of establishing and maintaining
the Postal Service shall not be apportioned to impair the
overall value of such service to the people. 96
Critics point out not just the lack of improvement in postal service but
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the deterioration which has occurred.
What is the best example of something in this country thatdoesn t work as well as it once did? It's a tough choice, buttor lots of people the answer is the Post Office. With thearrival last month of the 20-cent stamp, first-class postal
rates have increased more than 150 percent in the last 10years—better than double the decade's inflation rate-andpoor service is increasingly annoying to millions. 97
From the Kappel Commission's recommendations, which were based on
bringing a "superb service" to the American people, to PRA promises of a
reliable and efficient service, to the widespread dissatisfaction with
the service the USPS provides: why is there such disparity? Jonathan
Alter wrote that, "After all, despite its name, 'service' is no longer
its priority: money is."^^ John Tierney attributes perceived failure
to "unrealistic expectations.
. .inflated by the rhetoric of enthusias-
tic reformers who needed to convince others of the reorganization's vir-
tues. The National Academy of Public Administration apparently be-
lieved that perceptions are dependent upon your contact with the USPS
(as an individual mailer, a business, a postal worker, USPS management,
etc.), and that both service delivery and perception of such can be im-
proved. Kathleen Conkey wrote that:
When people want to denigrate government, the Postal Service
is often their example, not only because it is familiar, but
because service deterioration has been steady and visible . -'-^^
The Postal Service defends its service delivery, at least to the point
of stating that, "The Roper Report. . .finds that consumers continue to
rate postal service highly."!^-'- Analysts have been skeptical, since
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there xs some question if a five-fold choice of opinion withgood as the central category (and most frequent choice? aposition usually designated by a neutral terl nT.
such as "neither good nor bad " a^^nr^! ^
expression
tive t&<^r Mf T.,Ki- 109 ^ ^o^' s an adequate and objec-c est o public opinion. 102
What are the service characteristics of the USPS? Firstly, there
is delivery performance. This is what much criticism centers around:
the reliability and speed of the mails. If you mail a letter or package
to some distant spot, how soon will it be delivered-or will it be de-
livered?
The USPS instituted a new measurement device, called the Origin-
Destination Information System (ODIS)
, to better evaluate its stamped,
first class mail service. The standard for delivery success is 95% with-
in its overnight, two-day, and three-day delivery areas. The overnight
boundaries are locally determined, two-day delivery is expected within
a radius of 600 miles, and three-day delivery is expected everywhere
else in the United States.
Standard 1973 1977 1981
Overnight 92%* 95% 95%
Two- day 80% 90% 86%
Three-day 81% 91% 87%
The figures above are representative of the earlier rise and then
deterioration of the service delivery performance in the years since
ODIS was first instituted. Thus, even within USPS's own goal structure,
^Percentages are the portion of mail which met the delivery stan-
dards.
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the Postal service is failing in its delivery perfor^nce. This is ^-
welcome news to consumers, aggrevated by the fact that the measuring de-
vices of overnight, two-day, and three-day service do not .ean that a
letter has to actually be delivered in those spans for it to meet the
standard. Why? Because the USPS does not include Sundays or holidays
as days in which the letter is in the n>ail, and because the time mea-
surement is only from the point a letter is face cancelled (at a sorting
post office) to the time it reaches the last delivery unit.^O^
The reasons for the poor performance of the USPS include the amount
of misdirected mail, due to operator error on the LSMs (without a recall
key), machinery error, computer forwarding delays, massing of mail and
regional centralization, and changes in airline schedules. Promis.es of
improvement stem from the installation of optical character recognition
equipmentl05 ^ar code readers, which will increase productivity and
give more accurate sorting. (With 58 billion letters sent per year, a
1% error rate mearis 600 million missent letters.) Regardless, the de-
livery system is falling short of the goals established by the Postal
service itself, and the public is aware of this performance.
The centralization of mail delivery is also perceived as a deteri-
oration of service. Beginning in 1978, the USPS issued new regulations
which mandated use of curbside boxes or central locked boxes for resi-
dents in new housing. Interestingly enough, businesses (because of
their mail volume, presumably) still have the option of to-the-door de-
livery. "'"^^ The new regulations were designed primarily for economic
savings. (Cluster boxes or centrally located boxes cost about half of
what front door delivery costs, with curbside delivery somewhere in be-
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tween.) The Postal Service is enthusiastically promoting this trend:
Jo.f.rr '° °f centralized delivery the
luSSri t'^''
''''
^'^^ regulations t;a thor ze the purchase, installation, and maintenance ofneighborhood delivery and collection boxes and parce! lockersThe most cost efficient of all delivery methods! cen'raUzeddelivery, serves apartments and groups of curbslde boxes aswell as neighborhood delivery and collection boxes. Of the68.5 million deliveries served by city carriers, approximately23 3 percent are now centralized, while 49.5 pe;cent are doordeliveries and 18.9 percent are curbline.108
^
Collections at collection boxes have been curtailed also. "The
number of collections, especially evenings, Sundays, and holidays, has
declined; so has the number of collection boxes, from 355,000 in 1973 to
275,000 in 1980. "109
Routes for mail carriers have been more rationalized, i.e., tight-
ened up, so that the number of mail carriers has declined while the num-
ber of delivery points has increased. This means that the carriers have
less time to spend at each address, especially with increasing delivery
centralization; consequently, there is less of a social presence by mail
carriers in the neighborhood. Since mail carriers may be understood to
serve more than a simple mail carrying role, this is a social service
loss to the community. A letter carrier, for example, may be an infor-
mal authority presence, cognizant of the neighborhood and its residents,
and of any abnormal conditions, and serve as a substitute for the more
coercive police presence in a neighborhood. This is lost as the carrier
loses contact with the people in the community, and as he rushes through
his mail route.
Post office hours have been curtailed, so that post offices are no
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longer open the whole day on Saturday, but only ^til noon. Staffing
has been cut, as well as hours. This ™ay be an entirely defensible „ay
to run the Post Office, but It brings with It problems because of expec-
tations for certain levels of public service.
Six-day mall delivery has been threatened several times, although
customers are presently protected through Fiscal Year 1984 from cuts to
five-day dellvery.llO As recently as April of 1980, Postmaster General
Bolger warned that cuts In subsidies would necessitate service cutbacks,
among these, possibly, curtailing six-day service."! And the National
Academy of Public Administration's study concludes that
In spite of the political problems Involved, the potentialsavings from reduced He llverles are too or... ^„ L r-'m,^ r„Tly discardeX-USPS .ho„1H p erlodi-^^lT;rg;;^., ,.P~"k
iHii^S£iL c^hedule i n U^r ot current lnUMr,l. operat onaT "and budgetary conditions .-'-'-'^ ' — ~
No doubt the Postal Service will review the potential savings, and again
push for service delivery reductions. This is in line with a decrease
in delivery frequency over decades,
.^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^
The closing of small post offices has continued, though at a rate
moderated by Congress. The small post offices, vulnerable to the ra-
tionalization process, were targeted in a 1975 GAO report, which sug-
gested that great savings and no service loss would attend the closing
of 12,000 small post offices. Postmaster General Benjamin Bailar,
despite Congressional resistance, closed two hundred post offices with-
in a three-month span, and reviewed closing many more.^^^ Congress re-
acted by stopping the closings through the Postal Reorganization Act of
1976.
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ac-
The 1976 amendments were a rlpar- -^^a u
rural America, aad PosLl^^sLL
'irg:re?:r^h:':!"'
«g to^flght the corporate
.acMnary ofX^Ltsirslit!"
At the same time as thpc;p GP-r-<rT^« ^ jnese se vice trends occurred generally, the
USPS has paid increasingly close attention to business needs. Programs
for cost-reduction for pre-sorted mail, suggested to be in excess of
tual pre-sort costs at times, have grown since their first introduction
under the USPS. Programs such as INTELPOST, E-COM, optical scanning
readers, and ZIP Code + 4 are aimed specifically at the large volume
mailer and include discounts. The Postal Service claims this attention
is dictated by the fact that businesses are the main users of the mail,
,t:hat money is easier to save here (e.g., through presorting), and that
in second-class, third-class, and fourth-class mail there is competition
which threatens the postal system's market.
So the USPS has been more visibly attentive to business while serv-
ice delivery expectations have changed. This experience reflects on the
government, for the USPS as a governmental enterprise is considered a
part of the government. There has been no explicit acknowledgement,
though, that the Postal Service is or should be a service-for-fee or-
ganization. Such an explicit statement, legitimated through the poli-
tical process in some form, might diffuse concern over changes in postal
services
.
Conclusions
,
The modem USPS is a much different organization than the old Post
Office Department. It provides a different type of postal service des-
185
pite the fact that it still delivers lettPrc=ers, parcels, newspapers, maga-
zines, fruit trees, and various other products.
Evaluated by the terms of the Kappel Commission intentions and the
PRA, the USPS has been a limited success. As a positive public enter-
prise, incorporating social, cultural, educational, and political values
as well as organizational and economic ones, it is a break with more
traditional understandings about a political institution.
The Kappel Commission was interested fundamentally in producing a
mail system as close to the private corporate model as possible. In-
deed,
-most members" favored a privately controlled postal system. The
goals of increased managerial autonomy, a clear line of responsibility,
depoliticization, and budgetary and rate making control were intended to
let the postal service act in a much more privatized manner. In very
many ways, the success of the Kappel Commission has led to certain fail-
ures of the postal system. There are several reasons for this.
The historical role of the Post Office has been to provide services
to the public in terms of delivery the mail as efficiently and quickly
as possible. Mail delivery (and various associated services) was the
primary goal; and the political connections to the general public,
through Congress, insured a certain amount of responsiveness. This was
most vividly apparent in the success of Rural Free Delivery.
The Post Office Department was also a limited service, able to sub-
sidize new industries but not to operate those industries itself. This
meant that, in general, it was an important factor in the development of
the infrastructure necessary for the commercial and industrial growth of
the country. Without challenging business, it promoted business develop-
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ment. Thus, although there have been sporadic calls for limiting its
mandate, particularly the private express statutes pertaining to first
class mail, these have been isolated and unsuccessful.
The problems the Post Office Dpeartment accumulated in the twentieth
century did not mean that it was moribund, and the transition to a public
corporation was not necessarily the best or only answer for these diffi-
culties. More attention to the Post Office Department's capital needs
and to modernization, by Congress and the Executive, and some reorgani-
zation and budgeting changes could have been instituted, perhaps being
a less expensive and less dramatic move. Identification of these needs
at the point in time after Chicago's post office "seizure" might have
been an acceptable response to bring about Congressional legislation.
After all, the problem was visible, identified (through President John-
son's appointment of a Presidential Commission to study the Post Office
Department), and ripe for legislative recommendations. But the Kappel
Commission was a panel representing business interests and primed to in-
terpret the needs of the postal system from such a perspective. And the
period was one in which business methods were increasingly being applied
to government agencies (e.g., PPBS)
, and when the success of government
corporations, at all levels of the federal structure, was being ac-
claimed.
Whatever the ifs (a distraction common to sports fans), the Kappel
Commission's recommendations were largely instituted by way of the PRA.
The present USPS is its child; in Kappelian terms it is successful.
The USPS has reached almost unimagined heights in managerial auto-
nomy, including the 1981 Board of Governors' overruling of the PRC
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reconnnended rate decision, and the subsequent introduction of the twenty
cent sta:^. Management has been able to set its own agenda, and act on
that agenda, to a much greater degree than the old Post Office Depart-
ment ever could. Emphasis on business-oriented customers, benefit-cost
analysis, and limited Taylorism and automation in the workplace all have
been part of the management agenda. Responsibility has also been more
centralized in the Postmaster General and the Board of Governors, with-
out distracting separate authorities as in the Post Office Department.
But this has had the consequence of making the USPS aloof from the
broad public interest in mail delivery. It has given the USPS a much
closer identification with business management, and generated a poor
public image of responsiveness. It has caused the social, educational,
and cultural goals cited by Congress to decrease in importance relative
to the economic, marketing, and organizational goals favored by manage-
ment. It has, in some important ways, undermined the Postal Service's
public character.
This has been helped along by the depoliticization of the postal
establishment. By removing the influence of Congress and the executive
almost completely, the USPS is able to operate in its own quasi-govern-
mental world, largely unscathed by public input except when it runs
across opposition from regulatory bodies such as the PRC or the FCC, or
in rare cases a perturbed Congress. This is in contrast to a Congres-
sionally controlled Post Office Department or to a Post Office Depart-
ment designed to be run by the Executive with significant authority but
also tied to notions of administrative responsibility. The limitations
are not insignificant ones, but they remain tangential to daily opera-
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tlcns. However, politics is not ll:,lted to the „ea of government ac-
tion; by insulating daclsionn^king in a public corporation £ro. Congress,
power is really being transEoliticizad. in this case to the
..nage.ent
structure and the interest groups they derive fro. and interact with.
In the case of the USPS, this translates to the nation's businesses and
heavy mailers.
Reorganizing the Post Office Department "removed it from poli-tics only xn the sense that it became much more difficult forthe congressional committees to control. (Before the reor-ganization the House committee was particularly influential.)The first board of governors of the Postal Service came fromthe nation s business leadership, and the executive came fromindustry as well.-!-!/
"Politics" did not disappear, but a change did occur in the iocus of
operation and the actors involved. The loss of public accountability
through the loss of Congressional influence may have been the largest
negative of the reorganization. Relevant to this is the inability to
realize local and national public needs through politics and the post
office. Government problems as a whole are now divorced from USPS prob-
lems. Thus, "The total number of Postal Service workers was reduced
[after reorganization] while new public service jobs were being financed
by Congress. "11^
Similarly, rates have risen with unprecedented speed under the
USPS. By removing the political element and direct Congressional con-
trol over rates, the PRA made rate setting a professionalized adminis-
trative chore.
The Postal Service has achieved some success with its
authority, creating a $612 million surplus for Fiscal Year
new budgetary
1982.119
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"hetha. this is the short-te™
.esult of the twenty cent sta^ or the
beginning of a longer te™ trend is oncleat, though unless the USPS «re
aggressively pursues new technologies while at the sa^e ti™e addresses
its i^age and service problems with the general public, the deficits „ay
yet be record in this decade. Indeed, so.e analysts conceive as a
realistic possibility the collapse of the postal system within fifteen
years if electronic communication evolves as expected. Yet this is cer-
tainly a tentative conclusion.
Societal goals can be related to the present USPS in two areas,
postal centralization and carrier mail delivery. Though not completely
separable, they allow for an understanding of both what is and what
could be.
Postal centralization has been brought about for efficiency and
economy reasons. Better service within the centralization schemes of
the postal service means moderated rate hikes and more efficiency be-
cause of mechanization, closing of small post offices as well as limited
hours at many of those remaining, the massing of mail for certain sort-
ing times, less employees, and a change in how mail is collected,
routed, and delivered. But this has other social effects beside the
change in these specific activities.
The manner by which mail is distributed has further implications
for the local community as well as the region. Under Post Office De-
partment rules, postmasters had to live in the area served by the post
office; the PRA abolished this rule. Presently, sorting is likely done
at a distant post office, and employees there have no familiarity with
the original locality. The local post office cuts down hours, and be-
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co.es, increastagl,.
.n economic liaMUty. subject to economic scrutiny
by the USPS ^aagement. The Florence post offtce story, referred to
previously, is a good case in point.
•01062? Florence merchants seek o™ zip code," relates the story
of local merchants and others who „ant their old zip code back, and the
old hours at their substation reinstated. One reason for the change is
that there is a Main Street. Florence, and a Main Street, Northampton,
with many buildings having conunon addresses as well as a common zip code
of 01060. Merchants and businessmen in both Northampton and Florence
complain of frequently receiving missent mail, although Northampton Post-
master Alfred T. Healy maintains that "We are getting very few complaints
on mail in Northampton. "121 The article reports that:
At one time Florence had the zip code 01062, but it was later
revoked as the postal service began streamlining Its opera-
i
tions.
And the Florence Business and Civic Association wants theFlorence post office open from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m., as it was be-fore Its hours were cut back last year [to 8:30-1 and 2-
4 : 30 j . I'^l
They have gathered a petition of more than five hundred signatures.
Postmaster Healy was quoted as saying that, "By giving Florence a
zip code, it would do nothing for our office. No savings for us."123
Further, Healy indicated that the business volume is not sufficient in
Florence to justify keeping the postal station open all day.
The story indicates the gist of postal service policy in centrali-
zation and cost efficiency at the expense of local customer service.
What is in it for his post office? Nothing, evidently, but unbalanced
books. There is no place for significant public input, whether to rati-
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fy the arrangement or to adjust it to .eet public determined needs.
Something as seemingly mundane as the type of delivery service ^
present in a community can have an effect on its social character, re-
lating to neighborliness, safety, and appeal of the neighborhood. For
instance, the difference between having a carrier walk a route and
either drive or deliver to cluster boxes can be significant.
A familiar face in the neighborhood changes relationships in the
community, and gives people a chance for social intercourse, whether
they are elderly people confined at home or children playing in the
yard, to whom the mail carrier presents an outreach to the larger (pub-
lic) world and a positive social image. The friendly postal carrier is
a character of legend, and not too closely related to the more modern
breed, glued to the car seat or walking briskly through the rounds.
Further than neighborliness, though, the postal carrier provides a
noncoercive, informal authority presence who is aware of the normal con-
ditions in the neighborhood and who notices abnormal conditions .^^^
This is in contrast to the policeman who drives the beat in the car with
his rifle or gun.
It is true, modern communities are in many ways not closely related
to the neighborly communities of the past. But is the postal system a
reflection of this or a cause? Is there not social value in reaching
for positive elements of social existence? The appeal of a friendly,
informal and yet safe neighborhood, with a governmental employee at ease,
concerned about the community, and a positive representative of govern-
ment surely contrasts with our current image of the Postal Service.
In sum, the USPS has recently achieved a short-term (FY 1983) finan-
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cial success, but with significant change in the understanding of a pub-
lic service's political responsiveness. This is a failure of the cor-
porate .odel of public enterprise as measured m one sense, but should
not be considered a failure of the possibility for positive public en-
terprise. It is, in a sense, an abdication of political will by Con-
gress, although one can understand how the constraints on Congress' role
may have lead to the ullUngness to release the Post Office to a eore
rationalised corporate form. One colunmist, in asking who Is to blame
for a postal service which concentrates on balanced books at the expense
of service, wrote:
TTae politicians in Congress, but not for the predictable rea-sons. The real reason that they're to blame is that theydon trespect their own profession enough. That's right thepoliticians took politics out of the Post Office, and we're
ail suffering because of it.
The Post Office worked best before World War II, when it
was entirely [not entirely] political. In those days thelocal postmaster was appointed by the local congressman. That
was patronage, all right, but a kind of patronage that we
could learn a lot from today. If the congressman appointed
his drunk brother-in-law, he had to face the wrath of his con-
stituents. So the appointments were usually good. 125
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The history of the United States Post Office shows how the fulfill-
-nt of a public service function, and perceptions concerning the suc-
cess in that role, has been shaped by the American political process.
The Post Office allows for a unique comparison of how differing organi-
zational structures relate to the public service function, because it
has been both a department of gover^ent (as the Post Office Department)
and a government corporation (as the Postal Service). The history of
postal policy has been characterized by four themes which are conceptu- '
ally distinct but overlapping in practice: 1) the Post Office as a na-
tional institution, 2) the Post Office as a service-provider, 3) the
Post Office as a subsidizer of commercial development, and 4) the Post
Office as an institutional example of the change in the nature of the
understanding concerning the relationship between administration and
politics. This chapter will develop these themes.
The first characteristic of the postal service is that of a wholly
national entity, whose comprehensiveness had never been seriously at-
tacked. From the first conception of a postal system, this implication
has been apparent, beginning with the Revolutionary Era's Committees of
Correspondence and continuing to the present time. Even those who pres-
ently attack retention of the private express statutes by the United
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States Postal Service (USP<?^ ^nn ^l bPS) still envision postal service as a compre-
hensive service to all citizens. (One ma, ,nestion, however, whether
the economic underpinnings of their arg^ent might not undermine the
comprehensive role, and finally the universal service feature cf the
postal system. By allowing the marketplace to function freely in the
area of postal service, the Post office would be put in the position of
having to provide service to the least economically viable patrons while
private business could "skim" the most profitable portions cf the postal
business. This would undermine the universal feature of postal service
as wall as lead to further attacks on the nature of governmental opera-
tion of public services.)
In a country which prides itself on its federalism and the division
of responsibilities and functions among the various levels of govern-
ment, the postal service appears to be a major exception to that sharing
of powers. States do not retain their own postal systems as they do
their own militias. They do not provide a portion of the operating
costs of the national postal system as they have and do for developing
and maintaining the interstate highway system. So, as almost any exam-
ple illustrates, from regulatory activity over electric rates to distri-
buting food stamp benefits, the postal function is a rare instance of a
purely national power and service.
Yet in an important sense, this national power had not meant, at
least until recently as a result of the Postal Reorganization Act (PRA)
,
that the postal power operated at the expense of local government, a
general condition expected by Antifederalists concerning national/state
relations. In fact, the Post Office Department was uniquely responsive
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to the needs
.nd desi.es
.He ci.i.e..,
.H.o.gK necessary connec-
tion
.o Congress and to the local postmasters
„Ho provided a local pres-
ence and tie to the community .
1
AS the country grew, post offices sprouted in reaction to demands
for mail service. The parallel development of roads, railroads, steam-
ships, etc., was a boon to the developing nation. As f...ers demanded
Rural Free Delivery (RFD)
,
Congress and the Post Office responded.
Though the system was not perfectly responsive, and certainly did oper-
ate within the constraints of the peculiarly American political culture,
the Post Office was generally a success story. And its service charac-'
teristics continually improved, well into the twentieth century.
In a real sense, the postal service was a facilitator both of local
development and the ability of diverse communities and states to be ap-
prised of national politics and to influence those politics to their
advantage. Prerogatives were enhanced rather than limited. No
questioned the benevolence of the national postal power in a rapidly
growing society, except its expansion into new service areas such as the
telegraph or banking functions. But even these were not seen as: threats
of national government dominance over local political units, but rather
as threats to private development. Accordingly, postal service was
limited in certain meaningful ways.
The national Post Office has been a representative of postive na-
tional government activity since the founding of the nation. ^ No one
suggests giving this power to the states for the history and nature of
the postal mandate mitigates against this. The perceived successes and
failures of the postal service are considered against the standard of a
own
one
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national government's ability to art ir.i c c m a positive, beneficial manner.
But a corollary must be added because, since reorganization in
1971, the nature of the mandate has changed. Although the USPS is still
understood to be a part of the national government in its guise as a
"government corporation," its very structure and service orientation,
and so its essential nature, has changed.^ The USPS remains a national
service, but it is no longer a department of government and no longer a
direct national government function. It is often referred to as "quasi-
public," which is as close as many can come to an accurate characteriza-
tion. (When a success, it is often characterized as a private corpora-
tion, but when it is a failure, the USPS often "reverts" to governmental
status and a governmental role. Thus, it makes money as a corporation,
and it provides poor service as an example of government inefficiency.)
The national service orientation is retained by universal service and
subsidization of certain classes of mail, but the nature of that service
has been changed because of the transformation concerning the political
basis of its mandate, from one of Congressional politics or Executive
responsibility to that of a public corporation.
The second characteristic of the Post Office is that of a service-
provider rather than a revenue-producer throughout most of its history.
This has been debated over time and severely moderated by the PRA in
1971, so that now the USPS is in a netherworld of being both or neither.
The entire history of the U.S. Post Office demonstrates the subordinate
role of economic considerations as compared to the operation of a private
organization.
Although early in its history proponents viewed revenue-production
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as a possibility (and ever since, ^ny political figures have attempted
to so Shape the Post Office), Congress has rather willingly expanded
service and incurred deficits, despite the rhetoric. This is evident
beginning with the earliest period, when Congress mandated that any
leftover funds were to be allocated to new post offices and new postal
facilities. And this continued until reorganization.
With the Postal Reorganization Act, the USPS still was not n^ndated
to make money (i.e., profits), but rather to reach "self-sustenance,"
thus putting the Postal Service in a corporate mold without availing it
of similar benefits of profit generation. The critical step of rever-
sing the long-held mandate of service primacy over fiscal responsibility
was accomplished.
The reasons for this had to do with the ever increasing Post Office
deficit, the perceived deterioration of service, the saturation of the
nation with traditional postal services, the fiscal problems of the na-
tion generally, the growth of competing national programs (in terms of
allocating funds), the desire for administrative responsibility, the
growth in legitimacy and political expediency of the government corpora-
tion, and the rising influence of the business-corporate ethic in the
provision of government services. All this allowed for a narrower mea-
sure of the goals and benefits of postal service provision. Thus, the
perceived needs of the national government and inclinations of those
legislating policies coincided to transform the purpose and political
meaning of the Post Office without, in some ways, realizing the trans-
formation thereby generated. A corporate model would, while paying at-
tention to service and legislated mandates to provide such service, em-
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phasize certain considerations while at th» =n i e same time cater to the major
customers of postal services the u •, large businesses and corporations in
American society. And this would appear to he natural in a society in-
creasinsly shaped hy the power and political influence of business/
In a tangible way, though, the USPS is caught in a realm peculiar
to the public corporation form. Although it espouses self-sustenance it
is restricted in how it may operate, e.g., into what areas of new tech-
nology it can expand (Just as the Post Office Department had always been
limited)
.
When the USPS chose to enter the electronic co^unciations
field, important elements of the society rose to block its entry and
limit government enterprise in significant ways. Delays in entering
such areas have usually been sufficient to allow private sector develop-
ment of the field which then serves to delegltlmate a public (postal)
"takeover" of private industry.
This relates to the third characteristic, that of a limited postal
service which serves most essentially to promote commercial development
and not to displace it. In this sense, the Postal Service has always
bought services which would promote private development of new Indus-
tries but has always met with unyielding resistance to its own efforts
to enter those fields. This is the case with E-COM where the USPS uses
RCA to electronically transmit messages which the USPS then delivers as
hard copy.
While highlighting the unchanging nature of the support for com-
mercial development which the Post Office has played (and does play),
attention should be drawn to a change which may be occurring under the
USPS. This change has to do with the lessened degree of oversight of
2Q7
:ure
,
1
as con-
pursuing
postal activities in the reorganized Post Off.vS i±^ a f ice, and so the ability of
the USPS to expan. its activities into ateas „hich pteviousl, would have
been defined as illegitimate by the prevailing political cult
This tentative step is tolerated because of a narrowly-defined cor-
porate argument which construes entry into a portion of a market
ducive to its economic intere^fc. At. arests. n advance in the sense of
possible new roles it i <^ ai oIS lso a regressive step away from a public
accountab ility
.
This suggests a critical weakness of the public corporation model.
Although it is freer to initiate new activities because it is more de-
tached from public control, this freedom represents a lack of identifi-
cation with public ne.ds and desires, except in a marketplace-responsiv.
sense. The process means that the public corporation model may lead to
a loss of public purposefulness when compared to activity based on di-
rect government attachment. Historically, for the Postal Service, gov-
ernmental involvement has meant a broad public service orientation
coupled with a purposeful support of commercial development and a lim-
ited mandate in terms of development as a public industry. The reor-
ganization in some ways loosens the constraints on the latter feature,
but in other ways it ties the USPS into the dominant corporate model, so
that any novel developments occur within that rather limited conceptual
framework
.
Furthermore, this indicates a change in the creation of public
policy. In earlier times, the Post Office was a tool of active public
policy, controlled by Congress and Congressional politics. Congress
funded the Post Office Department, and it put constraints upon the Post
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Office which were consistent with the political vf.wx c ie concerning the role
of government and its institutions Whil^ ^K
•
c c . e this meant that the Post Of-
fice was limited to a role of helping to promote co^^ercial development
(and not becoming a manufacturing industry itself), this was largely
consistent with the direction of mainstream American public policy. The
loosening of these constraints by the lack of Congressional oversight
and active involvement in Post Office policy does potentially allow
greater leeway by the Postal Service, but it also removes the Post Of-
fice from the context of Congressional and public policymaking.
This inhibits the possibility of changing public conceptions con-
cerning the nature of public enterprise. As a result, attempts to pro-
mote other positive public goals are sidelined. This not only affects
current service but also, perhaps more importantly, the conception and
implementation of new postal service mandates in a rapidly changing era.
Not only do broad considerations of employment get removed from govern-
mental consideration, but other questions of what new public purposes
can be met by an established public entity are obscured. Therefore, the
notion that the Post Office might serve certain social functions, e.g.,
visiting elderly people to help them fill out forms, check their needs
for medical and food supplies, or even provide company for them, similar
to what rural postmen do in Sweden, would not only be limited by our
cultural predilections (as in previous times) but now by the limited
notion of public service which the USPS carries with it. The "freedom"
of a public corporation thus plays a significant role in restricting the
possibility of public purposefulness in the Post Office.
Thus, the postal system operates in a changed political context
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Which, aUHou,H aUcwins
. ,.e«e. a„.„. p.s.al o.sani.a.ion
initiative,
.ces so subject to syste.ic constraints pethaps „..e sisni-
fleant than the freedom it now eniovs AnH ^h
•
j y . d this prerogative coupled
With purposelessness
.elates to the centtai p.ohle„ of an, positive sov-
em^ental pro^tion of public goals. Government has so farmed out its
essential functions and made disparate its national, centralizing poten-
tial, that a new public philosophy based on public purposefulness „ould
have a tremendouslv diffirn^^ h^k 4- -> .y lt cult job of translating that goal into institu-
tional activity.
The fourth characteristic is the change in the Post Office from a
government agency rooted In Congressional prerogative and responsible
and effective administrations to a public corporation based on princi-
ples of corporate organization and related administrative techniques.
The result is a postal service which has a changed orientation, albeit
in a changed society.
The early period of the Post Office shows a public service con-
trolled by Congressional politics and prerogatives. The Post Office was
administered by the executive with the goal of
-good" administration,
coupled with the impetus for postal decisionmaking and drawing of broad
public policy in Congress. Congress had an integral part in appointing
postmasters and identifying post roads. Congress controlled rate making
nd determined (in most instances) where the line lay between "legiti-
te" public enterprise and the realm of private enterprise, such as in
the case of the telegraph system.
The rapid physical growth of the United States in the nineteenth
century was conducive to distributive Congressional policymaking. The
a
ma
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push toward the frontiers „ith concurrent demands for postal service put
pressure on Congressmen to deliver postal services, and Congress oMig-
Ingly did so.
At the sa^e ti.e, the Post Office beca.e a policy vehicle for pat-
ronage. The Post Office was "politicized- markedly with the advent of
the Jacksonians. As a significant part of the national government and
a presence in every state and locality, the Post Office was a readily
available and useful tool for patronage needs and demands.
Changes in the American political world at the turn of the century
were reflected in the Post Office. Several events contributed to the
change from the earlier Post Office heavily influenced by Congress to
the twentieth century Post Office which was increasingly dominated by
the Post Office Department. The Pendleton Act of 1883 regarding civil
service reform, the "closing" of the frontiers, party realignment in
1896, Rural Free Delivery, increasing professionalization in society,
and the development of a big business economy all played a part in that
change. The result was a Post Office which was less tied to the exigen-
cies of Congressional policymaking (and former ideas of administrative
effectiveness) and one more immediately responsive to the developing
bureaucratic emphasis in government. (In a certain way, this made for
a postal service which was more removed from Congress yet at the same
time even more sensitive to its actions concerning the Post Office, for
less attention in policy terms could also mean less attention in finan-
cial terms.)
The establishment and growth of RFD signalled such a change in the
Post Office Department. The Post Office became more heavily bureau-
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ing
cratized as the century wore on Tho ^i-y . r e shortcomings of the Post Off
became more evident and calls for reorganization developed, bringi
With them recommendations for rationalized administration. The result
was ultimately a USPS which was "depoliticized, " being not only removed
from Congressional policymaking and politicking but also from the taint
of any meaningful political input by the executive branch. Thus, the
political Post Office Department whose reputation is perhaps without
equal as an example of patronage and politics in government has been
gradually transformed into a public corporation which is largely removed
from national government politics and which is managed on the model of a
private business corporation.
The example of the Post Office makes clear that within the American
political culture a public corporation is limited in its activities.
This brings with it advantages and drawbacks. The USPS is attentive to
service demands, but within a context of market surveys and associated
measures rather than through an actively political process of determin-
ing service needs. It cannot threaten to displace private enterprise,
but only help in its development. It is removed from the main political
arena, Congress, and so is viewed as isolated from the vagaries of poli-
tical infighting, party spoils, and undue public influence. In fact, a
modern corporate form is considered desirable because it is insulated
from public control. And given the size and nature of modern bureau-
cratic enterprises, whether public or private, the ability to act in such
a politically "disdainful" manner is evident.^
While this is descriptive of the contemporary USPS, it is in many
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respects at odds with the larger history o, the Post office. The
legendary political influence in the Post Office Department meant that
the attention to public de„.nds, to party affairs, and to the "hasic
realities" of political intercourse were the staple diet of the Post Of-
fice. B,e Post Office Department had to internalize the vagaries of
electoral politics, of local demands, of Presidential leadership, and of
e nonrationalized administration, rather than be aloof from public inter-
vention and a political context. Although the Post Office Department
did not enjoy managerial autonomy or operation by strict economic effi-
ciency, it certainly was encouraged to focus on public satisfaction and
the political capital which service success generated.
Public corporations are an effort to retreat from this historical
model of public service and achieve public service goals in more market-
oriented ways. They purposefully resemble business operations, with the
important qualifiers that their goal structure is not so clear (because
of the inclusion of public, statutory goals which conflict with their
organizational goals) and that they do answer some public desires (if
only in terms of catering their public images). Iliis changes the nature
of their public service role.
Public corporations are institutions designed to deliver services
based on a recognition of public needs and desires. These publicly
recognized goals have been legislated, so that an institutional struc-
ture represents those basic societal attempts to address certain issues.
The foundation of these modern institutions, then, is laid in explicitly
political action focusing on issues of political substance.
But in the process of establishment, they have been removed from
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much further oolitirai -.•r,^!p i c c l influence. Their nrio-ir,^iu o ig nal mandate derives from aPoUUcal sol.uon.
^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^
-chants..
.He
.e^nUion an, „ve„ene c„„a.. a p.HUc pu.-
posefulness is undermined by the lack ofy cn any well-structured understand-
ing of publicly determined or identified goals.
This Change in postal service reflects a lack of political acumen
and sensitivity because public corporations cannot operate in a political
vacuum, since their mandates and so political impetus derive from the
political structures and actors with which they interact. Narrow but
important service orientations are presentlv hP-inc •y bei g given to largely un-
accountable agencies and authorities. „hUe the .ost acceptable parts
Of the political process shun the "political- fulfillment of avowedly
political needs through aggressive mandates. Political actors Instead
attempt to fulfill the needs of society in the form of public corpora-
tions, such as the USPS, so that the needs are addressed on one level
(symbolically) while they may be Inadequately fulfilled on a service or
political level, aus, although the political system has identified a
problem area and acted, the "solution" provided through a public corpor-
ation may be Inadequate or Irrelevant, given that the problem area may
require different types of political solutions to the dilemmas which
occur
.
This is not a case of simply identifying problems in implementation
and rectifying administrative feedback processes. The nature of a pub-
lic corporation like the USPS is to insulate politicians from the dyna-
mics of the political world, 7 as well as to rationalize its bureaucratic
structure. The politicians apparently prefer to not deal with the dilem-
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mas which may not be solvable; they would rather "solve" problems, win
votes, and secure stability.
What this means for the postal service is that how it is structured
and expectations of how it performs will parallel dominant political
moods. Public corporations are not intended to provide access for poli-
tical dialogue and change, and people often feel powerless, disenfran-
chised, and unable to effect political change through traditional poli-
tical channels
.
From time to time, critics do charge that public authorities
are autocratic, beyond the reach of the people, or unrespon-
sive to public officials, but these criticisms focus on the
very characteristics that advocates of government corporations
regard as virtues. Public authorities provide a relatively
independent base of operations for entrepeneurs in the public
sector, providing managers with administrative power that is
greater than that usually found within the regular hierarchies
and bureaus of government. The corporate form of public
authorities permits jobs to be done and projects completed
without the clamorous debates, recurring compromises, and de-
laying checks and counterchecks that characterize the rest of
American government.^
These very strengths of administrative autonomy, efficiency, and
political aloofness mean that political frustrations may build, since
they are not debated, compromised, checked, and so dealt with or ful-
filled. The purposes of a political system are undermined, in that the
issues which are important to individuals and groups in the society are
addressed, if at all, in a cavalier fashion.
The expectations of what a public enterprise can do or should do
are restrained:
Ideologies of laissez-faire, localism, autonomy, and limited
politics converge to limit the forms and ambitions of public
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enterprise, to preserve the power of groups with narrow and
specialized aims, and to relieve the enterprises themselves
of obligations to respond to broader interests.^
The public, therefore, receives little in the way of participation in or
benefits from a public corporation; public corporations carry the labels
of being inefficient and unresponsive. They "prove" the shortcomings of
government service provision. The fact that public corporations are by
their very structure and purpose not intended to provide political sen-
sitivity as the primary focus is not generally recognized.
Despite being a wholly national entity throughout its existence,
the goals and environment in which the Postal Service operates have
changed. The Post Office Department was essentially a political vehicle
of Congress and the Executive while the USPS is a public corporation
geared towards self-sustenance. The Post Office has always been a pro-
moter of commercial development, but the nature of that commerce has
changed so that in the modern era not only does the USPS promote the
business of large corporations but it also pursues its goals within an
environment increasingly determined by, and conceived by scholars as,
the corporate state. And the USPS is structured on a corporate model as
well. This is a significant difference from the world of eighteenth and
nineteenth century America.
Viewing the Post Office as a public service measured by service
criteria and political responsiveness rather than managerial or corpor-
ate criteria leads to certain conclusions about postal service in United
States. To begin with, the bulk of postal history has included a service
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measurement "internally" within the postal system, through the role of
politics and thus the Post Office's relationship with Congress and the
public. Beginning with Rural Free Delivery and working through the
twentieth century, the Post Office was considered increasingly by the
criteria of administrative and managerial efficiency.
The political and service responsiveness of postal service to the
general public has declined, though specific interests have received
more attention to their needs than was the case in the past. Since this
is in line with the Post Office's mandate, it is not unexpected. How-
ever, this result ties into public feelings about the effectiveness and
legitimacy of government. It is in this context that the case study of
postal service points out the reasons for the failure of the delivery of
adequate public services and the possibility that this trend can be re-
versed by conscious policy choices and political action. This is a
first step in conceptualizing the nature of the problem and so a begin-
ning in building foundations for deliberation and change.
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NOTES
This is not to say that the Post Office Department itself was re-
sponsive, for in many cases it resisted expansion of service and growth
because of economic and/or organizational reasons, but that with Congress
also involved the postal system was a responsive institution.
2Positive in the sense of active, and through most of our history
it has also been a relatively positive experience, despite complaints
from Mason, Washington, and Jefferson, and all through the nation's ex-
istence
.
-^See Chapter V.
^Martin Camoy and Derek Shearer, Economic Democracy; The Chal-
lenge of the 198Qs (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1980), p. 21;
Charles E. Lindblom, Politics and Markets: The World's Political-Eco-
nomic Systems (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1977).
^Effective or "good" administration was an important goal of the
founders, presenting a contrast to the government of the Articles°'of
Confederation. This idea of effective or "good" administration would be
related to the ideas of statesmanship (Herbert J. Storing, "American
Statesmanship: Old and New," in Robert A. Goldwin, ed.. Bureaucrats
,
Policy Analysts, Statesmen: Who Leads ? (Washington, D.C.: American En-
terprise Institute, 1980), leadership qualities (James W. Ceaser,
Presidential Selection: Theory and Development (Princeton: Princeton
University Press
, .1979) , and the search for able personnel at the levels
of policymaking and "service" (Leonard D. White, The Federalists: A
Study in Administrative History 1789-1801 (New York: The Free Press,
19A8). The understanding of "good" administration in the founding era,
then, incorporated the qualities of administrators as being moral,
civic-minded, and public spirited, while also checked in their activ-
ities by the political process and Congress. This contrasts with later
ideas about administration, which center more around efficiency, ration-
alization, and scientific management (Frederick Moser, Democracy and
the Public Service (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968)).
^Bureaucratic politics is a part of the whole mind set which dic-
tates a style of decisionmaking. Ralph Hummel, when writing about bur-
eaucracy and its influence on politics, strikes a relevant note:
In bureaucracy, administration replaces politics. Not poli-
tics as the decision-making center of society—bureaucracy in-
creasingly makes the central decisions that govern public and
private life—but politics as the participatory activity of
citizens cooperating and fighting with one another to work out
solutions to public problems.
Politics of this sort is replaced by purportedly "apoliti-
cal" decision-making of the managerial few. The only thing
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apolitical about such decision-making is that the public isexcluded from the process. The rest of this bureaucratic
apolitics is as political as traditional politics used to bem the sense that through it are determined the ways in whichwe live our lives. Apolitics, in short, is hidden decision-
making which decides the fate of the public but excludes thepublic from the process.
^'Q7T'^^'
Bureaucratic Experience (New York: St. Martin's
rress, ly//;, p. 165.
^Ibid
.
Vnmarie Hauck Walsh, The Public's Business: The Politics andPractices of Government Corp"^tions (Camhridpp, Mp..ch..c.o^^^ . ^ j^j^Press, 1980), pp. 3-4.
^Ibid., 6.
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